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The purpose of this dissertation is to assess the degree to which state legislators are 
responsive to their various constituencies. The guiding research questions are: 1) 
Under what circumstances are state legislators most responsive to their districts, 
parties, and interest group supporters? 2) What drives certain legislators to take 
extreme issue positions? And 3) What explains and what are the consequences of 
state legislative polarization? I propose a theory of conditional responsiveness that 
specifies circumstances (issue type, electoral competition and legislative 
professionalism) under which responsiveness is most likely to occur. I systematically 
test my hypotheses using an original data set that includes information on over 4,000 
state legislators and their districts in 30 different states.  
 
I find legislators to be most responsive to constituents on high salience social issues. 
On lower salience economic issues, state representatives are much more responsive to 
their interest group supporters. In addition, I find members from electorally safe 
districts to be most responsive to their districts as safe members are more likely to 
reflect their district’s demographic and political homogeneity. Legislative 
  
professionalism if found to enhance responsiveness. This discovery supports the view 
of many scholars who saw the professionalization of state legislatures in the latter 
half of the 20th century as a healthy development.  
 
Across the country, I find a good deal of ideological extremism among state 
legislators. This legislative extremism, when aggregated, results in chamber level 
polarization. This polarization cuts into the productivity of the legislatures, making 
stalemate a more common legislative outcome.  
 
Policy responsiveness occurring in state legislatures is a reassuring finding; 
responsiveness, however, is conditional. Certain conditions influence the degree to 
which constituency opinion really matters. Perhaps the most important condition is 
the level of public interest on a given policy issue – when people care, legislators 
respond. This observation has practical implications for our democratic system of 
government. Representatives, without an informed or caring citizenry, can get away 
with straying from the wishes or needs of their constituents. As such, a necessary 
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Chapter 1: Responsiveness in State Legislatures 
 
The laws and processes of state governments intimately affect the lives of all 
Americans. Assisting us into this world are doctors and nurses licensed and certified by 
the state; assisting us out are state licensed and certified morticians. In-between, state 
laws and processes concerning such things as education, welfare, transportation, the 
consumption of alcohol, and the ability to marry, influence the lives of state citizens. The 
devolution revolution of the 1980s and 1990s made state governments even more relevant 
by transferring responsibility for many policies away from the federal government and 
into the hands of the states. Food stamps, Medicaid, and welfare programs – that states 
administer through federal block grants – are examples of policies once primarily the 
domain of the federal government but now largely managed at the state level.  
The oft-cited justification behind the politics of devolution is that state 
governments are “closest to the people.” The assumption is that at this low level of 
government, representatives are particularly attuned to their constituents and uniquely 
able to represent their interests. But, how in touch are they? Certain conditions exist in 
the states including: largely uncompetitive elections (Key 1949; Ranney 1976; Weber, 
Tucker, and Brice 1991; Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993); a citizenry with very little 
information about state politics (Boynton, Patterson, and Hedlund 1969; Jennings and 
Zeigler 1970); and, in some states, only part-time legislative institutions (Rosenthal 
1998). These factors may make this “closest to the people” idea a myth. In this detached 
political environment, it is possible that constituency representation suffers. Furthermore, 
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such an environment seems a perfect setting for elite influence over legislative decision-
making.  
Representative Lenore Barrett (R-ID-26th) and Majority Leader Barbara Currie 
(D-IL-25th) legislate at different ends of the ideological spectrum. Barrett is 
overwhelmingly conservative in her roll call voting behavior, while Currie is a strong 
liberal. Both are ideologically extreme. What differentiates these women politically? One 
is a Democrat and one a Republican, but is that the end of the story? They both ran in 
electorally safe districts (Currie ran uncontested in 1998; Barrett won by a 40 percent 
margin) perhaps making it easier for them to gravitate towards ideological extremes. 
Furthermore, both came from homogeneous districts, as Currie’s was overwhelmingly 
Black and liberal, while Barrett’s was almost entirely White and conservative. Although 
herself a Southern Baptist, Barrett represented a majority Mormon district, which likely 
supports and nurtures her brand of social conservatism.  
Just the opposite of these strong ideological women, Representative Don Moffitt 
(R-IL-94th) and Representative Ben GiaQuinta (D-IN-80th) were very moderate in their 
roll call activity. What made these two men so at home in the ideological middle? Unlike 
Currie and Barrett, GiaQuinta ran in a competitive race in 1998 winning by just a 10 
percent margin. Moffitt, however, won by a comfortable 40 percent margin. Both come 
from districts that are relatively diverse economically and religiously. Moffitt raised 43 
percent of his funds from labor organizations, a real exception among Republicans. Both 
of these men served in divided governments. Could these various facts offer some clue to 
a more systematic pattern behind legislative voting behavior? Throughout this study, I 
will return to these individuals to explicate my findings. 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to broadly assess the roll call responsiveness of 
state legislators to their districts, through a quantitative assessment of approximately 
3,500 legislators in 30 states. In addition to the district, I assess legislative responsiveness 
to more elite party and interest group constituencies along with the influence of different 
demographic and institutional variations on these relationships. The guiding research 
questions are: 1) Under what circumstances are state legislators most responsive to their 
districts, parties, and interest group supporters? 2) What drives certain legislators to take 
extreme issue positions? And 3) What explains and what are the consequences of state 
legislative polarization? 
Democracy through Representation 
Representation is a necessary feature of contemporary democracies. The 
democratic ideal of mass decision-making, what has come to be known as “direct 
democracy,” has, according to James Madison, “little basis in practice.”1 Citizens only 
know or care about a certain number of issues, leaving the rest to be sorted out by a 
subset of the population – our representatives. Acting on behalf of those they represent, 
these officials engage in democratic decision-making on a manageable scale. Not only is 
representation a practical form of government, Madison also suggests that it is a safer 
form of government as it mitigates the violence of faction that can arise through direct 
democracy (Schwartz 1988). 
                                                 
1 Even in ancient Greece, direct democracy was limited to a certain subset of its citizens (Rosenthal 1998, 
p. 7). Besides Athenian democracy, and perhaps town hall meetings in New England, we have few 
examples of pure democracies.  
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The Representational Ideal 
In its simplest form, the ideal representative process goes as follows: Through 
free and fair elections (inclusive suffrage, the right to run for offices, freedom of 
expression, authoritative dissemination of information) citizens periodically choose 
leaders who most closely hold their policy views. Once in office, those elected 
representatives act with a self-interest to be responsive to their constituents. If their 
actions in office prove unpopular back home, they risk being replaced in the next 
election. In An Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs developed both an 
elegant theory of voting behavior and perhaps the clearest statement of this 
representational ideal. When two parties or candidates are competing for majority 
support, they converge on the mass ideological middle with the winner being the party or 
candidate closest to the majority position or the median voter in their district. From the 
individual voter’s perspective, this theory offers them a clear rubric for making a self-
interested voting decision. From the perspective of the system as a whole, this theory 
results in the perfect representation of the entire constituency.  
 This model, while useful as a template for research on voting behavior and 
representation, is by its design simplistic and not entirely accurate in explaining 
representation in the contemporary United States. Voters are not particularly cognizant of 
matters concerning ideology and public policy (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 
1960), and parties along with their aligned interest groups are full of policy-motivated 
activists (Schattschneider 1942; Morehouse 1981; Aldrich 1995; Miller and Schofield 
2003) that work to pull their parties and candidates away from the median voter. 
According to Uslaner (1999) “Public officials don’t stand naked before an 
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undifferentiated mass public. Nor do they jump through ideological hoops. They are 
pushed – by their partisans, party activists, and fellow officeholders.” In primary 
elections, candidates rush to extremes to solidify their base partisans and then, depending 
upon general election competition, run back towards the center. Some critics go so far as 
to argue that instead of representing the interests of ordinary citizens, legislators often act 
as conduits for elite influence over policy outcomes. This fear of elite hegemony is 
illustrated in opinion surveys that show many Americans worry about politicians who are 
acting in a self-interested way that runs contrary to the public good (Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse 2002).  
The true nature of representation in the United States likely falls somewhere 
between the representational ideal and elite hegemony. But how to assess representation? 
How do we know representation when we see it? How should representation work? 
Surely, it is not enough to simply examine the electoral process and, once satisfied that 
elections are free and fair, conclude that the representational ideal has been met. “Unless 
mass views have some place in the shaping of policy, all this talk about democracy is 
nonsense” (Key 1961). 
Identifying “Ideal” Representation 
Edmond Burke famously dichotomized representation as a struggle between 
delegate and trustee notions of representation. Borrowing on what Hobbs termed 
authorization theory, and similar to what Pitken (1967) would term independence theory, 
Burke described his trustee as someone whom citizens authorize to act in their place. 
This legislator takes a great deal of autonomy in carrying out the tasks of representation 
and must only justify positions to their constituents, not consult them before making 
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decisions. Burke found this type of legislator most appealing because he worried that 
ordinary people, given the charge of dictating legislative behavior, would not have the 
necessary knowledge or expertise to properly direct their representatives.  
While Burke found the trustee to be a more practical solution to effective 
representation, in the face of a politically unsophisticated population, this prescription 
falls short of the representational ideal. At the other end of Burke’s continuum, the 
delegate theory suggests that legislators act only on instruction from their constituents. In 
this formulation, there is no room for legislators’ personal opinions, nor for issues 
concerning the quality of the policy or how it may affect the state or country as a whole. 
This prescription of delegate style behavior is much more inline with the representational 
ideal. Observing that in reality representatives fall somewhere between trustee and 
delegate models, others have employed politico theory, which suggests that legislators 
engage in both trustee and delegate behavior depending on the circumstances (Pitkin 
1967). Politico theory takes into account all possibilities and thus predicts very little. One 
important reformulation of the delegate/trustee approach adds a third dimension by 
including actions aimed at the good of the state regardless of delegate desires or district 
wants – what Schwartz (1988) calls transmission belt theory.  
Pluralism, as a theory of representation, focuses on the relationships between 
representatives and organized interests. Under this framework, legislators need not try to 
understand their constituents as a whole, but instead focus their attention on those citizens 
concerned enough about a particular issue to organize. Legislators operating under this 
theory can carry out a more streamlined representational approach because the interest 
group community offers a convenient simplification of the concerns and desires of the 
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citizenry. Critics argue that these groups are potentially unrepresentative and elitist 
(Schattschneider 1960). As such, representatives are misled if they are counting on the 
interest group community to be a microcosm of their district. 
Descriptive representation, in the words of John Adams, values legislators who 
are “an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, and should think, feel, reason 
and act like them.” In short, to be like your constituents, demographically, is the surest 
way to meaningful representation. Opponents of this theory argue that looking like one’s 
district is only a poor substitute for substantive representation in which the constituency 
and legislator share similar policy interests and ideologies regardless of race or ethnicity 
(Fenno 2003).  
In practice, the idea of descriptive representation exists more as a normative claim 
of what some would like to see as opposed to a real description of the way things actually 
are. Overall, legislators come from more privileged and achieving sectors of society. 
They have better education (almost half have a graduate degree and 82 percent have a 
college degree) and higher salaries ($85,000 in their outside or previous job) than those 
they represent (Rosenthal 1998). While all legislators tend to come from the upper 
echelons of society, women and African Americans have made important gains in state 
legislatures. In 1940, only 2 percent of legislators nationally were women. By 1970, this 
number increased to 4 percent, and by 2000, 22 percent of state legislators were women. 
African American representation has also increased. In 1970, African Americans 
accounted for just over 1 percent of all state legislators but by 2000 that number had 
increased to nearly 7 percent (U.S. Statistical Abstract).  
 
 8
Representation as Responsiveness 
Most understandings of representation, including Downs, require some notion of 
responsiveness of representatives to the wishes of those they represent (Eulau et al. 1959; 
Key 1961; Pitken 1967; Dahl 1989). That is, for any form of democratic government to 
be legitimate, it must respond in some meaningful way to public sentiment. As such, a 
popular strategy in assessing representation has been to assess the policies that 
governments adopt and measure the degree to which those policies align with mass 
preferences. Scholars call this policy responsiveness (Eulau and Karps 1978; Jewell 
1982).2 Responsiveness is conceptually distinct from delegate style representation, 
although the two are intuitively similar. Jewell (1982), in clarifying the concept of policy 
responsiveness, states, “we are interested in how representatives respond to both the 
articulated demands and the unarticulated interests of their constituents.” In this sense, 
responsiveness draws on both delegate (demands) and trustee (interests) notions of 
representation.  
Research has in fact found that policy output, at the state level, often corresponds 
to aggregate mass preferences (Dawson and Robinson 1963; Erikson, Wright, and 
McIver 1993). This, however, is aggregate level congruence that runs the risk of violating 
the ecological fallacy.3 The key for studies of representation is to find individual 
legislator responsiveness. This is the level of study where representation occurs. If 
                                                 
2 Because of convention, in this chapter I will call this type of responsiveness “policy responsiveness” even 
though a more accurate term may be “roll call responsiveness” as government output is policy and 
legislators’ preferences are roll calls. Throughout the rest of the study I use “roll call responsiveness” but 
the two should be thought of interchangeably.   
3 Forces at play in the aggregate are not necessarily emblematic of individual level behavior.  
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legislators are indeed being responsive to their districts through their roll call activity, 
then the resulting policy output of government should be an accurate measure of policy 
responsiveness. However, because districts are not perfectly apportioned, and because 
legislative chambers have rules and processes, through which legislation must flow, the 
potential exists for aggregate outcomes that are not the sum of their individual parts. 
Therefore, these studies of policy responsiveness should be taken with a grain of salt and 
more studies of roll call responsiveness, at the individual legislator level are needed, 
especially in the states.  
At the congressional level, many studies find evidence supporting a link between 
legislative behavior and district opinion (Miller and Stokes 1963; Eulau and Karps 1978, 
Erikson 1978, McCrone and Kuklinski 1979; Glazer and Robbins 1985; Stimson, 
Mackuen, Erikson 1995). At the state legislative district level, studies tend to focus on 
just one state (Erikson, Luttbeg and Holloway 1975; McCrone and Kuklinski 1979; 
Snyder 1996) thus limiting the generalizations we can draw from the findings (but see 
Uslaner and Weber 1977; 1979, 1983). More recent work by Gerald Wright and 
coauthors Jon Winburn and Tracy Osborn find evidence of constituents’ preferences 
influencing legislative roll-call positions either directly, or through parties acting as a 
linkage mechanism connecting people to their state legislators (Wright and Osborn 2002; 
Wright 2005).  
Policy responsiveness is not the only type of responsiveness noted by scholars. 
Others include symbolic, service, and resource responsiveness. Links between legislators 
and districts that emphasize these traits, while perhaps pleasing to constituents and 
important to economic development back home, are by their nature less important than 
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policy responsiveness – from the standpoint of democratic theory. At least since Hobbs, 
and certainly since Madison, the concern of democratic theorists who employ a system of 
representation has been how to approximate the needs and wishes of the people with an 
assembly of the few. While policy responsiveness strikes at the heart of this concern, I 
argue that these other forms of responsiveness at their best are subservient and at their 
worst actually work to undermine the representational ideal.   
 “Being one of them,” what Ealau and Karps (1978) call symbolic responsiveness 
and what Fenno (1977) would go on to call member’s “homestyle” is a form of 
responsiveness where members try to become the stereotype of their district. Symbolic 
responsiveness is more a psychological than a behavioral bond that legislators use to 
generate trust and support among their constituency. This may involve a representative 
putting on a cowboy hat in a parade, changing the patterns of their speech, or kissing a 
baby, to name but a few. The success and effect of these symbolic efforts on behalf of 
legislators are exceedingly difficult to measure (Jewell 1982), but Fenno (1977) 
convincingly shows that “homestyle” related activities dominate the efforts of certain 
members in their districts. “Being one of them,” however, is certainly not enough for the 
proper functioning of a democratic system. In fact, it may serve to harm policy 
responsiveness. If legislators need to use symbolism to generate trust and support, the 
implication is that they are searching for authority to shirk away from a district held 
policy preference.  
Service responsiveness, more commonly called “casework,” is another popular 
form of representation. This involves legislators and their staff members helping 
individuals with problems they are having with government. It often involves help with 
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welfare, health and hospitals, unemployment compensation, drivers’ licenses, taxes, and 
public jobs (Rosenthal 1998). In certain states, such as Louisiana, Maryland, and Illinois, 
legislators can give out a number of college scholarships; this is usually done based on 
merit, but occasionally for outright political gifts (Squire 1992). Evidence suggests that 
casework is becoming an increasing focus of legislators at both the national (Fenno 1977) 
and state level (Rosenthal 1998).  
In state legislatures, the amount of casework is directly related to the number of 
staff members legislators employ, but even less professional states are entering into the 
casework game. Some state legislators even incur out-of-pocket expenses, usually in the 
form of long-distance telephone, in helping their constituents (Rosenthal 1998, 17). As 
for the affect of service responsiveness, some are concerned that it can grow to border on 
an abuse of power when legislators begin advocating a particular decision rather than 
simply helping to cut through red tape (Rosenthal 1998). Usually, however, these 
activities are benign, neither undermining nor enabling the representational ideal. 
Allocative responsiveness refers to the ability of the legislators to get goods and 
services for their districts. As opposed to the individual nature of casework, these benefits 
are usually more general like park funds, money for police and fire departments, 
convention centers, community colleges, courthouses or perhaps some new government 
facility. These efforts are commonly referred to as “pork,” but known in New York as 
“member items,” in Pennsylvania as “walking-around money,” and in Florida as 
“turkeys.” Efforts by legislators to bring in new resources, or prevent some from being 
taken away, are sometimes viewed as an offensive activity. These goods are usually zero-
sum in nature - one districts gain is another’s loss. Rosenthal (1998, 18) warns “in these 
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situations, such a thing as state interest is almost completely lost from view.” This 
implies that allocative responsiveness has the potential to work against the public good, 
which is an implicit good in the notion of policy responsiveness.  
 While symbolic, service, and allocative responsiveness are clearly forms of 
representation, they do not further any notion of the representational ideal and in specific 
instances may in fact do it harm. As such, this dissertation will focus on policy 
responsiveness, what I will call roll call responsiveness (see footnote 2) as a rubric for 
measuring representation in state legislatures. Although this helps in limiting the scope of 
inquiry, the task is nonetheless complicated.  
Can a representative truly be responsive to their district? In state legislative 
districts, this involves not one principal, but a constituency of perhaps several hundred 
thousand principals (Rosenthal 1998). Pitkin (1967) notes that a constituency is not a 
single unit with one expressed opinion on every topic. On some topics, a small group 
may hold a strong opinion while the rest of the district does not care or holds a contrary 
opinion. In this case, what legislative choice would be considered responsive? These 
concerns will reappear in the next chapter and when I discuss measures of district 
ideology and district homogeneity in Chapter 3.  
States as Laboratories and State Legislators as Lab Mice 
 Why study roll call responsiveness at the state legislative level? In 1932, Supreme 
Court Justice Louis Brandeis referred to states as “laboratories of democracy” suggesting 
that through experimentation with different solutions, states show the way in providing 
answers to questions of social and economic policy. Political scientists who study state 
level politics often view states in much the same way.  
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As mentioned above, a good number of studies of responsiveness exist at the 
national level and a number of important contributions exist at the aggregate state level. 
Studying state legislators; along with their states, their districts, and their supporters; 
combines the strengths of both the national and aggregate state level studies. Like the 
national studies, which focus on individual members of Congress, studying state 
legislators puts the focus on the most useful level of analysis, the individual legislator; 
which allows for the inclusion of legislator, district, election, interest group, and donor 
related characteristics. Like the aggregate state studies, studying members across states 
employs the considerable variation that exists between the states, including the level of 
chamber competition between the parties, the presence of divided government, and the 
level of legislative professionalism. 
 I intend to use the variation that exists between states to increase what is known 
about legislative responsiveness more generally. Is responsiveness greater in professional 
legislatures? Is responsiveness greater in chambers that are closely divided? How does 
divided government relate to responsiveness? The answers to these questions are as 
useful to understanding representation at the national level as they are to representation in 
the states. Congress goes through periods of close partisan division, calls for reforms 
aimed at amaturizing their institutions, and periods of divided government. We need not 
wait for these conditions to occur in Congress to get a handle on the effects they will 
have on representation. We can simply look to the state legislatures, where all these 
patterns are currently at play in one state or another, and employ the states as laboratories 
of democracy.  
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The Plan of this Study 
 This study is an assessment of the functioning of representative democracy, as 
understood through the lens of policy responsiveness in the American states. Based on 
work at the congressional and aggregate state level, my expectation is that a considerable 
amount of responsiveness will be revealed in the state legislatures. I do not, however, 
expect it to always jump right out of the data. I expect that forces at play at both the 
district and state level condition responsiveness.  
 In Chapter 2, I introduce the actors and conditions that likely influence roll call 
responsiveness. The actors include the legislators themselves, their constituents, their 
parties, and their interest group supporters. The conditions include the distinctive types of 
issues they consider, as well as electoral characteristics, and the designs of their 
legislative chambers.  
 In Chapter 3, I present the operationalization of the various components of 
responsiveness. This chapter introduces my composite measurement of legislator 
liberalism, extremism, and state legislative polarization. It also introduces my measure of 
district ideology, district homogeneity, interest groups activity, as well as various state 
and chamber characteristics. In addition to specifying the methods, Chapter 3 presents a 
descriptive account of the data in this study.  
In Chapter 4, I examine the first research question, regarding ideological 
responsiveness, and find that legislators are indeed conditionally responsive to their 
various constituencies. As one would expect, in an era of strong partisan polarization, the 
party affiliation of legislators is a strong indicator of legislative roll call activity. On 
social/culture war issues, legislators are greatly influenced by their districts, while on 
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economic issues, legislators are more likely to fall in line with their interest group 
supporters. I find the professionalism of the institutions in which legislators serve to 
facilitate greater responsiveness of legislators to their districts.  
In Chapter 5, I assess the ideological chasm that exists between legislators of the 
two major parties on the major issues of the day asking: What leads some legislators to 
ideological extremes while others remain more moderate. The findings suggest that 
district diversity is a primary indicator of legislative extremism. More homogeneous 
districts elect extremist legislators while districts that are more heterogeneous elect 
legislators more predisposed toward roll call moderation. The findings also suggest that 
party leaders are more extreme than rank and file members and that greater legislative 
professionalism leads to roll call extremism.    
In Chapter 6 I take on the third research question focusing on the causes and 
effects of polarization in state legislative chambers. I show that both mass and elite 
polarization affect the level of polarization in state legislative chambers. As the party elite 
and the masses polarize, so too do their legislative chambers. I find this polarization, in 
turn, influences the policy output of the chambers. 
In the concluding chapter, I tie together the major findings of the study, which 
focus on the striking level of polarization in state legislative chambers, especially on 
contentions social issues. The discussion focuses on the overall moderate distribution of 
district ideology, the bimodal distribution of legislator ideology and the implications of 




Chapter 2: Conditional Responsiveness 
 
How responsive are legislators to their various constituencies? To begin, consider 
a legislator faced with a roll call vote. Although free to vote their own preference, they 
are also faced with the views of their districts, their party, and their interest group 
advocates. When the preferred outcomes of all these actors align, the legislator’s decision 
is relatively simple, but when the actors are at odds, the legislator’s roll call vote becomes 
a difficult balancing act. In such a case, the legislator must gauge the relative interest of 
the issue to all the different actors and consider the degree to which upsetting them might 
come back to haunt their reelection effort or preclude future legislative support (Kingdon 
1973).  
Legislators “jumping ship,” or abandoning, their various constituencies, however, 
is not the norm. A liberal legislator is likely to be a Democrat, have a liberal leaning 
district and accept campaign money from left leaning interest groups. Likewise, a 
conservative legislator is likely to be a Republican, have a conservative leaning district 
and accept money from rightward leaning groups. Legislators who deviate from this 
model are the exceptions (Kingdon 1973; Lascher, Kelman, and Kane 1993; Uslaner 
1999). As a generalization, however, this only cuts in half the ideological positions to 
which a legislator will likely adhere, with Democratic legislators mostly falling on the 
left half of the continuum and Republicans on the right. Their constituents, parties, and 
interest group supporters, however, may occupy very different ideological space on that 
half of the continuum.  
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District ideology, while likely reflecting a general sense of liberalism or 
conservatism in the district, is likely less ideologically extreme than that of the more 
activist constituencies (Converse 1966; Fenno 1978). Elite constituencies drive 
Democrats to the ideological left and Republicans to the right. Everything else being 
equal, however, legislators need not be overly concerned with this division. If they were 
to split the ideological difference between the elites and their constituencies, legislators 
would still be safe in their reelection, especially when given a lack of primary 
competition.4 
Yet, not everything is equal. In this study, I focus on three specific contextual 
variations that may complicate the generalization that legislators are equal servants of 
their multiple constituencies. First, not all legislation is the same. Some issues elicit 
strong constituency opinions while they largely ignore other policy items. Do legislators 
shirk their districts when their constituents do not care about a certain policy? Second, 
not all legislators face the same electoral circumstances. Some districts are so safe that a 
legislator need only protect his district lines every 10 years to assure a lifetime of 
reelection; others are so competitive that even the youngest lawmaker, upon starting their 
career, needs an immediate prescription for blood pressure medicine. Do legislators shirk 
their districts when they need not worry about reelection or are they at that point so 
similar to their districts that they are in fact a walking-talking portrait of those they 
represent? Finally, not all legislative institutions are the same. Some, like the California 
                                                 
4 In state legislative elections, primary challenges are not often successful. Jewell (1983) finds that more 
than half of all incumbents run unopposed, about 10 percent run in competitive primary races (10 point 
Margin) and around 2 percent are unseated in primary elections.  
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and New York legislatures are extremely professional, while others, most notably New 
Hampshire, are extremely amateur in their design. A debate exists as to whether 
lawmakers in professional legislatures are more or less likely to represent their district 
constituents, as opposed to those from amateur districts. Likewise, party and interest 
group power relates to their ability to permeate different types of legislative institutions. 
Do legislators serving in professional legislatures serve their various constituencies 
differently than legislators serving in amateur legislatures?  
I divide this chapter into two major sections. The first focuses on three legislative 
constituencies, the ideological desires of which likely account for a significant amount of 
the variation in legislative voting behavior – their districts, parties, and interest group 
supporters. The second section analyzes the various conditions that may influence 
responsiveness to these various groups – issue type, electoral competition, and legislative 
professionalism. The final section, brings together the previous two and synthesizes the 
theory of conditional responsiveness used to posit hypotheses related to the conditions 
under which legislators are most likely to be responsive to their various constituencies 
and why certain legislators can afford to become ideologically extreme.  
The Actors 
Besides their own predispositions, three primary actors influence the voting 
behavior of state legislators: their district constituents, their parties, and their interest 
group supporters.5 I make a basic assumption that the direction of communication is one 
way – from the various groups to their members. This clearly is the case for the 
                                                 
5 While I directly analyze these three actors, others may want to include such actors as committees, staff, 
and the Governor.  
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geographic constituency, as they are not attentive enough, cohesive enough, or trusting 
enough to be swayed by their state legislator to alternative issue positions.6 Using these 
same three criteria, it is also likely (although perhaps less so) that the direction of 
communication flows from the parties and interest groups to the legislators. While 
interest groups may be attentive and cohesive, they likely do not trust legislators enough 
to change their positions, as they are accountable to their own constituencies. A 
Democratic legislator, for example, not happy with the AFL-CIO’s goal of increasing the 
minimum wage would have a hard time convincing unions to change their issue 
positions. Likewise, a Republican legislator who wants to cast a pro-choice vote would 
have a hard time getting the Christian Coalition to come around to their position.  Parties 
are similarly not likely to change issue positions to meet that of an individual or group of 
state legislators when they must be concerned with the ideological orientation of the 
entire party.7  
The District 
 A legislator’s formal, or geographical, constituency includes all voting age 
residents within the physical bounds of their legislative district. As outlined in the 
previous chapter, constituency opinion explains a significant portion of legislative 
                                                 
6 These criteria were proposed by Uslaner (1999, Chapter 1).  
7 The only office holder that could possibly rearrange the ideological goals of a political party might be a 
sitting president. That individual state legislators are so distant from a position of such party power only 
underscores the fallacy of this counter-argument. In a study of presidential elites, my coauthors and I show 
that party delegates adjust their positions in response to different presidents. Clinton for example 
temporarily changed the nature of the Democratic Party during his tenure to one of relative moderation 
(Jackson, Bigelow, and Green 2006).  
 
 20
behavior (Miller and Stokes 1963; Eulau and Karps 1978, Erikson 1978, McCrone and 
Kuklinski 1979; Glazer and Robbins 1985; Stimson, Mackuen, Erikson 1995). Were the 
political science literature to appeal to a mass audience, this finding would be welcome 
news, as overwhelming majorities of citizens wish their representatives to be responsible 
delegates.8 Because it is the explicit design of government to represent citizens, and 
because this is such a consistent finding in the literature, the reasons why constituency 
influence matters are not always discussed. Yet the question should be asked: Why do 
legislators follow the wishes of their constituency?  
For several reasons, it would seem perfectly reasonable for state legislators not to 
care much about constituency opinion. When walking down the street, pull aside a 
friendly looking person and ask them if they know the name of their state representative. 
Polls from the 1960s showed that about 25 percent of people could correctly identify their 
state legislator (George Gallup 1967) and Jewell (1982, 167) generalized from data on 
name recall and recognition, that at any time about half the people who can name their 
U.S. House member can also name their state legislator. In 2000, this means that about 10 
percent of citizens can correctly identify their state legislators.9 Many fewer constituents 
contact their legislators (Jewell 1982). Furthermore, even if constituents were to monitor 
the behavior of their state legislators and decide to hold their member accountable, voters 
may find their member running unopposed or against a candidate with little chance of 
winning (Jewell 1982). Finally, even well intentioned legislators may have a difficult 
                                                 
8 A 1993 Time-CNN poll found 68 percent of respondents wanted members of Congress to vote the district 
line, while just 24 percent would prefer to leave them to their own devices (cited in Uslaner 1999, 17).  
9 In the 2000 ANES, 30 percent of respondents said they could recall their house members name, 
approximately 10 percent were wrong, leaving about 20 percent who could recall their member.  
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time “voting their district” if their constituencies are deeply divided or fragmented on an 
issue (Ingram, Laney, and McCain 1980). This, however, is the exception rather than the 
rule, as most districts are comfortably homogenous (Patterson 1996).  
 Contrast this rather grim reality about citizen’s lack of knowledge and lack of 
electoral choice concerning state legislators with the attitudes and behaviors of 
legislators: 
 “They start running the day they take their oath of office,” explained one observer  
in Illinois. “The thought of reelection may not occur to a first-term legislator 
within the first five minutes after winning the election,” writes a Michigan 
legislator, “but I would not count on that” (Patterson 1996, 169-69).   
Legislators, as a matter of expressed fact, are overwhelmingly preoccupied with what 
their constituents are thinking (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978; Jewell 1982; Miller and 
Stokes 1963). From the legislator’s point-of-view, the fact that constituents do not know 
much about them, care enough to contact them, or rise up to support or become an 
opposition candidate, is evidence that they are successfully representing their districts 
(see Fenno 1989, 31), what is sometimes called an “investment in political office 
holding” (Davis and Porter 1989; Erikson 1971). The constant fear among legislators is 
that deviations from the district may wake up a “sleeping giant” costing them an election 
(Uslaner 1999, 19).  
Focusing on responsiveness as a struggle between legislator and constituents 
oversimplifies a more complicated political reality. Fenno (1978) described the full 
district as just one, and in fact, the most remote, of several constituencies conceived of in 
terms of concentric circles. Fenno’s study of congressional representation finds 
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representatives are closest to the innermost activist circles of their districts and only 
concern themselves with their more remote constituencies if needed, to assure reelection. 
For example, a legislator from a one party dominated district would likely focus no 
further out than their primary constituency.  
Other congressional studies describe a similar “two-constituencies” perspective, 
finding that congruence is much stronger between legislators and core supporters than 
between legislators and the district as a whole (Huntington 1950; Fiorina 1974; Markus 
1974; Achen 1978; Powell 1982; Bullock and Brady 1983). These inner circles are by no 
means a representative sampling of a legislator’s district. Party elites and interest group 
activists hold more polarized views of policy than do the mass public (Aldrich 1983; 
Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Jackson, Bigelow, and Green 2006).  
These elite constituencies, no matter how influential, are normatively and 
practically less important than the constituency as a whole. Normatively, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, district congruence is most critical to notions of representative 
democracy. Our system was designed to represent the many through the few, and 
anything less brings into question what we mean by “democracy.” Practically, the district 
is most important because formally, they have the last say in who holds the seat. Districts 
alone have the authority to say “enough is enough” and throw the rascals out.   
Political Parties 
Representation, conceived of in terms of responsible party government, is often 
considered the opposite of district control notions of representation (Key 1956; Miller 
and Stokes 1963). In the responsible party model, legislators should ignore the median 
district opinion and instead present voters with two diametrically opposed party positions 
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(APSA 1950). Key to responsible party government is strictly disciplined and ideological 
roll call voting by legislators along party lines. As discussed, however, district and party 
ideology is often not fundamentally different; liberal districts elect Democrats, and 
conservative districts elect Republicans.  
Research consistently finds that the party identification of legislators is essential 
to understanding the positions taken by members of Congress. Over the last twenty years, 
and due in large part to the alignment of the South with the Republican Party, Congress 
has polarized along party lines (Bartels 2000, Poole and Rosenthal 1997). One study goes 
so far as to say there is virtually no overlap between the policy positions of the parties 
(Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2000).   
State legislative research from the 1950s and 1960s explored the different levels 
and causes of party voting (for example see MacRae 1952; Keefe 1954; Jewell 1955; 
Becker et al 1962; Sorauf 1963; Flinn 1964). In the 1970s, however, this line of research 
turned increasingly to Congress. Recent research finds that party is still extremely 
important to understanding the motivation of state legislators (Jenkins forthcoming; 
Wright and Osborn 2002).  
How do parties influence the activity of state legislators? They do so through 
psychological bonds and practical processes. Concerning the latter, parties give structure 
to mass issue preferences and over the past several decades, that structure has become 
increasingly ideological in nature (Poole and Rosenthal 1984; Rohde 1991). Party 
identifiers pull legislators toward the extremes and party activists push them even further 
(McCloskey, Hoffman, and O’Hara 1969; Lengle and Shafer 1976; Aldrich 1995; 
Jackson, Bigelow, and Green 2006). These partisan supporters are the front-line of 
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legislator support networks. They are the first constituency recruited as the primary 
approaches, they are the group most likely to communicate their views to the legislator, 
they share a collective fate with the success or failure of the member, and they are 
likeminded sorts of people with similar viewpoints and often close personal bonds (Fenno 
1978; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Uslaner 1999).  
As a practical matter, parties in chambers across the country set up leadership 
structures designed to “whip” members into line with the party. Parties in the United 
States, however, do not have all of the tools they might want to control the votes of their 
members. For instance, parties cannot remove a member for voting against their 
expressed wishes; they can, however, offer benefits to members who toe the party line. 
Parties must use the carrot rather than the stick (Hershey and Beck 2003). Such carrots 
include prime committee assignments, chair assignments, help in introducing/passing 
legislation, help delivering pork, and help finding jobs and appointments for constituents 
(Rosenthal 1998).  
The power of parties in state legislatures varies greatly, but in many ways, it is 
greater than that of parties in Congress. At the state legislative level, party leaders have 
more direct control over the day-to-day workings of the legislatures than congressional 
leaders have over Congress. Furthermore, they usually do not have to defer to powerful 
steering committees or policy committee chairs and are freer to appoint committee chairs 
of their choosing, regardless of seniority (Jewell and Morehouse 2000).10 
                                                 
10 Congress, however, is increasingly acting in the same way as power has shifted from committees to party 




 The influence of constituents and parties dominate the literature on legislative 
responsiveness. Political interests groups, however, can substantively influence policy- 
making. Indeed, early pluralist theory contended that competition between groups is the 
main way policy forms, with institutions acting simply as the referees in their game 
(Bentley 1970; Latham 1952; Schattschneider 1935; Truman 1951). Fenno (1989) found 
that groups were mentioned (in his interviews with members of congress) just slightly 
less (31 percent of the time) than fellow members (40 percent) and constituencies (37 
percent) as being important influences on members’ votes (146). In their survey of 
legislators from the “four-corners” state legislatures, Ingram, Laney, and McCain (1980) 
found that legislators viewed interest groups as either having too much or about the right 
amount of influence, but most members agreed they were powerful influences on 
legislative voting behavior.  
State legislatures are inundated with groups and lobbyists all trying to get 
something from government (Patterson 1996; Gray and Lowery 2000). Some states have 
a single or major economic interest and legislative policy likely bends to their wishes 
(Ingram, Laney and McCain 1980). Agricultural interests, for example are likely to 
dominate states like Iowa, just as labor unions have a special place in Michigan politics, 
as do oil companies in Oklahoma and Texas (Patterson 1996). The relative lack of 
scholarly attention paid to the influence of groups, as a component of legislative 
responsiveness, is shocking given the incredible influence of group politics in the broader 
literature (but see Denzau and Munger 1986; Gray and Lowery 2000, 246-257). 
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Classic works argue that business interests are especially powerful and over-
represented in our lawmaking bodies (Schattschneider 1960; Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 
1963; Lindblom 1977). Journalists go a step further charging the political activity of 
business with “the breakdown of contemporary democracy” (Greider 1992). Businesses, 
however, are not the only groups trying to influence government. Labor unions and 
citizens groups also are active at both the federal and state level (Berry 1999; Francia 
2005; Gray and Lowery 2000).   
 How do groups attempt to influence policymakers? The most traditional way they 
insert themselves in the policy making process is through direct lobbying (Rosenthal 
1993). Lobbyists work to gain access and develop a rapport with legislators (Ainsworth 
1993). The old model of “wining and dining” legislators, while not extinct, has given way 
to a more professional relationship – focusing on the production and transfer of specialist 
information and campaign donations (Rosenthal 1998, 219). As issue specialists, 
lobbyists can become a trusted source of information for legislators who are stretched 
thin concerning their ability to know all the necessary information on all legislation 
(Hansen 1991; Rosenthal 1998, 216). The ability of lobbyists to sway legislative 
behavior, however, likely relates to their overall standing in relation to the constituency. 
Jewell (1982) contends that when legislator’s view groups as not necessarily 
representative of the majority district opinion, or perhaps if a group is not from the 
district, their lobbying influence decreases markedly.11 The implication here is that 
groups may not be very influential once district opinion is considered.  
                                                 
11 Fenno (1989) also finds this response from members of Congress.  
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It could be that groups are simple service agents of sympathetic legislators – 
associating mainly with legislators who share their own policy predispositions (Milbrath 
1963, 210; Dexter 1969; Hall and Deardorff 2006). Other research shows that groups 
strategically pass on information to legislators concerning the opinions held by people in 
their district and that this can affect legislator behavior (Hansen 1991). More recent 
studies suggest that groups concentrate their lobbying efforts on their weak allies and 
weak enemies (Austen-Smith and Wright 1994). At the ideological margins, groups hope 
they can take those weak partisans muddling around the middle and push them toward 
ideological extremes and congruence with the group’s position. 
Citizens overwhelmingly view interest groups and their lobbyists with disdain, 
buying into the stereotype (correct or not) that groups have considerable and unfair 
influence over legislators and legislation. A poll conducted by the Hartford Courant 
found 40 percent of citizens in Connecticut felt “they would be better off in all respects if 
there were no lobbyists (cited in Rosenthal 1998, 217; see also Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse. 2002). These results are likely echoes of a press that is equally suspicious of the 
lobbying system (Rosenthal 1996).  
 While relationship lobbying may be the “dinosaur” model of lobbying influence, 
campaign contributions are increasingly a part of groups strategies aimed at both 
influencing legislative votes and helping to elect friendly members (Herrnson 2004). 
There is, however, much dispute concerning the influence of interest group money on 
policy at the congressional level (Wright 1985). Like congressional studies, some state 
legislative studies often find only marginal influence (Grenzke 1989; Dow and Endersby 
1994), while others, particularly case study analyses, show a great deal of influence 
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(Moore et al. 1994). The trouble with inferring influence is establishing that the 
legislator’s predispositions were actually altered by the money (see Roscoe and Jenkins 
2005). The consensus is that money usually does not buy votes, but does facilitate access, 
create attitudinal tendencies, and works at the margins to create slight changes in 
legislative behavior (Snyder 1992; Rosenthal 1998, 223).  
 If interest groups can influence policy, in what direction is that likely to occur? 
Interest groups, especially citizen groups, are ideological outliers within their own party 
coalitions. Parties and legislators may find it frustrating, because they want to pursue a 
vote maximizing strategy, but interest groups want them to emphasize their issues (Berry 
1997, 58). The Christian Coalition, antiabortion groups, and the NRA are not moderating 
influences on Republican legislators; just like women’s groups, civil rights organizations, 
environmentalists, and gay rights organizations are not moderating forces on Democratic 
legislators. Their influence is strengthened because parties do not control nominations, 
and candidates must build personal coalitions, of which these groups are often critically 
important (Polsby 1983; Herrnson 2004).  
 Constituents, parties, and interest groups are three independent actors that share, 
through their ideological inclinations, similar, but not identical, goals. Legislators must 
traverse the moderating influence of constituents and the polarizing forces of parties and 
interest groups. Actor preferences, however, are only a part of a comprehensive 
explanation of legislative voting behavior. How responsive legislators are to these groups 




 Policy responsiveness does not happen in a bubble and legislators do not have a 
universal formula to calculate their issue preferences. A vast number of factors influence 
roll call decisions and the relative weights legislators give to the opinions of the groups 
seeking out their support. I consider in this study what might be termed the “big three” 
conditions - the type of issue considered, the electoral circumstance of the member, and 
the type of legislature in which they serve. In the following three sections, I present a 
discussion of each condition and propose specific legislative outcomes under each.  
Issue Type 
 On February 22, 2006, the legislature of South Dakota, with the signature of the 
Governor, passed legislation outlawing abortion, except for cases involving threats to a 
woman’s life; no provisions were included for cases of rape and incest or even the health 
(accept life – implying impending death) of the woman. This law represents a direct 
challenge to Roe v. Wade and will likely make its way to the Supreme Court in the 
coming years. Other states are waiting to see what will become of the case as culturally 
conservative legislators, and their supporters from the religious right, draft similar bills in 
state legislatures across the country.12 Local and national media devoted extensive ink 
and airtime educating the public to the happenings in Pierre. Over the past six months 
(prior to March 9, 2006), 137 articles in major newspapers were devoted to the abortion 
legislation in South Dakota. In the New York Times and Washington Post, national news 
outlets, 31 stories appeared about the legislation. Compare this to another important piece 
                                                 
12 On March 10, 2006 the Tennessee Senate passed a proposed amendment to the state constitution to 
outlaw abortion.  
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of legislation in South Dakota that would increase the state’s minimum wage; in a state 
where the average personal income falls below $26,000 a year. Only two stories have 
appeared on this legislation, both of which simply mention it in passing. This is not just 
an isolated trend. The number of major newspaper stories on the issue of abortion in state 
legislatures, during the 1990s, totaled 1,649. In the same papers, over the same period, 
only 179 stories covered the issue of minimum wage in state legislatures.13 
Thus, generalizing about the demands and focus of responsiveness requires 
special attention be paid to the different types of policy issues. Legislators do not weigh 
every issue equally as they know their various constituencies do not consider them 
equally. Some issues are extremely salient to the public, striking at deep held beliefs, and 
perhaps prejudices, that resonate at an emotional level. Historically, these issues might 
include civil rights legislation like school busing or ratification of the ERA. More recent 
examples include reproductive rights, gun rights, capital punishment, gambling, flag 
burning, and gay rights. Other issues are less salient floating below the radar screens of 
all but the most interested of observers. These might include collective bargaining 
agreements or public employee salaries (Jewell 1982).  
In A Policy Approach to Political Representation, Ingram, Laney, and McCain 
(1980) suggested that attitudes of voters on issues are fragmented and multidimensional, 
and legislator attentiveness to and agreement with constituent opinion varies by issue 
cluster. They show that certain issues cluster together making it possible for legislators to 
grasp citizen preferences. If all citizens had random issue clusterings, the task of 
                                                 
13 All these numbers come from simple keyword searches in Lexus-Nexus. “Abortion,” “State Legislature,” 
“Minimum Wage,” “South Dakota” and date specifications were the search terms.  
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responsiveness, they suggest, would be overwhelming. When issues are related or 
clustered, as opposed to discrete, legislators are able to trade off issue positions against 
one another allowing responsive action. Indeed, the authors show that as issues cluster 
together, legislators become more responsive; but on issues that fail to meld into a 
coherent cluster, legislative action is less likely and responsiveness does not happen. The 
authors note the growing tendency (in the early 1980s) of issues to take on a singular 
ideological cluster and speculate that if taken to extremes, ideology will end up the 
predominant cluster, making responsiveness much easier.  
 Ingram, Laney, and McCain (1980) also suggest that legislators will pay more 
attention to their constituency on issue clusters that they believe to be more salient and 
even on less salient issues that relate to a salient issue cluster.  These issue domains 
“activate certain cues because of the basic interests and concerns of the persons and 
groups involved” (13). Others have noted the importance of issue type to legislative 
responsiveness. One of the most important findings in the classic study of responsiveness 
by Miller and Stokes (1963) was that issues of greater saliency result in greater 
congruence between constituent attitudes and their member’s roll call vote choice on such 
issues. In their study, higher salience issues were civil rights legislation, on which 
members produced congruence, and the lower salience issues related to foreign policy, 
which resulted in less congruence.  
 Kingdon’s (1977, 1989) work also takes into account issue type. His model of 
legislative decision-making starts with the level of controversy on any given issue. If the 
member decides that it is controversial, they will move to carefully examine the positions 
of the various actors in their political environment (including the constituency). Kingdon 
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(1977) states, “the congressman considers the constituency interest first. He may not end 
up voting with the constituency, but he always considers it when it is above the minimum 
level of importance (578). It is the saliency of this issue to their constituents, or 
significant group within it, that motivates member responsiveness.  
What types of issues would we expect to be the most salient, and as such, can we 
expect to see the most congruence? Jewell (1982) categorizes issues into three categories: 
1) major issues that affect important groups of citizens generally, 2) narrow, parochial 
issues of concern to specialized groups, and 3) issues, however broad or narrow in scope, 
that are not salient even to organized interest in the district. In his interview with 
legislators, Jewell found that economic issues would sometimes enter the first category, 
but often fell into the second.  
A number of traditional economic issues seldom produce much interest from 
constituents. Broad questions of budgetary policy generate little response, 
although proposed cuts in specific areas will arouse complaints from citizen – 
particularly employee groups. Legislation affecting the regulation of business or 
labor is of direct concern to specific interest groups but seldom arouses large 
numbers of constituents…Constituents are more likely to grumble generally about 
high taxes than to express their views about specific proposals to change the tax 
laws (80). 
This corresponds to contemporary public opinion polls that often show economic issues 
(generally stated) to be a high priority, but specific economic issues to fall much lower on 
the systemic agenda.14 Jewell (1982) goes on to note the “relatively new” social issues 
                                                 
14 See Gallup Poll release May 12, 2003.  
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mentioned by legislators, including abortion, capital punishment, and the ERA, produced 
some of the strongest emotional responses. What Jewell noticed as an emerging trend 
circa 1983 is today a full-blown reality. Contemporary social issues, sometimes called 
“culture war” issues, carry with them strong emotions on the part of legislators, citizens, 
parties, and organized interests.  
 I contend that citizens need not have sophisticated political views, or an 
abundance of political knowledge, to have deeply held views concerning these issues. 
Abortion, the death penalty, and gay rights elicit visceral or “gut level” responses rooted 
in ones psychological and social orientations: they are issues that Carmines and Stimson 
(1989) might refer to as “easy issues.” These issues are salient and tap into all the criteria 
discussed above that lead scholars to suggest that legislators will seek out congruence. 
Highly salient social issues are also issues on which congruence will likely come most 
naturally. Elections tend to highlight culture war issues, and the winning candidate is 
likely to be close to their constituencies on these matters. Furthermore, social issues do 
not lend themselves to compromise positions. In most cases, legislators are forced to be 
either pro or anti…you pick the issue. Citizens identify themselves similarly, as do 
groups and parties.  
 Economic issues (like tax, labor, and health care policy), which only a handful of 
experts fully understand, attract much less direct public attention. These are typically 
“hard issues” and of much lower salience to citizens. With the district not paying 
attention, legislators are provided the opportunity to operate more autonomously or 
perhaps in congruence with supportive interest groups. The public may not be aware of a 
proposed change in pay for public employees, but it is likely front and center on the 
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minds of unions. These issues, as opposed to most social issues, can produce 
compromise, as these are not usually simply “pro” or “anti” issues but amiable to degrees 
of support or opposition. Legislators may choose a middle of the road alternative, or “log 
roll” with other members, promising support on one issue for a promise of future support 
on another.  
 All of this suggests that issue type is a key factor that conditions responsiveness. 
Issue type, as a condition, is most important in determining the responsiveness of 
legislators to their district constituency. On high salience, “gut level” and polarizing 
social issues, legislators need to be especially concerned with their districts opinion. 
Lower salience “hard issues” that float under the radar screen of public attention allow 
much more leeway on the part of legislators. When freed from public scrutiny, legislators 
can drift to a more natural ideological equilibrium, which is likely proximate to the elite 
level party and interest group constituencies.  
Electoral Competitiveness 
Political scientists have long argued that increased party competition results in 
greater responsiveness (MacRae 1952; Deckard Sinclair 1976; Sullivan and Uslaner 
1978; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995). The logic here is that elected officials who 
run in competitive races will pay especially close attention to their constituents because 
failure to do so may result in them losing their next election. Stimson, Mackuen, and 
Erikson (1995) specify that legislators have a personal ideal point in the space of policy 
options and an expediency point or position they feel will most likely optimize future 
reelection chances. Those who feel safe at home will choose their personal ideal point 
and those who are worried about reelection will choose their expediency point.   
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Empirical evidence for this link, however, has been hard to find (Miller 1964; 
Fiorina 1974; Jones 1973). Critics of the “marginality thesis” suggest an opposite logic. 
They contend that legislators in safe districts may well be more responsive to their 
constituents because opinion in homogenous districts is easier to assess and there is less 
chance of multi-dimensional constituency opinion (Miller 1964; Jones 1973; Powel 1982; 
Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001). Furthermore, legislators in homogenous 
districts are more likely to be “of their districts.” The idea that responsiveness is more 
likely to flourish in safe districts has come to be known as the “homogeneity thesis.” 
What both sides of this argument have in common is a belief that electoral margin 
matters to the responsiveness of legislators to their districts. Which side is correct, 
however, has important implications for reformers who wish to adjust redistricting plans 
to facilitate greater competition. The popular view is that redistricting plans that favor 
safety create unnecessarily polarized chambers. Polarized and ugly politics, however, 
does not necessarily mean less responsive politics – if the “homogeneity thesis” is 
correct.  
Party leaders tend to be from safe seats. When party caucuses meet to elect 
leaders, one important consideration is the likelihood that the nominees for leadership 
post will still be in office after the next election.15 These legislators, who are usually 
electorally safe and therefore more ideologically extreme, have a heavy hand in defining 
the ideological planks of the party. In addition to being run by what are likely ideological 
outliers, legislative parties are also creatures of their activist components (McCloskey, 
Hoffman, and O’Hara 1969; Aldrich 1995; Jackson, Bigelow, and Green 2006) making 
                                                 
15 Tom Daschle might not agree.  
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parties more extreme, ideologically, than typical district opinion. As such, legislator 
deference to the party position is likely less common when they have to worry about their 
chances for reelection.  
Similarly, interest groups may be better able to influence legislators in safe seats 
when a member has nothing to fear from setting aside district opinion. Danzau and 
Munger (1986) develop a formal model where policy outcomes depend on comparative 
advantages of three participants (groups, constituents, and legislators). They theorize 
about the amounts of money interest groups must offer a legislator (in order to support 
their position) to depend on the legislator’s productivity and the preferences of their 
districts. Groups pay a much lower price when the voters are less hostile – as they tend to 
be in safe districts.  
The electoral competition facing members may relate to their ideological 
alignment with interest groups. They may be more likely to fall inline with interest 
groups when they face minimal competition for the same reasons they align with their 
party – if left unchecked they will align themselves with more ideologically extreme 
actors. On the other hand, members running in competitive races have a greater need to 
raise campaign money (Herrnson 2004). So, it is possible that, in an effort to increase 
their war chest, in order to persuade voters to support them, they may need to ignore their 
voters and grow more extreme – a real Catch-22 for legislators.   
Legislative Professionalism 
Regarding the link between legislative professionalism and responsiveness, a 
similar difference of opinion exists. Critics of legislative professionalism (often term 
limit advocates) argue that professionalism serves to insulate representative s from their 
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constituents, leaving legislators less responsive to district interests (Hickik 1992; Luttbeg 
1992; Opeim 1994). Those espousing this view believe that amateur, or citizen 
legislatures, filled with legislators not bound by selfish, careerist, aspirations, are better 
equipped to represent the average citizen. In this view, closeness is the key ingredient to 
successful responsiveness. Most scholars, however, hold the view that without the 
necessary resources (staff, salary, session length, space, structure) legislators cannot 
effectively represent their constituencies. They view the professionalization of 
legislatures over the past 50 years as a positive development that they hope will increase 
institutional resources and attract a more diverse and more capable set of members that 
will increase policy-making capabilities (Squire 1992; Rosenthal 1996; 1998, Chapter 2; 
Maestas 2000).  In this view, it is capacity that facilitates responsiveness.  
Professionalism in state legislatures enables deliberation, an important component 
of representative government (Rosenthal 1998). Legislators in professional legislatures 
are presented with more information, develop a greater skill set, can link bills together 
contextually, can bargain and compromise, and in the end be responsible for their 
decisions. The opposite of professionalism is direct democracy in which voters make 
policy choices without a skill set, the ability to contextualize policy, the ability to 
bargain, or the ability to be held responsible (Rosenthal 1998). Furthermore, when asked 
policy questions, 4 out of 5 citizens do not have stable opinions; they instead invent 
answers on the spot (Fishkin 1991). Legislators in amateur legislatures are not as 
handicapped as typical voters, but they are not as sophisticated as their professional 
counterparts either. They do not legislate full time, are not expected to become policy 
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experts, do not have much of a staff, and in many states are forced out of office after a 
limited number of terms, thus limiting their accountability. 
Regarding the constituency responsiveness of legislators serving in professional 
as opposed to amateur legislatures, divergent possibilities exist. Perhaps, as term limits 
advocates suggest, a more amateur legislature comprised of “ordinary citizens” with 
fewer political career ambitions are better able to represent the “common man or 
woman.” In other words, just keeping members “ordinary” might be enough to make 
representative democracy responsive. On the other hand, perhaps professional, career 
oriented legislators, with ample resources for legislating are the best equipped to respond 
to their constituents – as the proponents of professionalism (mostly political scientists) 
argue. Throughout this project, I test both possibilities. 
No scholarly work, that I can find, directly studies the influence of legislative 
professionalism on party voting. Some peripheral observations, however, lead to the 
expectation that parties have a greater affect on legislators in professional, as opposed to 
amateur, legislatures. Urban and industrial states are typically more partisan than agrarian 
states (Patterson 1972), as are highly staffed legislatures (BeVier 1979). Furthermore, 
states with stronger party organization also seem to have stronger party control in 
chamber. For example, party votes are more common in California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York than they are in Alabama, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi (Patterson 1994; Little 1995; Mahtesian 1997; Rosenthal 
1998, 186-87). Perhaps coincidentally, perhaps not (as Mahtesian 1997 would likely 
suggest), legislative professionalism is closely related to all of these observations. Greater 
staff, urban and industrial states, and organizationally strong parties are all highlights of 
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professional legislature states. As such, professionalism may account for increases in 
party loyalty among legislators and increasing the significance of political parties on roll 
call outcomes.  
Some scholarly work investigates the influence of interest groups in professional 
versus amateur chambers. The prevailing wisdom is that interest groups gain power when 
parties are weak (Rodgers, Sittig, and Welsch 1984; Wiggins, Hamm, and Bell 1992) and 
legislators serving in professional chambers are thought to be more impervious to interest 
group pressure (Patterson 1996, 195). Legislative staff, it is thought, provide members 
with expertise making interest group issue specialists less relevant. Furthermore, as 
legislatures become more professional, lobbyists are more likely to make contact with 
staff members instead of the legislators themselves. This dynamic precludes the 
establishment of meaningful relationships between legislators and lobbyists.  
For at least six reasons this traditional thinking about the weak role of interest 
groups in professional legislatures may be wrong. First, as discussed, campaign 
contributions are increasingly a complementary part of the lobbying game. Legislators in 
professional states (like California, New York) spend much more on their reelection 
campaigns than legislators in amateur states. Interest group money is therefore important 
to legislators in professional states. Second, amateur states are less likely to have partisan 
issues that groups would rally against (Patterson 1972; Mahtesian 1997) as they tend to 
be more homogenous, parochial, states. Third, interest group density is greater in 
professional states (Gray and Lowery 2000) perhaps acting to counter any reduced 
capacity brought on by virtue of staff acting as a buffer between groups and members. 
Fourth, professional states have longer (or perhaps continuous) legislative sessions. This 
 
 40
makes interest groups more likely to develop a permanent presence at the statehouse (as 
their increased density in professional states would indicate). Fifth, professional 
chambers have more access points (more committees and subcommittees) where groups 
can attempt to insert themselves. Sixth, professional chambers induce members to stay in 
office longer (Rosenthal 1998). This offers groups more time to develop a rapport with 
legislators. For all these reasons, the prevailing wisdom regarding interest groups 
irrelevance in professional chambers may in fact be wrong.  
Conditional Responsiveness to the Various Actors 
Voters want legislators to be delegates, while legislators want to follow their own 
ideologies (Uslaner 1999). In addition, parties want their members to toe the line, and 
interest groups want their positions represented. What do legislators do when the 
preferences of their various constituencies are inconsistent? Everything else being equal, 
they likely follow their own interests and shirk their constituents’ interests in favor of 
more common ideological ground they find with parties and interest groups. However, 
not everything is equal. Legislators face differing pressures that likely effect their roll call 
behavior by empowering their various constituencies. The key to understanding their 
support of the various actors is in understanding context. Representatives are 
conditionally, not intrinsically, responsive.  
Best Friends with Constituents 
 Legislators are only conditionally best friends with their district constituents. 
What in not known is exactly how the various conditions empower the district. It is quite 
likely that on social/culture war issues legislators pay much closer attention to their 
districts as these are issues that tend to matter to the greatest number of their citizens, the 
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ones they pay the most attention to, and therefore the ones for which they are most likely 
to hold members accountable. These are the issues most critical to their friendship. 
Legislators running in competitive races may fear the electoral wrath of their districts and 
be bullied into being responsive. Or perhaps safe, homogeneous, districts send members 
to the statehouse “born and raised” to be the best of friends with their district 
constituents. Legislators in professional legislatures may have the requisite resources 
respond to district opinion and nurture their friendship. On the other hand, legislators in 
amateur legislatures may be, by virtue of their “sameness,” more like the citizens they 
represent and therefore unconsciously very friendly.  
Married to the Parties 
 Legislators are married to their parties, but sometimes they do not make the best 
spouses. Under certain conditions, they will abandon their party and submit to 
constituency pressure, interest group coercion, or both. Legislators are likely “of their 
parties” ideologically, but they also need to be reelected, and for that they need support 
from other constituencies. When they perceive the district as paying particular attention 
to an issue at odds with their party, legislators will usually fold to that pressure. Just ask 
all but two of the 64 members voting on the House Appropriations committee who bolted 
from the White House sponsored deal on the sale of a U.S. port to a company based in 
Dubai, UAE. The two holdouts, as one might expect, were members who are considered 
electorally safe.16 It is not clear exactly what effect professionalization has on the power 
of parties. Some argue that given increased individual member capacity, which comes 
                                                 




with professionalism, parties become less relevant to legislators. However, parties are 
stronger, and partisanship sharper, in professional as opposed to amateur states.  
Affairs with Interest Groups 
 From time to time, legislators may stray from their parties, abandon their districts, 
and have affairs with interest groups. It is tempting for legislators to stray into an affair 
with interest group supporters as they likely share similar views on policy issues. Just as 
spouses may cheat when the other is not paying attention, legislators too are more likely 
to stray when their districts are not paying attention – perhaps on issues of less salience to 
the average voter. Furthermore, legislators may be able to get away with their affair if 
they are so safe in their reelection that they need not worry about losing a few votes. To 
extend the metaphor, their spouse may not have the money to hire a divorce lawyer. 
Although some think that members may be less likely to come in contact with interest 
group harlots in professional states, there are several reasons to expect groups are even 
more likely to set up their houses of ill repute in the capitols of states with full-time, year-
round, legislating.  
 This study addresses the forces that play on the minds of legislators as they make 
decisions on legislation. What forces lead legislators to ideological extremes? Under what 
circumstances do district constituencies matter the most? What are the implications of 
ideological extremity in regards to the operation of the legislatures?   
 I devote the next chapter to the operationalization of the key concepts in this study 
of responsiveness. In Chapters 4 and 5, I present my findings and relate them back to the 
ideas presented in this chapter. Legislators are found to be conditionally responsive to 
their districts, their parties, and their interest group supporters. Often, however, the 
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relationship between the condition and responsiveness will come as a surprise to readers 




Chapter 3: Measuring Responsiveness 
 
 Measuring the components of responsiveness has been a major preoccupation of 
scholars over the past half-century (Miller and Stokes 1963, Poole and Rosenthal 1993, 
Ardoin and Garand 2003). In an ideal world, we would know the precise motivation 
behind the roll call votes of every member and have detailed information on all of the 
different constituencies those legislators attempt to represent. Even at the congressional 
level, this ideal does not exist. Legislators are not routinely open about their motives, and 
opinion surveys, even pooled over time, are not large enough to infer much below the 
state level. The only recourse is innovative measurement.  
Some of the concepts in this study of responsiveness are perfectly clear, including 
such things as the party affiliation of legislators and the number of women serving in any 
given chamber. Others, including the nature of legislator’s roll call votes and 
characteristics of those living within state legislative districts, are much more difficult 
concepts to operationalize. This is especially true at the state legislative level where roll 
call and census data are relatively scarce, compared to Congress and congressional 
districts. Due to the complexity of many of these measures, and the rather elaborate 
techniques used, this chapter is dedicated exclusively to the measurement techniques used 
throughout the rest of the study. Particular focus is paid to issues of reliability and 
validity.  
 The data in this study are classified in four broad categories: the legislative 
activity of members, information related to their districts, characteristics of legislative 
elections, and state level institutional and opinion variation. Some of the data are largely 
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self-explanatory, and as such, I include brief descriptions of these variables in an 
appendix at the end of this chapter. What follows is a description and presentation of the 
less intuitive measures. 
Roll Call Voting Behavior in State Legislatures 
 To measure the roll call voting behavior of state legislators, I collected scorecards 
from a variety of state level interest group organizations. These groups included state 
chapters of the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), the Chamber of 
Commerce (COC), the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO), Right to Life (RTL), the National Association of 
Reproductive Rights and Liberties (NARAL), Planned Parenthood (PP), and the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). If the interest group organization(s) existed in 
the states, I attempted to contact each of them in all 50 states. I called and emailed the 
organizations and completed Internet searches for the scorecards until either receiving it 
by fax or email, finding it on the internet, discovering that it does not exist, or in rare 
cases having my request turned down.  
Project Vote Smart also collects these scorecards, but unfortunately only posts the 
scores of legislators currently serving, making their scores for 2000 (the primary year of 
analysis in this study) incomplete. Project Vote Smart, however, was a useful resource for 
phone numbers and Internet addresses for the various groups and provided a good 
indicator of which groups exist and are active scorers in any given state.  
Once collected, it became clear the scorecards were not of equal value. Some 
groups collected several dozen roll call votes, while others collected as few as one. Upon 
closer analysis, I decided to exclude any scorecards with fewer than five roll call votes, as 
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they tended to become unreliable when compared to other scorecards from the same 
state.17 Some groups provided simple endorsements of candidates. Because these 
scorecards do not have variation similar to those with a 0-100 percent support score, I 
removed them from the analysis. Finally, some groups surveyed members and either 
endorsed or provided some sort of support scale. I excluded these as theresponse rates 
were usually very low. Table 1 reports the remaining scorecards included in the study. 
Clearly, economic policy groups are much more prolific than social policy groups in 
generating scorecards. In addition, the South has many fewer groups, especially social 
groups, engaged in scoring vis-à-vis other regions. 
                                                 
17 The incidence of scores not meeting the .750 Cronbach’s Alpha threshold went up exponentially when 






 States and Interest Group Scorecards Included in this Study 
             
    Year NFIB COC AFL ALPHA CC RTL PP NARAL ACLU ALPHA
  Arizona 2000 X X  .841      -- 
  California 2000 X X X .979  X1 X X2 X .996 
  Colorado 2000 X  X .872    X3  -- 
  Connecticut 2000 X X X .901      -- 
  Georgia 2000 X   -- X4     -- 
  Idaho 2000 X   --   X   -- 
  Illinois 2000 X X X .955   X   -- 
  Indiana 1998 X X X .973   X  X .750 
  Iowa 2000 X X X .920  X X   .945 
  Kansas 1998  X  --      -- 
  Kentucky 2000 X   --      -- 
  Maine 2000 X X  .957  X X5   .891 
  Michigan 2000 X X X .958   X   -- 
  Minnesota 2000 X X X .955  X6  X7  .917 
  Missouri 2000 X   --      -- 
  Montana 1999 X X  .957      -- 
  New Mexico 2000 X   --      -- 
  New York 2000 X   -- X8   X  -- 
  North Carolina 2000 X   --      -- 
  North Dakota 1999 X  X .593      -- 
  Ohio 2000 X   --      -- 
  Oregon 2000 X X X .921     X -- 
  Pennsylvania 2000 X  X .794      -- 
  South Carolina 1998 X   --      -- 
  Utah 2000 X   --      -- 
  Vermont 2000 X  X .925      -- 
  Washington 2000 X  X .861      -- 
  West Virginia 2000   X --      -- 
  Wisconsin 2000 X X X .941  X X   .956 
 Wyoming 2000 X          
  
AVERAGE 
ALPHA     .900      .909 
1. Life Priority Network of California; 2. California NOW PAC; 3. Colorado Women’s Agenda; 4. 
Georgia Conservative Coalition; 5. Family Planning Association of Maine; 6. Minnesota Citizens 
Concerned for Life; 7. Minnesota NOW, 8. New Yorkers for Constitutional Freedoms PAC 
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Roll Call Liberalism 
 Each group assigns legislators an average support score with a range from 0 to 
100 based on the overall percent of votes that align with the groups position. For the 
liberal groups (AFL-CIO, PP, NARAL, ACLU), this is a roll call liberalism measure; for 
the conservative groups (NFIB, COC, RTL, CC) this amounts to a roll call conservatism 
measure. The scholarly precedent is to compute roll call or policy liberalism (Erikson, 
Wright, and McIver 1993) therefore, I recoded the conservative scores to point in a 
liberal direction. Based on the theoretical discussion in the last chapter, I have decided to 
treat economic and social policy separately. As such, I split these scorecards based on 
their issue focus. The economic policy groups include the NFIB, COC, and AFL-CIO and 
the social policy groups include the RTL, NARAL, PP, and ACLU.  
Because the same group scorecards do not exist in every state, and because 
scoring groups measure different votes from state to state, indexing these scores may 
create threats to internal reliability and validity through instrumentation problems 
(Campbell and Stanley 1963). As such, it is necessary to provide evidence that the 
scorecards are reliably measuring a common concept and that they are valid.  
To assess reliability, I computed a Cronbach’s Alpha score for each set of 
scorecards within each state (see Table 3.1). This creates a measure of the inter-
correlations of the scores where a coefficient of 1 would indicate identical measures 
between scorecards. Most scholars consider an Alpha of .750 an acceptable level to allow 
indexing and in all but one state (North Dakota), this minimum threshold is met.18 In fact, 
                                                 
18 The NFIB in North Dakota chose bills that were unusually bipartisan while the AFL chose bills which 
provided more variation. Subsequent models (in Chapter 4 and 5) were run with ND excluded and the 
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the average Alpha scores across states is above .9 indicating that these group scores are 
overwhelmingly measuring the same concept. Paying special attention to states that had 
both liberal and conservative scoring groups (AFL-CIO and NFIB for example), no 
systematic reduction in reliability is found. In addition, the ACLU, which is somewhat 
distinct among the social policy groups in that their focus includes more issues than 
reproductive and gay rights, no systematic reduction in reliability is present.  
 Across states, the reliability does not diminish. Economic scores with all three 
scoring groups present have an overall Alpha of .920. When only the NFIB and COC 
scorecards exist, the Alpha is .872; when only the NFIB and AFL exist, the Alpha is .870. 
The levels are similar among the social policy scoring groups with the overall Alpha 
never dropping below the .750 standard. This pattern of reliability provides confidence on 
two fronts. First, where more than one scorecard exists in a state, this demonstrates the 
groups are measuring a very similar construct. Second, it allows the assumption that 
when only one scorecard exists for any given state, it will reliably tap into the same 
construct that exists in states with more than one scoring group.  
 This evidence suggests reliability, but are these scores valid? In other words, are 
they measuring the intended concept? The most common standard for validity involves 
“face validation.” That is, do the measures yield results that reasonable people would 
agree are proper measures of the desired concept. A more stringent test of validity is 
“criterion validity” – that the measurement predicts or agrees with similar external 
measures (Cook and Campbell 1979). Ideally, this would involve coming up with another 
                                                                                                                                                 
changes, while working against my expectations, were not significant. I chose to keep ND in the model to 
preclude any notion that I am cheating with the scores I keep.  
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measure of roll call liberalism, or perhaps roll call partisanship, and comparing it to the 
scorecard data. In my case, this is unfortunately not possible.  
I can, however, compare state aggregated lower house (house or assembly) scores 
to aggregate upper house (senate) scores to see if one might predict the other. This is 
similar to what survey researches do when they break a sample by even and odd 
numbered respondents to look for similarities. The resulting correlation coefficient is 
.834, suggesting at the aggregate level the scores in one chamber are highly related to 
those in the other. Although this indicates that scorecards are measuring the same 
construct between chambers, it is admittedly only a weak test of validity.  
A second, a more stringent test of validity is the correlation between state 
aggregated roll call liberalism and state policy liberalism (as measured by Erikson Wright 
and McIver 1993). These measures are nearly a decade apart, but a correlation would 
nonetheless help to confirm validity. In this case, the correlation is .350 (p<.001), 
indicating a modest relationship between similar, but far from identical, constructs. 
Resulting policy, of course, involves the governor’s consent as well as the traversing of 
many institutional barriers before actual policy adoption. Therefore, the correlation 
between aggregate roll call liberalism and resulting policy liberalism (from a different 
time) should be taken with a grain of salt.  
Finally, Wright, and McIver (1993) found an impressive correlation between 
statewide opinion liberalism and state policy liberalism. As such, I would expect (if these 
roll call liberalism measures are valid) a solid relationship between roll call liberalism 
and state opinion liberalism. Unlike Erikson, Wright and McIver’s policy liberalism 
measure, which is essentially lost to time because of its unique components; Gerald 
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Wright continually updates the state opinion liberalism. The resulting correlation between 
my state aggregated roll call liberalism scores and state opinion liberalism in 2000 is .627 
and .624 (both p<.001) for economic and social policy roll call liberalism respectively. 
These three criterion test, combined, offer substantial evidence of validity for my roll call 
liberalism measures.  
 Beyond criterion validity, it is important for these measures to have “face 
validity.” In other words, to a reasonable observer, do these scores seem valid? To 
present the roll call liberalism of state legislators in a manageable way, I aggregate and 
present the average state roll call liberalism (see Table 3.2 an Table 3.3).  The states 
scoring most liberal on economic roll calls are California, Connecticut, Illinois, West 
Virginia, Vermont (especially the VT Senate), and Minnesota (especially the MN 
Senate). The states scoring the most conservative are Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, 
South Carolina, Utah, and Ohio. All of these scores make sense with the exception of 
Ohio, which is notably more conservative than expected for a state with a good number 





 Economic Roll Call Liberalism in State Legislatures 
  Lower Chamber (House or Assembly) Upper Chamber (Senate) 
    N Ave. Min. Max. S.D N Ave. Min. Max. S.D 
  Arizona 60 30 0 74 22 29 35 0 83 24 
  California 79 53 1 94 37 40 58 2 99 40 
  Colorado 65 36 0 84 35 35 38 0 89 35 
  Connecticut 150 50 7 95 22 36 53 18 90 16 
  Georgia 159 41 0 80 23 54 46 0 83 28 
  Idaho 68 15 0 73 21 33 16 0 43 13 
  Illinois 117 53 4 100 28 58 51 6 100 26 
  Indiana 100 47 2 90 28 50 47 10 100 30 
  Iowa 100 38 0 89 32 50 42 0 95 37 
  Kansas 116 16 0 50 16 -- -- -- -- -- 
  Kentucky 100 25 0 57 14 37 11 0 37 11 
  Maine 149 37 0 95 32 34 32 0 89 29 
  Michigan 110 38 0 88 35 38 42 5 100 36 
  Minnesota 132 48 7 93 31 66 56 16 100 25 
  Missouri 153 37 0 86 37 31 45 0 83 40 
  Montana 100 26 0 91 37 50 24 0 89 28 
  New Mexico 69 38 0 75 26 42 35 0 67 22 
  New York 149 46 10 56 13 61 48 8 57 10 
  North Carolina 112 44 0 100 25 -- -- -- -- -- 
  North Dakota 98 28 8 65 18 49 42 11 100 21 
  Ohio 93 20 0 80 22 33 14 0 90 20 
  Oregon 59 32 0 86 28 30 39 0 91 36 
  Pennsylvania 202 52 15 79 18 50 49 0 100 36 
  South Carolina 110 16 0 83 26 -- -- -- -- -- 
  Utah 75 31 0 80 25 29 28 0 62 22 
  Vermont 145 45 0 100 35 30 62 21 95 25 
  Washington 94 29 0 100 30 49 46 0 88 34 
  West Virginia 95 62 16 100 24 16 54 33 88 18 
  Wisconsin 99 46 18 89 25 33 53 16 75 25 







 Social Roll Call Liberalism in State Legislatures 
  Lower Chamber (House or Assembly) Upper Chamber (Senate) 
    N Ave. Min. Max. S.D N Ave. Min. Max. S.D 
  California 79 63 8 98 36 40 67 7 100 39 
  Colorado 65 36 10 100 34 35 75 38 100 22 
  Idaho 36 38 0 100 39 14 42 0 100 45 
  Illinois 106 68 0 100 32 53 46 0 100 41 
  Indiana 86 46 0 100 27 50 37 10 87 23 
  Iowa 100 36 0 100 34 50 34 0 100 32 
  Maine 147 56 0 100 42 32 60 0 100 38 
  Michigan 110 34 0 100 46 37 30 0 100 43 
  Minnesota 132 42 0 100 40 66 53 0 100 43 
  New York 140 63 0 100 44 61 42 0 100 47 
  Oregon 59 38 0 100 41 30 43 0 100 37 






The states consistently scoring the most liberal on social roll calls are California, 
Maine, and Illinois while those scoring the most conservative are Iowa and Michigan. 
One peculiarity is Colorado, which has a conservative score in the State House and the 
most liberal score in the State Senate.19 Despite these few oddities, there appears to be 
“face validation” for the operationalization of scorecards as proxies for the ideology of 
state legislators’ roll call votes across states. One might be concerned that the scale of 
conservatism to liberalism is completely different from state to state, but that does not 
appear to be the case. These groups have a relatively standard idea of what is, and what is 
not, support for their issue positions and they enforce their view across the states and they 
do not appear to adjust their ideology based on characteristics related to their home state.     
 A district level graphic presentation of roll call ideology offers further evidence of 
“face validity.” Mapping out the distribution of roll call ideology in Oregon (see Map 
3.1) reveals expected variation. East of the Cascades, are a conglomeration of rural 
districts where a predominantly moralistic and individualistic conservatism prevails.20 
This conservatism is most apparent on social issues. Areas west of the Cascades are 
dominated by much more liberal cities descending from Portland in the north, down 
through Salem and Albany to Eugene in the middle of the state – west the Cascades. 
Thus, the cultural divide along the Cascades is represented in the roll call voting behavior 
of Oregon’s legislators. This geographic distribution of roll call liberalism, lends further 
                                                 
19 This likely relates to the fact that the Colorado House was controlled by Republicans and the Senate 
controlled by Democrats. The ability to control the agenda, in this case, affected the level of roll call 
liberalism.  
20 Elazar’s field notes on Oregon are available at http://www.jcpa.org/dje/articles3/oregon.htm 
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evidence scorecards having sufficient “face validity” to be used as measures of roll call 


































Economic Roll Call Liberalism 
Most Conservative 0-25
More Conservative 26-50
More Liberal 51-75 
Most Liberal 76-100Social Roll Call Liberalism 
Map 3.1:  




 One important caveat is in order regarding the use of scorecards. No groups exist, 
and thus no scorecards are made, relating to non-controversial or non-salient issues. 
Simply the fact that these groups exist suggests that the issues they care about, and thus 
the scorecards they produce, are measuring the ideology of members on the most 
contentious issues of the day. As such, a built in salience exists in these measures. This 
almost certainly means that these measures overestimate the amount of conflict in state 
legislatures, but this is a benefit for studies of roll call responsiveness. It is more useful to 
examine the roll call responsiveness of members to their constituents on matters that are 
of pressing public concern as opposed to the least salient issues. If the inclusion of non-
salient issues were to result in congruence, the implications for representation would be 
far less than congruence discovered on the most salient issues.  
Roll Call Extremism and Chamber Polarization 
 Derived from the policy liberalism scores are two additional variables key to this 
study – roll call extremism and chamber polarization. By folding in half the roll call 
liberalism measure, I generate a roll call extremism measure for each legislator. Instead 
of the ideological range, conservative to liberal, extremism measures ideological intensity 
from moderate to extreme. For example, if a legislator received a score of 100 from the 
AFL-CIO and a 0 from the NFIB, the legislator would have a 100 percent liberal 
economic roll call ideology (NFIB is recoded in a liberal direction). That legislator would 
also have a 100 percent extremism score. On the other hand, a legislator with a 50 percent 
economic roll call liberalism score (average of group scores) would have a roll call 
extremism of 0. The same procedure applies to my creation of social roll call extremism.  
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Analyzing the state averages for levels of roll call extremism yields intuitive 
results with states like California (ranking high in levels of economic extremism) and 
Connecticut and West Virginia (ranking relatively low). On social roll call extremism 
California, Michigan and New York rank among the most extreme, while Colorado and 
Indiana rank relatively low.  
California, Michigan and New York, the most extremist oriented states overall 
have competing urban and rural areas, are diverse racially, and have professional 
legislatures; characteristics that likely lead to extremism. Each of these states also 
contains an individualistic component in their political culture (Elazar 1972). Such states 
are noted for viewing politics as a “dirty” game and where parties are strong and the 
divisions on issues tend to fall along partisan lines. Colorado, Connecticut, and West 
Virginia are more noted for the moralistic component in their political cultures where 
politics is viewed as a healthy exchange of ideas on issues, as opposed to entrenched 






 Economic Roll Call Extremism in State Legislatures 
  Lower Chamber (House or Assembly) Upper Chamber (Senate) 
    N Ave. Min. Max. S.D N Ave. Min. Max. S.D 
  Arizona 60 53 1 100 27 29 40 0 100 38 
  California 79 72 10 98 19 40 80 39 98 12 
  Colorado 65 71 2 100 26 35 67 2 100 29 
  Connecticut 150 37 0 90 22 36 27 3 80 18 
  Georgia 159 41 0 100 29 54 52 0 100 24 
  Idaho 68 76 0 100 32 33 67 14 100 27 
  Illinois 117 51 1 100 20 58 46 7 100 23 
  Indiana 100 54 7 97 19 50 57 1 100 20 
  Iowa 100 65 6 100 23 50 74 40 100 16 
  Kansas 116 69 0 100 31 -- -- -- -- -- 
  Kentucky 100 50 0 100 27 37 77 26 100 22 
  Maine 149 61 0 100 32 34 57 12 100 35 
  Michigan 110 69 1 100 25 38 70 1 100 18 
  Minnesota 132 59 10 86 18 66 48 11 100 16 
  Missouri 153 72 14 100 29 31 74 0 100 28 
  Montana 100 63 2 100 34 50 68 12 100 32 
  New Mexico 69 48 0 100 30 42 39 0 100 35 
  New York 149 68 0 90 25 61 62 0 94 19 
  North Carolina 112 43 0 100 28 -- -- -- -- -- 
  North Dakota 98 49 0 85 28 49 41 8 100 17 
  Ohio 93 66 0 100 34 33 76 12 100 29 
  Oregon 59 61 8 100 27 30 70 15 100 25 
  Pennsylvania 202 33 0 70 13 50 66 20 100 29 
  South Carolina 110 79 0 100 31 -- -- -- -- -- 
  Utah 75 53 0 100 35 29 50 0 100 38 
  Vermont 145 67 4 100 25 30 49 0 90 26 
  Washington 94 65 1 100 33 49 34 6 100 24 
  West Virginia 95 43 0 100 32 16 29 0 76 21 
  Wisconsin 99 47 0 75 17 33 47 7 69 15 







 Social Roll Call Extremism in State Legislatures 
  Lower Chamber (House or Assembly) Upper Chamber (Senate) 
    N Ave. Min. Max. S.D N Ave. Min. Max. S.D 
  California 79 73 0 96 12 40 82 17 100 18 
  Colorado 65 64 0 100 33 35 52 0 100 40 
  Idaho 36 86 20 100 22 14 85 38 100 23 
  Illinois 106 64 0 100 35 53 77 0 100 25 
  Indiana 86 49 7 100 49 50 48 5 80 21 
  Iowa 100 68 0 100 27 50 64 0 100 31 
  Maine 147 79 0 100 29 32 72 0 100 32 
  Michigan 110 95 16 100 13 37 91 8 100 24 
  Minnesota 132 76 2 100 31 66 81 0 100 29 
  New York 140 86 0 100 31 61 91 0 100 23 
  Oregon 59 81 14 100 29 30 67 14 100 34 






 To compute chamber polarization, I find the absolute distance between the 
average policy liberalism score of both parties in each chamber. As expected, states 
scoring high on economic chamber polarization include California and Michigan, states 
scoring low include Connecticut and particularly Kansas and Kentucky. The chambers 
are overall much more polarized on their levels of social polarization, with California, 
Michigan, Minnesota, and Oregon being the most polar, while Colorado, Illinois, and 





 Economic Policy Polarization in State Legislative Chambers 
  Lower Chamber (House or Assembly) Upper Chamber (Senate) 








Liberalism Polarization  
  Arizona 51 19 32 53 21 32  
  California 83 9 74 88 8 80  
  Colorado 77 10 67 73 11 62  
  Connecticut 63 27 36 66 40 26  
  Georgia 53 27 26 64 15 50  
  Idaho 51 7 44 27 15 12  
  Illinois 77 27 50 76 30 16  
  Indiana 72 23 49 80 25 55  
  Iowa 73 10 63 86 13 74  
  Kansas 18 14 4 -- -- --  
  Kentucky 27 23 4 18 5 13  
  Maine 66 5 61 51 6 45  
  Michigan 74 6 68 84 15 69  
  Minnesota 80 20 60 74 27 47  
  Missouri 67 2 65 79 4 76  
  Montana 53 8 45 50 13 37  
  New Mexico 59 11 48 50 13 37  
  New York 80 24 56 85 23 62  
  North Carolina 62 23 39 -- -- --  
  North Dakota 50 17 33 66 28 39  
  Ohio 55 4 51 60 6 54  
  Oregon 61 10 51 69 16 53  
  Pennsylvania 68 36 32 87 23 65  
  South Carolina 34 2 32 -- -- --  
  Utah 61 19 42 45 17 29  
  Vermont 71 13 58 81 38 44  
  Washington 53 5 48 75 11 63  
  West Virginia 69 40 29 57 39 19  
  Wisconsin 71 25 46 75 29 46  







 Social Policy Polarization in State Legislative Chambers 
  Lower Chamber (House or Assembly) Upper Chamber (Senate) 









  California 92 22 70 95 20 75 
  Colorado 98 42 56 95 59 36 
  Idaho 73 17 56 85 38 48 
  Illinois 83 52 31 79 20 59 
  Indiana 65 26 39 56 24 32 
  Iowa 59 17 41 60 18 42 
  Maine 75 35 40 66 52 14 
  Michigan 67 5 62 70 3 67 
  Minnesota 77 10 67 77 13 65 
  New York 83 24 58 81 14 67 
  Oregon 82 6 77 77 16 61 






Mass Opinion in State Legislative Districts 
 Perhaps the greatest methodological struggle for scholars of responsiveness, at 
both the congressional and state legislative level, is their ability to operationalize citizen 
opinion in legislative districts. As mentioned, national surveys typically have 2,000 or 
fewer respondents while the nation has more than 7,500 state legislative districts. 
Aggregating dozens of opinion surveys may provide valid measures of state level opinion 
(Erikson, Wright and McIver 1993), but they fall far short of providing valid district level 
measures of opinion. 
District Liberalism 
 Approximations of district liberalism take many forms. Presidential election 
results are a frequently used surrogate for district opinion (Fleisher 1993; Glazer and 
Robbins 1985; LeoGrande and Jeydel 1997; Nice and Cohen 1993). The problem 
associated with using election results as a measure of district opinion is that depending on 
the year and the candidate, wide swings can occur which are likely a reflection of the 
candidate and not an underlying ideological orientation in the district.  
 Demographics are a common substitute for district liberalism (Pool, Abelson, and 
Popkin 1965; Sinclair-Deckard 1976; Weber and Shaffer 1972). Using demographics to 
approximate district opinion typically involves the use of Census information, often racial 
composition, education, income, age, class, urbanization etc., to model the roll-call 
behavior of legislators. This approach assumes that individuals’ demographics relate 
systematically to their policy preferences, and that aggregate demographic characteristics 
and aggregate policy preferences are a reflection of the individual level. Ardoin and 
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Garand (2003) warn that this has the potential to violate classic notions of the ecological 
fallacy – that processes operating at the individual level need not happen at the aggregate 
level. The evidence suggests the use of demographics alone is only imperfectly related to 
policy preferences of citizens and always predicts just a small portion of the variance 
(Ardoin and Garand 2003).  
 The more promising use of “bottom-up” simulations (Weber and Shaffer 1972; 
Sullivan and Uslaner 1978; Uslaner and Weber 1979) use demographic data available at 
the district level, as well as knowledge of the relationship between individuals’ 
demographic characteristics and their policy positions, to approximate district liberalism. 
This procedure involves obtaining individual level regression estimates and then 
substituted these means into regression models that predict district-level opinion. 
Potential problems associated with this model include exceedingly low levels of fit with 
the data. Adjusted R2 levels often fall below .20, leaving district-level opinion measures 
with a large amount of random error (Ardoin and Garand 2003).  
The measure I use in this study was developed by Ardoin and Garand (2003) at 
the congressional district level and is a “top down” simulation of district opinion. Their 
approach has two basic steps. First, using OLS regression, state ideological liberalism (as 
measured Wright’s aggregation of CBS/NYT in 2000) is predicted using various state 
level demographic and political variables. Second, this 50 state OLS equation is applied 
to analogous district level demographic and political variables with the resulting 
predicted values representing the ideological orientation of the districts. The fifty states 
are essentially used as a template that is applied at the district level. 
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The challenge for applying this method at the state legislative level is developing 
enough analogous demographic and political variables at the district level that also 
produce a 50 state, first stage, model with a good deal of explained variance. I will first 
present the 50 state model, before explaining the method used to obtain the same 
measures at the district level. The first stage model is: 
State Opinion Liberalism = a+b1(vote for Gore)+b2(vote for Nader)+ b3(vote for 
Buchanan)  +b4(percent service workers)+b5(percent farm workers)+b5(percent 
receiving pubic assistance) +b5(percent with a college degree) +b6(percent living 
in poverty)+ b7(percent Evangelical)+b8(Northeast)+b9(West)+b10(south) +e. 
For the first stage to be an accurate predictor of district liberalism, particular attention 
must be paid to the adjusted R2 of the model. Ardoin and Garand’s simulation of 
congressional district opinion produces a state level model with an adjusted R2 of .701. 
The model I employ produces an adjusted R2 of .877 with a good fit (see Table 3.8). The 






 Modeling Opinion Liberalism at the State Level  
 (for use in Predicting District Level Ideology) 
   β  (se) P >׀z ׀   
  Vote for Gore    .597 .100 .001 
  Vote for Nader  .857 .360 .012 
  Voter for Buchanan   -3.175 1.476 .020 
  Percent Service Workers  .267 .162 .054 
  Percent Government Workers -.305 .333 .184 
  Percent Farm Workers  .527 .218 .011 
  Percent Receiving Public Assistance  1.147 .701 .056 
  Percent with a College Degree -.281 .169 .052 
  Percent Living in Poverty    -.905 .257 .001 
  Percent Evangelical   -.175 .079 .017 
  Northeast  3.257 1.720 .034 
  West   4.562 1.561 .003 
  South  3.408 1.713 .028 
  Constant -46.856 10.794  
  Adjusted R2 .877   
  N 47   





 The second stage of the model requires district level independent variables 
analogous to the state level independent variables. The measures for region are simply 
dummy variables for the census categorization of region and the district values for 
percent with a college degree and the various economic sectors come from the Almanac 
of State Legislatures (Lilley, DeFranco and Diefenderfer 1994). The election totals, 
percent receiving public assistance, percent living in poverty, and percent Evangelical, 
required the use of Graphic Information System software to compute at the district level. 
Election totals and percent Evangelical at the county level were obtained from Lublin and 
Voss (2001) and Jones et al (2001) respectively.21 The percent receiving public assistance 
and percent living in poverty at the census tract level were obtained from the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  
All of these values were mapped and state legislative shape files overlaid. By 
identifying the legislative district that the centroid of each county or tract shape file 
occupied, I then expanded the various data files to the overlaid district level. This 
provided a close approximation of these characteristics in each district. In the case of 
census tract data, these tiny units were easily centered in legislative districts and when 
expanded to the district level are likely to be very reliable estimators. For county level 
data, the method is more reliable in large (rural) legislative districts, and less reliable in 
                                                 
21 Percent Evangelical is the number of adherents in the districts who belong to a denomination determined 
to be Evangelical as opposed to Mainline Protestant, Black Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Liberal Non-
Traditional, Conservative Non-Traditional, Orthodox, and other (Hindu, Muslim, Eastern, .etc.). For a list 
of the 99 different Evangelical denominations, and/or the denominations fitting into the other categories, 
please contact the author.  
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counties with several legislative districts (urban). It is, however, the only method 
available.  
 Like studies of mass ideology (Fiorina 2005), the resulting district liberalism 
measure takes on a normal, not bimodal, distribution (see Figure 3.1). Unlike national 
samples of opinion liberalism, however, the center of the district liberalism distribution is 
slightly to the left of center. This is a function of the sample of states in this study. 
Northern, Midwestern and Western states are over-sampled vis-à-vis Southern states. 
Because of the extremely good fit in the first stage model, I am certain that if more 
Southern states were included in the study the mean of the distribution would move 
slightly to the right and be centered between .4 and .5 on the liberalism scale and fall 
closer inline with national survey data. It is aggregated national surveys, after all, upon 
which estimates from the first stage are based.  
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Figure 3.1:  
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 The state averages of district liberalism fall inline closely with what we would 
expect from mass ideology in states (see Table 3.9). The correlation between these 
averages and Wright’s aggregate state ideology measures is .895, which is to be expected 
as Wright’s measure is a component of the estimation. States like New York, California, 
Vermont, and Connecticut are the most liberal while Georgia, North Dakota, Wyoming 





 Mass Ideology in State House Districts 
    N Ave. Min. Max. S.D  
  Arizona 60 .53 .31 .68 .9  
  California 79 .67 ..48 .91 .11  
  Colorado 65 .59 ..40 .78 .10  
  Connecticut 150 .73 .53 .85 .6  
  Georgia 159 .45 .18 .76 .13  
  Idaho 68 .41 .11 .54 .8  
  Illinois 117 .63 .36 .83 .12  
  Indiana 100 .46 .16 .71 .10  
  Iowa 100 .61 .31 .78 .8  
  Kansas 116 .45 .16 .77 .10  
  Kentucky 100 .47 .21 .82 .13  
  Maine 149 .66 .7 .83 .8  
  Michigan 110 .60 .34 .82 .11  
  Minnesota 132 .62 .37 .81 .9  
  Missouri 153 .50 .27 .71 .10  
  Montana 100 .50 .18 .78 .11  
  New Mexico 69 .57 .33 .80 .11  
  New York 149 .73 .47 .100 .12  
  North Carolina 112 .45 .28 .64 .9  
  North Dakota 98 .39 .21 .55 .8  
  Ohio 93 .54 .37 .76 .10  
  Oregon 59 .65 .38 .87 .12  
  Pennsylvania 202 .64 .21 .94 .12  
  South Carolina 110 .40 .5 .60 .10  
  Utah 75 .44 .0 .63 .14  
  Vermont 145 .72 .34 .87 .7  
  Washington 94 .66 .50 .79 .8  
  West Virginia 95 .54 .39 .86 .9  
  Wisconsin 99 .57 .38 .78 .9  
 Wyoming 57 .44 .29 .62 .8  
Only the lower chamber is shown because these aggregate values are almost identical   





 More important, the districts within states where we would expect to see 
ideological variation seem intuitively aligned (see Map 3.2). The most liberal districts of 
Ohio are in Cleveland, Toledo, and Youngstown; with the northeast section of the state 
being the more liberal region overall. Pockets of liberalism are also identifiable around 
Columbus, Dayton and Cincinnati. In New York, the most liberal sections are in New 
York City and Long Island as well as Buffalo. Oregon is most liberal in greater Portland, 
with the overall ideological division running along the Cascades (notice the only liberal 
eastern districts extend into the west). South Carolina, as expected, has mostly 
conservative districts with small clusters of liberal districts around Columbia and Myrtle 
Beach. Between states, the dynamics also seem intuitive. Ohio and Oregon show regional 
diversity (they were picked for presentation because of these political divisions). New 
York is overall more liberal with its pockets of extreme liberalism. The opposite is true of 































Map 3.2:  
The Ideology of Citizens Living in State House Districts 
Ohio New York
Oregon South Carolina 





 Another dimension of opinion relates to district diversity. To what extent are 
districts homogeneous or heterogeneous? State diversity is known to correlate with party 
competition, inequality, and public policy output (Sullivan 1973). District diversity likely 
relates to the extremism of roll calls at the district level. To measure district diversity, I 
employ the Sullivan’s diversity index at the district level.22 I create three measures of 
diversity: economic, racial, and religions. The data for these measures come from the 
2000 U.S. Census and the 2000 Glenmary Religion data (Jones et al 2002).  
The computation formula for the Sullivan (1973) diversity index is: 
AW=1-(∑Yk2 / V) where AW represents the probability that a randomly selected pair of 
individuals will differ in their holding of the measured characteristic. Yk represents the 
proportion of the population falling into a given category within the variable and V 
represents the number of variables. For example, to measure the racial diversity of 
District X (60 percent White, 30 percent Black, 5 percent Latino, and 5 percent Asian):  
∑ Yk= [(.602) + (.302)+(.052)+(.052); therefore, AW=1-(.455/1) or .55. The probability that 
if an infinite number of pairs were selected randomly from a finite population, the 
average proportion of unshared race of these pairs would be .55. In real world terms: this 
district has a moderate amount of racial diversity.  
I follow this procedure for each district. For economic diversity, the categories are 
the percent of the population in manufacturing, service, government, and farm sectors. 
For racial diversity, the categories are percent of population White, Black, Latino, and 
                                                 
22 Although commonly referred to as the Sullivan Index, it was actually developed by Lieberson (1969).  
 
 76
Asian (see example above). For religious diversity, the categories are percent of the 
population Evangelical, mainline Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, other.  
 These three measures of diversity measure distinct constructs (see Figure 3.2). 
Economic diversity is normally distributed with a mean of .39, while racial diversity has 
a sharp right skew with an average of .18, and religious diversity is left skewed with an 
average diversity of .62.23 Economic and religious diversity reveal primarily intra-state 
variation as their aggregate totals at the state level show few signs of variation (see Table 
3.10). Racial diversity, however, show some expected inter-state variation. The most 
racially diverse states are California, New Mexico, and South Carolina; the least diverse 
are Maine, Vermont, Montana, and Iowa. 
                                                 
23 The highest correlation between these measures is only .10, between economic and religious diversity.    
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Figure 3.2:   
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 Diversity in State House Districts 







  Arizona 60 .38 .32 .58  
  California 79 .44 .49 .60  
  Colorado 65 .41 .28 .57  
  Connecticut 150 .45 .22 .64  
  Georgia 159 .38 .32 .59  
  Idaho 68 .39 .12 .59  
  Illinois 117 .40 .26 .66  
  Indiana 100 .38 .13 .60  
  Iowa 100 .37 .7 .66  
  Kansas 116 .38 .17 .65  
  Kentucky 100 .34 .12 .61  
  Maine 149 .38 .2 .52  
  Michigan 110 .40 .17 .58  
  Minnesota 132 .40 .9 .70  
  Missouri 153 .36 .13 .65  
  Montana 100 .35 .4 .61  
  New Mexico 69 .36 .43 .63  
  New York 149 .40 .30 .64  
  North Carolina 112 .38 .32 .60  
  North Dakota 98 .38 .32 .60  
  Ohio 93 .38 .17 .62  
  Oregon 59 .39 .14 .49  
  Pennsylvania 202 .38 .14 .66  
  South Carolina 110 .38 .37 .60  
  Utah 75 .40 .13 .47  
  Vermont 145 .41 .2 .55  
  Washington 94 .42 .20 .52  
  West Virginia 95 .33 .7 .53  
  Wisconsin 99 .39 .10 .68  
 Wyoming 57 .38 .13 .64  
Only the lower chamber is shown because these aggregate values are almost identical 




 Using Ohio as a case study illustrates typical patterns of variation within states 
(see Map 3.3). Economic diversity is greatest in suburban districts where the various 
economic sectors tend to mix. Intercity districts are dominated by manufacturing jobs, 
while the most rural districts have a greater percentage of farm employees. Racial 
diversity is most noted in inner-ring suburban districts. Both the intercity districts and the 
rural districts exhibit the highest levels of racial homogeneity. Religious diversity 
exhibits a regional pattern. Southern Ohio, which shares a similar demography with 
Appalachia, is overwhelmingly Evangelical, while the north mixes in a greater number of 
















































Map 3.3:  
The Diversity of Ohio Citizens by State House District 
Economic Diversity 
More Diverse .39-.43 
Most Diverse .44-.51 
Less Diverse .34-.38 
Least Diverse .24-.33 
Least Diverse .02-.06 
Less Diverse .07-.15 
More Diverse .16-.27 
Most Diverse .28-.55 
Racial Diversity 
Religious Diversity 
Most Diverse .66-.71 
More Diverse .60-.66 
Less Diverse .50-.59 
Least Diverse .41-.49 
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Campaign Characteristics of Legislative Districts 
Electoral Competition 
 An advantage of studying representation at the district, as opposed to the state, 
level is that measures of electoral competition are much more straightforward. Like 
congressional election scholars (Herrnson 2004), I measure competitiveness directly from 
election results. I do this by calculating the winning margin of legislators, which is 
simply the percent received by the winning candidate minus that of their closest 
opponent. Because I am interested in competitiveness as a condition for representation, 
that condition must exist and be known prior to the legislative sessions in which I am 
measuring responsiveness. As such, the competitiveness data is drawn from the election 
immediately preceding the year for which I collected the interest group scorecards (see 
Table 3.1). For most states this means 1998 elections, however for a handful of states that 
have four year terms, or for states with scorecards from 1998, the competitiveness 
analysis was done in 1996.  
 A good amount of variation exists in the levels of electoral competition in state 
legislatures circa 1998 (see Table 3.11). Some states, like Michigan, California, and Utah, 
had two party competition in all but a few House races. Other states, like South Carolina, 
Georgia and New Mexico, had more than 50 percent of statehouse races go uncontested. 
The average margin of victory in states was similarly varied. In every state, except North 
Dakota (average margin of 16 percent), the average margin of victory in the lower house 
was above 30 percent, with many states exceeding 60 percent average winning margins. 
Using a 10 percent margin (or less) as an indicator of competitiveness, some states, like 
Vermont, North Dakota, and West Virginia, had 40 percent or more of more races that 
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were competitive. Eight states in the study had fewer than 10 percent of races turn out to 
be competitive. Overall, these measures of competitiveness are slightly lower in the upper 
chambers of the state legislatures. State senators often have longer terms and greater 
visibility than their colleagues in the lower chambers of state government likely leading 





 Electoral Characteristics in State Legislatures 
  Lower Chamber (House or Assembly) Upper Chamber (Senate) 








a Margin of 








a Margin of 
< 10% 
  Arizona 60 36 44 37 30 57 71 13 
  California 79 4 36 11 40 3 31 20 
  Colorado 65 14 37 25 35 23 35 40 
  Connecticut 151 25 50 9 36 17 45 6 
  Georgia 180 59 70 8 56 52 66 9 
  Idaho 70 50 66 6 35 57 70 3 
  Illinois 118 49 66 10 59 47 68 8 
  Indiana 100 25 48 15 50 44 60 14 
  Iowa 100 33 49 20 50 20 36 26 
  Kansas 125 33 51 13 40 20 43 23 
  Kentucky 100 50 61 13 38 13 30 32 
  Maine 150 23 41 20 34 15 35 24 
  Michigan 110 1 37 18 38 0 36 13 
  Minnesota 133 5 29 17 66 2 26 20 
  Missouri 162 37 56 11 33 12 38 6 
  Montana 100 41 53 22 50 38 53 14 
  New Mexico 70 53 64 14 42 31 47 19 
  New York 150 13 58 5 61 15 62 2 
  North Carolina 120 37 47 32 50 30 41 38 
  North Dakota 98 8 16 65 49 10 27 24 
  Ohio 99 11 40 8 33 3 32 12 
  Oregon 59 17 39 17 30 20 42 36 
  Pennsylvania 203 38 65 4 50 32 56 14 
  South Carolina 124 72 78 9 -- -- -- -- 
  Utah 75 4 38 11 29 10 36 28 
  Vermont 146 20 31 40 30 0 10 73 
  Washington 98 27 44 22 49 24 40 39 
  West Virginia 101 20 32 43 17 24 40 12 
  Wisconsin 99 35 58 7 33 24 46 21 
 Wyoming 60 48 58 18 30 53 63 10 
Year – first election preceding 2000. In most cases, this is 1998 with a few from 1996 because of 4 year 





 These results are typical to levels of competitiveness found a decade ago. Tucker 
and Weber (1992) found many legislative races to be contested, but found lopsided 
general election victories. Typically, about three quarters of incumbent legislators are 
reelected (Breaux and Jewell 1992; Tucker and Weber 1992). As such, state legislative 
elections exhibit about the same levels of competitiveness as races for the U.S. House 
(Patterson 1996).  
Interest Group Support 
 At the federal level, campaign finance information for candidates is made 
available by the Federal Election Commission and made more accessible to journalists 
and the public through the Center for Responsive Politics. The Institution on Money in 
State Politics is in many ways the equivalent of the CRP at the state legislative level. The 
Institute was founded in 1999 and has conducted campaign finance research in states 
where programs did not exist, upgraded and standardized research where they did, and 
brought the results together on its Web site in an accessible and searchable format. The 
existence of campaign finance records at the state legislative level makes it possible to 
study the responsiveness of legislators to their interest group constituencies. Having all of 
the information in one place and in one format makes this process much easier.   
From the Institute, I collected the total amount of money legislators raised and the 
aggregate amounts donated to them from various economic sectors and interest groups 
for each legislator. The Institute collects their data from state disclosure agencies to 
which candidates must file their campaign finance reports. Political donors are then 
assigned an economic interest code, based either on the occupation and employer 
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information contained in the disclosure reports or on information found through a variety 
of resources. Currently, this data is the lowest level of aggregation available from the 
Institute. Like the competitiveness measures, these data come from the election preceding 
the session for which roll call data was collected (see Table 3.1). For most years, this 
means campaign finance records from 1998.  
When conducting cross-state research, the total dollar amounts must be 
standardized in some way to account for the fact that the amount of money required to 
run a campaign varies from state to state. Some states have extraordinarily expensive 
legislative elections, while others cost next to nothing (see Table 3.12). The average total 
receipts of legislators running for election in California in 1998 was $677,000. The 
average receipts in North Dakota and Vermont, however, was about $1,000.24   
                                                 





 Campaign Finance in State House Districts 
    N 
Average Total 












  Arizona 60 $30,000 47 4 1  
  California 79 $677,000 34 11 1  
  Colorado 65 $19,000 53 6 2  
  Connecticut 151 $20,000 31 7 1  
  Georgia 180 $37,000 35 2 1  
  Idaho 70 $9,000 63 5 2  
  Illinois 118 $202,000 44 15 1  
  Indiana 100 $52,000 48 8 <1  
  Iowa 100 $38,000 64 5 3  
  Kansas 125 $16,000 61 5 1  
  Kentucky 100 $23,000 59 3 3  
  Maine 150 $7,000 39 4 3  
  Michigan 110 $65,000 50 10 1  
  Minnesota 133 $24,000 9 5 <1  
  Missouri 162 $30,000 59 7 <1  
  Montana 100 $5,000 45 6 1  
  New Mexico 70 $25,000 52 3 2  
  New York 150 $57,000 61 5 2  
  North Carolina 120 $58,000 53 1 <1  
  North Dakota 98 $1,000 40 24 1  
  Ohio 99 $92,000 55 5 5  
  Oregon 59 $91.000 65 12 1  
  Pennsylvania 203 $69,000 31 11 1  
  South Carolina 124 $20,000 33 2 <1  
  Utah 75 $12,000 54 11 2  
  Vermont 146 $1,000 29 2 6  
  Washington 98 $57,000 55 6 5  
  West Virginia 101 $21,000 57 7 1  
  Wisconsin 99 $24,000 57 7 1  
 Wyoming 60 $3,000 51 9 <1  
Year – first election preceding 2000. In most cases, this is 1998 with a few from 1996 
because of 4 year terms. Because percentages are similar between chambers, only the 





 Percent of candidate receipts from business groups include donations made by 
groups and individuals who report affiliation with business interests.25 Labor is assigned 
its own category as are single issue/ideological groups. By far, the largest donating sector 
is the business community. The average amount of business contributions to state 
legislators ranges from 9 percent of total receipts in Minnesota to as much as 65 percent 
of total receipts in Oregon. Labor is the second most prolific interest sector, in terms of 
donations, while single issue/ideological groups provide a much smaller amount of 
money to legislators as a percent of their overall funds.  
State Level Opinion Characteristics 
 Most variables in this study are measured at the district level. Some measures, 
however, are only available at the state level. For some of these measures, the state or 
chamber is the primary unit of analysis: divided government, chamber competition, 
legislative professionalism. For two measures, however, the states are simply the lowest 
level available. These variables include mass partisan polarization and elite party 
polarization.   
Mass Polarization in the States 
 A standard question asked on public opinion surveys gauges respondents strength 
of partisanship. Respondents are typically asked to answer on a seven-point scale from 
                                                 
25 Business interests include those classified by the Institute as: agriculture, communications & electronics, 
construction, defense, energy & natural resources, finance insurance & real estate, general business, health, 
transportation. These sectors display enough inter-correlation to justify their aggregation into a business 
index (Cronbach’s Alpha = .876).    
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strong Republican to strong Democrat. By obtaining the average responses in a state for 
each party, the distance between is a measure of mass polarization. I use aggregated 
CBS/NYT polls to obtain this measure.26  
 The resulting mass polarization in each state reveals some expected results (see 
Table 3.13). Democrats were most liberal in Vermont and Connecticut. Republicans were 
most conservative in Idaho, Montana and New Mexico. Party identifiers were most 
different in Vermont and most similar in South Carolina and West Virginia.  
                                                 
26 I obtained this data from Gerald Wright and am very grateful for his assistance. Because this data was 
aggregated as percent of Democrats who were liberal, moderate and conservative and percent of 
Republicans who were liberal, moderate, and conservative, I transformed these percentages in each sate 
back to a seven point (0-6) scale. I did this in the following manner: By state (% dem. conservatives*0)+(% 
dem. moderates*3)+(% dem. liberals*6))/(sum of all three). I repeated the technique for Republicans. This 





 Mass and Elite Polarization in the States 
  Mass Elite 













  Arizona 3.6 1.6 1.9 4.6 1.5 3.1 
  California 3.7 1.8 1.9 4.9 1.7 3.2 
  Colorado 3.9 1.9 2.0 4.5 1.4 3.1 
  Connecticut 4.1 1.9 2.2 4.6 2.1 2.6 
  Georgia 3.2 1.7 1.6 4.6 1.3 3.3 
  Idaho 2.8 0.9 1.9 4.1 1.8 2.2 
  Illinois 3.7 1.7 2.0 4.4 2.6 1.8 
  Indiana 3.2 1.4 1.8 4.2 1.5 2.7 
  Iowa 3.5 1.8 1.7 4.7 1.1 3.5 
  Kansas 3.4 1.6 1.8 4.8 1.8 3.0 
  Kentucky 3.3 1.8 1.5 4.2 1.7 2.5 
  Maine 3.5 1.7 1.7 5.0 2.4 2.6 
  Michigan 3.6 1.6 2.1 4.6 1.4 3.2 
  Minnesota 3.9 1.3 2.6 4.7 1.5 3.2 
  Missouri 3.4 1.4 2.0 4.5 1.6 2.9 
  Montana 3.8 1.2 2.6 5.4 1.3 4.1 
  New Mexico 3.5 1.2 2.3 4.6 1.3 3.3 
  New York 3.6 2.1 1.5 4.8 2.0 2.8 
  North Carolina 3.1 1.3 1.8 4.8 1.5 3.3 
  North Dakota 4.1 1.5 2.7 4.8 1.5 3.3 
  Ohio 3.3 1.7 1.7 4.7 2.1 2.6 
  Oregon 3.7 1.4 2.3 5.2 1.6 3.6 
  Pennsylvania 3.2 1.5 1.7 4.5 2.3 2.3 
  South Carolina 2.7 1.9 0.8 4.7 1.4 3.3 
  Utah 3.8 1.4 2.3 4.2 1.4 2.9 
  Vermont 4.3 1.3 3.0 5.1 2.0 3.1 
  Washington 3.8 1.4 2.4 5.1 1.4 3.7 
  West Virginia 3.2 2.3 0.8 4.7 2.1 2.6 
  Wisconsin 3.5 1.6 1.8 4.4 1.7 2.7 
 Wyoming 3.9 1.3 2.6 4.4 1.8 2.6 




Elite Polarization in the States 
 To measure elite polarization I use surveys of national convention delegates from 
1992, 1996 and 2000, aggregated (to a mean) by state. The ideology question is identical 
to the CBS/NYT polls (used for mass polarization) measuring the ideology of Democratic 
and Republican delegates on a seven point scale.27 The distance between the delegates of 
the parties is my measure of elite level polarization.  
 As one would expect, Democratic delegates are most liberal in Oregon, Vermont, 
Washington and Maine, and most conservative in Idaho, Indiana, and Utah. Republicans 
are most conservative in Iowa, Georgia, Montana and New Mexico and most liberal in 
Connecticut, Illinois, Maine and Pennsylvania. The states with the greatest levels of elite 
polarization are Montana, Washington and Oregon, and the most similar in Illinois, 
Idaho, and Kentucky. As expected, I find a correlation of .4 between elite and mass levels 
of polarization in the states.  
Four Cases of Legislative Voting Behavior 
 Introduced in Chapter 1, I will use four legislators throughout as case studies to 
help explicate the finding. Two of these legislators are ideologically extreme in their roll 
call voting behavior, while two are relative moderates. In many instances, these 
legislators fit the generalizations I make about responsiveness, on some points they do 
not. Regardless, however, they add real life stories to the dynamic of legislative 
responsiveness. Before proceeding further, I will fill in the reader a bit more on these 
                                                 
27 I obtained these surveys from John Jackson who has been surveying national delegates since the 1970s 
and has generously shared with me his data (for the latest analysis of his findings see Jackson, Bigelow, 
and Green 2006).   
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legislators’ backgrounds, the types of districts they represent, and other information that 
relates to their particular brand of legislative responsiveness.  
Barbara Flynn Currie (D-IL) 
 First elected in 1979, Barbara Currie represented the 25th Illinois House district in 
2000. Curry has strong liberal credentials. She is a member of the Illinois Civil Liberties 
Union, the ADA, the Chicago Urban League, and Emily’s List. Before joining the 
legislature, she was an educator. In addition, she is her party’s majority leader in the 
House.  
In 2000, Planned Parenthood gave her a perfect 100 percent support score; the 
AFL-CIO gave her a 97 percent support score; and the NFIB gave her only a 9 percent 
support score. She is both socially and economically a liberal lawmaker. On a survey 
conducted by Project Vote Smart, she expressed support for almost all proposed tax 
increases on issues from education, to the environment, to alcohol and cigarette taxes, to 
inheritance taxes, just to name a few. Only on property taxes did she propose reductions. 
She supported the moratorium placed on the death penalty in Illinois and supported 
funding community centers to help at-risk youth. On education, she was overwhelmingly 
supportive of additional funding for public education and specifically for funding that 
would support sexual education programs. She indicated that she would support the 
inclusion of sexual orientation in anti-discrimination laws and was supportive of 
increasing the minimum wage and including race, ethnicity and gender as criteria for 
state agencies’ decisions on public employment, state college and university admissions, 
and state contracting. Her liberal views extended to issues concerning protection of the 
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environment, restrictions on gun possession, as well as health and welfare issues. Ms. 
Currie, in short, was a model liberal.  
As one would expect of a majority leader, she faced no electoral competition in 
1998 but still raised nearly $100,000 in campaign donations. Half of her war chest came 
from business and 14 percent from labor. Less than one percent came from 
ideological/single-issue groups. Although herself White, Currie represented a majority 
minority district (85 percent Black), which Gore easily carried in 2000 by a 40 point 
margin. Religiously, the 25th is overwhelmingly Catholic at 70 percent of all adherents. 
Economically over 83 percent of residents are employed in the service sector. Her 
chamber is professional and controlled by her Democratic Party.  
Lenore Barrett (R-ID) 
 Besides sharing the same gender, Lenore Barrett is politically the opposite of 
Currie. In 1998, Barrett represented the 26th House district of Idaho. Before serving in the 
Idaho House, Barrett was a Police Commissioner, on the Challis City Council, a State 
Committeewoman, and member of her county Republican Central Committee. Before 
starting on her political career, she was involved with the mining industry. Organization 
she belongs to include the Central Idaho Mining Association, the Daughters of the Nile 
(charitable association of women related by birth or marriage to Shriners/Masons), the 
Idaho Farm Bureau, and the Order of the Eastern Star (a fraternal order based on shared 
religiosity). She is a Southern Baptist, which is interesting given the fact that the majority 
of her district is Mormon (53 percent of adherents).  
 Barrett is a conservative. Planned Parenthood gave her a support score of 0 
percent and the NFIB gave her a 100 percent support score. Like Currie, Barrett filled out 
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her Project Vote Smart survey allowing us to glimpse at the nature of her conservatism. 
She believes abortion should be outlawed except when the woman’s life is in danger. She 
prefers either to decrease or eliminate all the types of taxes listed in the survey (22 
different types) except vehicle taxes which she thinks should remain the same. She 
supports the death penalty, endorses voluntary prayer in public schools, and supports 
abstinence-only sexual education programs. She does not support any type of affirmative 
action related to state agency hiring decisions. On environmental issues, she supports 
removal of wolves from the Endangered Species List. She would prefer to ease 
restrictions on the purchase and possession of guns, would cap punitive damages in 
malpractice lawsuits, and is against state guaranteed medical care. Concerning welfare, 
she supports increased work requirements for able-bodied recipients.  
Barrett won her reelection campaign in 1996 by a comfortable 40 percent margin. 
Seventy-seven percent of her campaign’s financial support came from business, 0 percent 
from labor and 2 percent from single issue/ideological groups. Bush carried her district in 
2000 by a comfortable 65 percent margin over Gore. The 26th is 95 percent white and 
contains a mix of service and farm workers (79 percent rural). The average household 
income is just under $30,000 and although 12 percent live in poverty, less than 3 percent 
get public assistance. The Idaho House is an amateur legislative institution in which the 
Republicans hold an 87 percent majority.   
Ben GiaQuinta (D-IN) 
 In 2000, Ben GiaQuinta represented the 80th House district of Indiana. First 
elected in to the legislature in 1990 (he lost his election in 1994, but was returned in 
1996), GiaQuinta worked most of his adult life as a Realtor after serving in 102nd Infantry 
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Division of the Army during World War II.  The only political experience he had before 
his 1990 election was a stint on the Wayne Township Advisory Board in the late 1980s.  
GiaQuinta is ideologically quite distinct from Currie and Barrett - he is an noted 
moderate. While receiving an 80 percent support score from Planned Parenthood and an 
85 score from the AFL-CIO, he received a 33 percent score from the ACLU and a 40 
percent from both the NFIB and Chamber of Commerce. His Project Vote Smart survey 
answers offer insights into his ideological moderation. GiaQuinta is a pro-life Democratic 
legislator believing abortions should only be legal when the life of the woman in 
endangered and thinks public funding should not go to organizations that advocate or 
perform abortions. Regarding gay rights, however, he feels that sexual orientation should 
be protected under Indiana’s anti-discrimination laws. Regarding affirmative action he 
feels race, ethnicity, and gender should not be taken into account in state agencies’ 
decisions on public employment, college admissions, or other state contracting. On gun 
issues, he thinks citizens should be allowed to carry concealed guns, but thinks proper 
licensing is required. On a list of tax issues his most often response is to maintain the 
status quo, but thinks slight increases should be made for education, health care and law 
enforcement. Regarding health care, he thinks patients’ have the right to sue their HMOs. 
These issue positions, which are all over the place ideologically, reinforce the validity of 
his interest group scorecard ratings that label him a moderate. 
  The 80th House district is quite competitive. In 1998, GiaQuinta won with only 
55 percent of the vote. Bush beat Gore in the 80th district by a solid 26 percent margin (62 
to 36 percent). Only 15 percent of his campaign money came from business and none 
came from labor or ideological groups. The lion’s share of his nearly $200,000 war chest 
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was provided by the Democratic Party ($148,000). The 80th is racially mixed with 68 
percent of residents being White and 27 percent Black. It is also a religious melting pot. 
The biggest percentage of adherents is evangelicals at 41 percent, followed by Catholics 
at 35 percent, and mainline Protestants at 22 percent. The Indiana House is an amateur 
legislative institution in which the Democrats in 2000 held a slight majority.   
Donald Moffitt (R-IL) 
 In 2000, Donald Moffitt represented the 94th district of the Illinois House. First 
elected to the statehouse in 1992, he had previously served as County Treasurer of Knox 
County been a schoolteacher and a farmer. Like GiaQuinta, he is a political moderate. 
Planned Parenthood gave him a support score of 38 percent, the AFL-CIO gave him a 
support score of 72 and NFIB rated him at 55 percent. Like GiaQuinta, his party label 
does not help describe his brand of politics.  
 When asked his position on Abortion, Moffitt felt that abortion should be legal in 
cases of incest, rape and health of the mother. He supports the death penalty, wants to see 
penalties strengthened for drug-related crimes, but wants to increase funding for teacher 
salaries, head start programs, and making college more affordable. On most economic 
issues, he supports slight tax increases, especially on education and health care issues. He 
supports the status quo or slight decreases on welfare generosity, and gas, alcohol, and 
cigarette taxes. On gun issues, he favors strict restrictions on issues of purchase and 
possession, but feels it is acceptable for citizens to carry concealed guns. Regarding 
welfare, he wants to see increased access to public transportation for welfare recipients, 
more money to be devoted to job training programs, and more TANF funds to extend to 
child care subsidies. On the other hand, he would like to see marriage promotion 
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programs for welfare recipients. While approving of limits on the punitive damages that 
can be awarded in medical malpractice lawsuits, he feels that patients should have the 
right to sue their HMOs in such cases. Moffitt is an interesting example of the conflicted 
lives that these moderate lawmakers live – splitting hairs and being on both sides of 
issues. 
Moffitt won his election with a comfortable 44 percent margin of victory. Of the 
$75,000 he raised, 39 percent came from Business and an incredible 43 percent came 
from labor. He is one of the few examples, from either party, who actually received a 
greater percentage of their money from labor than business. In 2000, Gore squeaked out a 
victory in Moffitt’s district winning with 50.3 percent of the vote. Like GiaQuinta, 
Moffitt’s district is religiously quite diverse with mainline Protestants making up 47 
percent of the district and Catholics making up 31 percent. Racially, the district is 90 
percent White and 8 percent Black. Like the other case studies, Maffitt’s district is made 
up primarily of service workers (65 percent) and a good number of manufacturing 
workers (24 percent). Moffitt served in the minority in the Illinois House with is a 
professional legislature.  
Taken together these case studies do two things. First, they are one final piece of 
face validation for the roll call ideology scores. The Project Vote Smart surveys, which 
get more detailed information regarding legislator ideology are congruent with the 
percent support scores of the various groups. Second, and more importantly, these case 
studies offer clues into the causes of legislative voting. The moderates were from districts 
that are more competitive. The ideological extremists were from much more 
homogeneous districts than the moderates. Interest group money, while in terms of 
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amount appears to relate to levels of political competition, as a sector percent appears to 
predict legislative extremism.  
Summary 
 This chapter outlines the methods used to operationalize the components of 
responsiveness in state legislatures and introduced the legislators that make up my case 
studies. The roll call behavior of legislators and the opinion characteristics of the districts 
proved the most difficult to operationalize. I show interest group scorecards to be useful 
measures of legislative roll call activity in this study for two reasons. First, they allow roll 
call activity to be differentiated based on issue type. This is a theoretically important 
distinction that is difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at using NOMINATE scores. 
Second, they exclude from the analysis roll calls on less salient issues. While this likely 
leads to an overestimation of overall polarization in the chambers, it does set the bar 
higher for studies of responsiveness. Finding district congruence on these most 
contentious issues eliminates false levels of congruence likely found through the use of 
NOMINATE scores that include so many procedural and non-controversial votes.  
This study expands upon the most recent district level opinion estimation 
techniques and takes advantage of a relatively new state campaign finance resource that 
is the Institute for Money in State Politics. In addition, I utilize Graphic Information 
Systems (GIS) to apply many previously unavailable variables to the study of 
responsiveness.  
Having conducted a descriptive account of the components of responsiveness, I 
now move on to systematically test my research questions. What accounts for the 
distribution of economic and social roll call liberalism discussed at the beginning of this 
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chapter? What accounts for legislative extremism? Under what circumstances will 
lawmakers be responsive to their various constituencies? What effect does polarization 
have on the operation of state legislatures? The rest of the study will seek answers to 
these questions.  
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
Other Variables Used in the Study 
Chamber Competition: Chamber competition is the absolute value of the percent of a 
legislator’s chamber that is Democratic minus the percent Republican and comes from 
the session immediately preceding the one for which the interest group ratings of 
legislators is available.  
Democratic State Legislator: This measure comes from the official election results from 
each state, which list the party affiliation of candidates.  
Divided/Unitary Government: A state with divided government is defined as any state 
where different parties control one of the following institutions: the governorship, the 
lower house, or the upper house. Unitary government is defined as any state where one 
party controls all of the said institutions (this can be either Democratic or Republican 
unitary government). This information was collected from the session immediately 
preceding the one for which the interest group ratings of legislators is available.  
Enactments Per Member: The number of bills enacted in the 2000 session, per member. 
If the legislature meets biannually, the data may be from 1999. This data comes from The 
Book of the States. 
Female Legislator: This dummy measure was deduced when possible from the first 
name of each legislator. When an analysis of the legislator’s first name did not work, 
Internet searches were done on the legislators name until two gender specific (his, her) 
results were found.   
First Term Legislator: This measure indicates that a legislator was serving their first 
term in the session immediately preceding the one for which the interest group ratings of 
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legislators is available. This measure comes from the Institute for Money in State 
Politics.  
Governor Power Index: Governor’s Power rating is collected from CQ’s State 
Factfinder 2002. The ranking is based on six measures of institutional power – tenure, 
appointment power, the number of other statewide elected officials, budget power, veto 
power, and party control. This measure is regularly updated based on an on-going study 
by Thad Beyle of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  
Interest Group Density: This is the number of registered interest groups in the states in 
1990. This measure comes from Gray and Lowery (2000).  
Bill Introductions Per Member: The number of bills introduced in the 2000 session, per 
member. If the legislature meets biannually this data may come from 1999. This data 
comes from The Book of the States.  
Legislative Professionalism: I use the Squire (1992) index of state legislative 
professionalism. This index measures session length, staff size, and legislative salary. 
Lower House: This control indicates a legislator works in the lower house of their state 
legislature. 
Party Leader: Party leaders are those who occupied one of the following positions 
within their chamber in the session for which I collected the interest group ratings of 
legislators: Speaker of the House, House Majority Leader, House Minority Leader; 
President of the Senate, President Pro Tem of the Senate, Senate Majority Leader, Senate 
Minority Leader.  
Percent Minority: For each chamber, the percent of legislators who are minorities. Data 
collected for the U.S. Statistical Abstract.   
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Percent Female: For each chamber, the percent of legislators who are women. Data 
collected for the U.S. Statistical Abstract.   
Region: Each state is coded Northeast, Midwest, West, or South based on the U.S. 
Census coding for region. North-East states in my sample include: Connecticut, Maine, 
New York, Pennsylvania, and Vermont; Mid-West states include: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, and Wisconsin; Southern 
states include Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia; 
and Western states include Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.  
Stalemate: Stalemate is measured by dividing the number of bills introduced in each 
state by the number of bills enacted and subtracting that percent from 100, in 2000. This 
data comes from The Book of the States. 
State Solvency: State solvency is collected from CQ’s State Factfinder 2004. These data 
relate to the overall “net worth” of a state. It is the answer to the question: “If each state 
were to cease operations tomorrow and pay off all debts, how much money would be left 
over?” This measure comes from a 2000 study by State Policy Research, Inc. 
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Chapter 4: Roll Call Ideology in State Legislatures 
 
This chapter analyzes the roll call ideology of state legislators. Why are some 
legislators extremely liberal, some moderate, and others extremely conservative in their 
roll call ideology? Some legislators in New York voted to increase penalties for those 
committing a crime determined to be a “hate crime” while others voted against this 
legislation. The same can be said of legislation on partial birth abortion and assisted 
suicide in Maine, as well as corporate responsibility for paying health insurance in Iowa, 
and raising the minimum wage in North Dakota, to name but a few examples. What 
explains this behavior? 
In the first section of this chapter I present an analysis of the primary dependent 
variables – the economic and social roll call ideology of state legislators. Drawing on the 
literature and theory presented in Chapters 1 and 2, the second section sets up models that 
help explain legislative roll call ideology. The third section includes a presentation and 
discussion of the results. The fourth section presents the expectations and analysis of the 
effects that different levels of electoral competition and different levels of legislative 
professionalism have on economic and social roll call liberalism. Finally, a summary 
discussion ties the four components of the chapter together.  
The Distribution of Economic and Social Roll Call Liberalism 
As discussed, this study uses the scorecards of various watchdog groups to 
approximate legislative roll call ideology. In the case of economic policy, the groups 
include the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), the Chamber of 
Commerce (COC), and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
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Organizations (AFL-CIO). To capture legislative ideology on social policy, the groups 
include state chapters of Right to Life (RTL), the National Association of Reproductive 
Rights and Liberties (NARAL), Planned Parenthood (PP), and the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU). 
These groups assign each legislator a support score with a range from 0 to 100 
percent based on roll call votes of interest to the groups. I adjust the scorecards to point in 
a liberal direction, and their resulting mean reflects each legislator’s economic and social 
roll call liberalism on a scale from 0 to 100 percent. For a full discussion of these 
measures, including tests of their validity, see Chapter 3.  
The Distribution of Economic Roll Call Liberalism 
What does the distribution of economic roll call liberalism look like? Overall, 
state legislatures are not hotbeds of economic liberalism. Of the 4,278 state legislators 
included in this study – from 30 different states – the average economic roll call 
liberalism of state legislators is 39 percent (see Figure 4.1). An impressive 13 percent of 
legislators have a 0 percent liberal (or 100 percent conservative) rating, while only 1 
percent of legislators are 100 percent liberal (or 0 percent conservative). This finding is 
consistent with a shifting in economic regimes over the past 30 years in which the New 
Deal coalition, which favored state intervention on economic matters, was to a certain 
extent replaced by a more conservative, laissez-faire, approach to economic policy.  
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Figure 4.1:  


























































The parties still polarize significantly on economic issues despite a general 
conservatism among state legislators. Republican legislators average 17 percent liberal, 
whereas their Democratic colleagues average 61 percent liberal (T=-75.5, p<.001). 
Anchoring Republicans in the conservative direction are the 24 percent of Republican 
legislators with a perfect conservative (0 percent liberal) rating. Indeed 96 percent of 
Republican legislators have an economic roll call liberalism rating of less than 50 
percent.  
The Democrats exhibit much more variation in their economic roll call liberalism 
with an average score of 61 percent. Around 2 percent of Democratic legislators identify 
as pure conservative and 2 percent as pure liberals. Thirty percent of Democrats fall on or 
below the 50 percent liberal line, making almost one-third of Democratic legislators (in 
this sample) economic conservatives. This ideological diversity relates to longstanding 
regional divisions within the Democratic Party. Although the South increasingly has gone 
to Republican Party candidates in federal elections, the state legislatures still house a 
significant number of conservative Democratic legislators (Rhodes 2000). The average 
economic liberalism of Southern Democratic legislators is 50 percent compared to an 
average of 64 percent in all other regions. Given sufficient time, the realignment of the 
South will likely complete itself, but one would be mistaken in the assumption that circa 
2000 all conservative Democrats in the South are extinct.   
With that said, there should be no confusion over which party is more liberal and 
which is more conservative on economic issues. Even in Georgia, a state famous for its 
conservative Democrats, the Democratic legislators are a full 33 percent more liberal than 
their Republican colleagues. Although not perfectly polarized (due to some Democratic 
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moderation outside of metropolitan areas) the legislators of the two parties are clearly 
oriented towards opposite ideological extremes.  
The Distribution of Social Roll Call Liberalism 
While state legislators show signs of polarization on economic issues along party 
lines, there is no doubt of their strong polarization of social issues (see Figure 4.2). Of the 
1,655 state legislators – from 13 states –for which enough data was available to measure 
ideology on social issues, the average social roll call liberalism for state legislators is 49 
percent. However, an impressive 43 percent of legislators are at one of the two 
ideological extremes. Twenty-two percent are perfectly conservative (0 percent liberal) 
and 21 percent are perfectly liberal (100 liberal).  
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Figure 4.2:  
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This polarization falls largely along party lines. Democratic legislators average 77 
percent liberal in their social policy roll call liberalism and nearly 40 percent have a 
perfect 100 percent liberal rating. Their Republican colleagues average 22 percent liberal 
on social policy roll calls and 37 percent have a perfect 0 percent liberal (or 100 percent 
conservative) rating. This finding reinforces the popular view of some that, at least on 
social issues, the parties are engaged in a culture war (Hunter 1991; White 2003). On one 
side of this battle are the liberal Democrats who are supportive of abortion rights and gay 
rights. On the other side are conservative Republicans who view the struggle against 
abortion and gay rights as the front line in a larger battle against an increasingly immoral 
culture. How far down into the general population this chasm extends is a matter of 
debate (see Fiorina 2005), but at least at the level of state legislatures the culture wars are 
alive and well.  
The Correlates of Economic and Social Roll Call Liberalism 
District Opinion and Roll Call Ideology 
The distributions of roll call liberalism indicate that party is a primary indicator of 
roll call liberalism. What else explains variation in roll call liberalism? The most 
prominent explanation, in both the literature and the preceding case studies, and perhaps 
the most critical to studies of democracy, relates to district preferences. Legislators, either 
through being “of their districts,” or through a concerted effort to be their districts 
delegates, cast votes based on the wishes of those they represent.  
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Is the relationship between lawmaker and district the same on both economic and 
social policy issues? For the several reasons discussed in Chapter 2, this relationship may 
be stronger on social as opposed to economic issues.  I specified five reasons social issues 
are likely to produce more responsiveness than economic issues. First, like civil rights in 
the 1960s (Miller and Stokes 1963), cultural issues currently are the most salient among 
the public. Second, these issues evoke the most controversy, leading legislators to at least 
seek out their district’s opinion and understand the possible consequences of “jumping 
ship” with their district (Kingdon 1973). Third, these issues tend to cluster together more 
easily in the minds of constituents (Ingram, Laney, McCain. 1980) making legislators 
more sensitive to district opinion. Fourth, these issues do not lend themselves toward 
moderation or bargaining. Legislators cannot take a “middle of the road” position the way 
they can on economic issues. Views towards abortion, gay marriage, and flag burning, 
are largely black and white.28 And as the distribution of social roll call ideology suggests, 
many more legislators gravitate to one side or the other. Because such a vast distance 
exists between legislators, it becomes unlikely that a conservative district would have 
anything but a conservative legislator on social issues and vice versa because not only 
would that legislator be liberal, he or she would likely be very liberal. Finally, social 
issues are, to a certain extent, “easy.” No one needs a great deal of knowledge to have 
opinions on issues like abortion and gay rights. Because nearly everyone has an opinion 
on these issues, it makes sense that lawmakers pay particular attention to these potentially 
volatile issue positions held by their constituents. On the other hand, economic issues are 
                                                 
28 Some might argue that abortion in cases of incest and rape would be a compromise, but that really is still 
a pro-life position. 
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relatively “hard.” People generally do not have a visceral response to specific issues 
regarding economic policy. Of course they do have an instinctive reaction to the overall 
state of the economy – they want it to be strong – but on particular economic issues over 
which legislators must decide, both the number of constituents with an opinion is likely 
smaller, and the strength of those opinions weaker than on social issues.  
This observation is not entirely new. Thomas Frank (2004) does a case study of 
Kansas politics arguing that even though citizens of Kansas are natural allies of the 
Democratic Party based on economic issues, they tend not to support Democratic 
candidates based solely on an aversion to liberal positions on social issues. A similar case 
study could probably be done of a state like Oregon, where citizen’s economic self-
interest may be with the Republican Party, but their pro-choice sentiments lead them to 
support Democratic Party candidates. 
To test this proposition, district ideology is included in both economic and social 
models. To measure district ideology, I use the method developed by Ardoin and Garand 
(2003) (See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this method). 
Interest Group Money and Roll Call Ideology 
Donations from interest groups may relate to the votes that lawmakers cast. Are 
interest group donations equally important on both economic and social roll call votes?  
Because economic issues are often dealt with under the radar screen of public attention, 
the views of interest groups are expected to be more influential on economic as opposed 
to social issues. This expectation is tied to the supposition that districts are more attuned 
to social issues. If this is true, it is also likely that relatively small groups of the organized 
can effect these less salient issues. To test this hypothesis, the receipts of legislators from 
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business and the receipts of legislators from labor (as a percent of their overall 
contributions) are included in the economic model and the receipts from conservative and 
liberal ideological/single issue groups are included in the social roll call model.29  
Other Explanations for Roll Call Ideology 
In addition to these key expectations, several control variables are included. A 
rich research tradition shows that female legislators are overall more liberal on their roll 
call votes when compared to their male colleagues (Frankovic 1977, Gehlen 1977, Welch 
1985, Thomas 1989). Furthermore, research finds women are more likely to take the lead 
on legislative issues related to women, children and the family (Gehlen 1977, Mezey 
1978, Thomas 1991, and Thomas and Welch 1991). Given these findings, I expect to find 
female legislators to be more liberal than their male colleagues on economic and 
especially social roll call votes.   
The standing of a member within their party may relate to their roll call activity. 
Party leaders are likely to be ideologically out in front of other members with Democratic 
leaders being more liberal and Republican leaders being more conservative than rank-
and-file members. I test this proposition more carefully in the next chapter, but include it 
here as a relevant control. Electoral competitiveness and professionalism of the 
legislature are included in the models. These variables, when interacted with the main 
                                                 
29 Because of the vast differences that exist in the amounts of money these groups donate to candidates, 
from state to state, some standardization method is required. These models use group contributions as a 
percent of overall contributions to gauge the relative dependence that various legislators place on the 
various groups. Another standardization method is the amount money per constituent. Both measures 
produce similar findings.  
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variables of interest will provide a test of the contextual hypotheses in the next section. A 
control is also included for South because of the unusually high levels of conservatism in 
this region. Unfortunately, not enough social scorecards were available from the South to 
include that region in the social policy model. 
Because this study includes legislators from both the upper and the lower 
chambers of state legislatures, a dummy control is included for lower chamber. Finally, a 
control is included for the various years of the scorecards included in the study. As such, 
a dummy is included for scoring year 1999 and 2000, keeping 1998 as the base for 
comparison. No scorecards from social policy groups were available in 1999 so that 
variable is not included in the social policy model.  
Because the distribution of the dependent variable has a defined minimum (0) and 
a defined maximum (100), and because cases tend to congregate at these polls (especially 
on social roll call liberalism), these models are run using Interval Regression. Interval 
Regression provides Tobit Coefficients, but unlike Tobit, Interval Regression allows for 
the use of robust standard errors and clustering (in this case by state) to adjust for 
heteroskedasticity across states and contemporaneous correlations within states.30   
                                                 
30 To test for multi-collinearity, I conducted a VIF test on an OLS version of the models. None of the 
independent variables had a VIF score greater than 1.8 - indicating no serious multi-collinearity problems. 
Even though relatively few cases congregated at the upper limit of the distribution on the economic roll call 
liberalism, both the lower and upper extremes (0 and 100) were censored in the Interval Regression model. 
This was done because the distribution of Social Policy Roll call Liberalism requires both sides to be 
censored, and to provide reliable comparisons between the chapters, the same method needed to be used on 
each. Running the model with only a lower limit censor, however, produces nearly identical results. In 
addition, the same variables turn out to be significant using an OLS version of the model.  
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The Causes of Economic and Social Roll Call Liberalism 
As expected, the party identification of state legislators is fundamental to 
understanding legislator’s economic and social roll call liberalism (see Table 4.1). Even 
when controlling for the other variables, the political parties clearly act to aggregate 
ideological orientations – with conservative legislators being largely members of the 
Republican Party and liberal legislators being mostly members of the Democratic Party. 
As the distributions suggest, party membership, although significant in both the economic 
and social models, appears to be particularly important to explaining roll call liberalism 




Table 4.1:  
Economic and Social Roll Call Liberalism among State Legislators 
  
Economic Roll Call 
Liberalism 
Social Roll Call      
Liberalism  
  β (se) P >׀z׀  β (se) P >׀z׀   
 Democratic State Legislator  .412 (.004) .001  .665 (.180) .001  
 District Liberalism   .174 (.110) .058  .744 (.232) .001  
 Percent of Receipts from Business  -.125 (.040) .001 -- --  
 Percent of Receipts from Labor  .282 (.098) .002 -- --  
 
Percent of Receipts from 
Conservative Social Groups -- -- -.115 (.130) .187  
 
Percent of Receipts from Liberal 
Social Groups -- -- .426 (.121) .001  
       
Control Variables:     
 Democratic Leader .068 (.019) .001 .208 (.084) .007  
 Republican Leader -.028 (.023) .111 .047 (.086) .291  
 Female Legislator  .029 (.014) .018  .143 (.058) .007  
 Lower Chamber of State Legislature -.024 (.018) .089 .003 (.050) .474  
 Electoral Margin of District  .001 (.001) .096  .001 (.001) .001  
 Professionalism of Chamber -.045 (.096) .321 -.113 (.211) .297  
 South -.052 (.062) .202 -- --  
 Scoring Year 2000  .093 (.108) .194 -.003 (.006) .334  
 Scoring Year 1999  .001 (.116) .500 -- --  
 Constant  .024 (.137) .432 -.430 (.136) .001  
       





 N 4140  1602   
Note: Interval Regression Coefficients with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by state. 





The influence of district ideology on legislative roll call liberalism is perhaps the 
most interesting finding in this chapter. As expected, legislators are extremely sensitive to 
their district’s ideology on social issues, but much less so on economic issues. In the 
economic roll call model, the district ideology coefficient just misses the p>.05 level 
necessary to achieve statistical significance, whereas on social roll calls the coefficient 
easily reaches the p>.001 level of significance. On social issues, legislators do their best 
to match up with their districts. This happens in one of two ways. Either they are so much 
like their districts they unconsciously represent their district’s social predispositions or 
they know that their districts understand these issues, and may hold them accountable for 
their stances, and thus go out of their way to appease their constituents. Either way, 
legislators are significantly more responsive to their districts on social issues as opposed 
to economic issues.31 
Campaign receipts from both business and labor significantly relate to economic 
roll call liberalism in the expected directions. On social issues, only liberal social group 
money reaches significance. Democratic leaders appear to be more liberal than other 
                                                 
31 To make sure that the differences between the economic and social models were not just a function of 
separate samples, a separate analysis was conducted that only included the 1,588 for which both an 
economic and a social roll call liberalism measure was available for each legislator. The findings between 
this limited sample and the larger (yet uneven) sample presented in the tables are nearly identical with none 
of the primary independent variable either falling out of or gaining significance based on choice of sample.  
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members are, holding all else constant. Consistent with previous research, female 
legislators are significantly more liberal than are their male colleagues.32  
Interpreting coefficients is not straightforward with Interval Regression. To 
interpret the effects of the various independent variables on the predicted change of the 
dependent variable, the predicted estimates are calculated for all the statistically 
significant variables in Table 4.1. By holding all other variables constant and 
manipulating the statistically significant independent variables, their effect on roll call 
liberalism is observed. For both the economic roll call model and the social roll-call 
model, all continuous variables are set at their means, and for binary variables, legislators 
are from the lower house, male, not from the South, and the scorecard year is 2000.  
The effect of party clearly maintains its importance in the economic roll call 
model, even when controlling for other variables (see Table 4.2). Democrats have an 
estimated economic roll call liberalism of 59.3 percent while Republicans have an 
estimated roll call liberalism of 17.6 percent. Since it is obvious that party is fundamental 
to understanding economic roll call voting, the other significant variables are analyzed 
twice, once while holding the model constant for Democrats and once holding it constant 
for Republicans.  
                                                 
32 This analysis was also run separately for each party to make sure the relationships were not 
fundamentally different based on party. Concerning the most important variables (district, Party, Money), 
this turned out not to be the case. Notable differences included: party leaders had more of an effect on 
Democrats, business and labor money affected Democrats, only labor money affected Republicans 
(business just missed significance). In the social policy models the only notable difference was that for 




Table 4.2:  
Predicted Probabilities for Economic Roll Call Liberalism 
  Predicted Roll Call Liberalism  
 Party   
  Democratic Legislators 59.3  
  Republican Legislators 17.6  
     
  Democrats Republicans  
 Receipts from Business    
  Max (100) 50.7 9.1  
  +1 sd (D=.64, R=.77) 55.2 11.9  
  Mean (D=39.3, R=.52) 58.3 15.0  
  -1 sd (D=.14, R=.27) 61.4 18.2  
  Min (0) 63.2 21.5  
 Receipts from Labor    
  Max (D=100, R=.81) 85.5 38.5  
  +1 sd (D=.25, R=.10) 64.3 18.5  
  Mean (D=.09.3, R=.03) 60.5 16.5  
  -1 sd (D=0.4, R=0) 57.4 15.7  
  Min (0) 57.4 15.7  
 Party Leader    
  Leader 66.1 14.9  
  Rank and File 59.3 17.6  
 Gender    
  Female 62.2 20.5  
  Male 59.3 17.6  
    
Note: These predicted estimates are based on the Interval Regression coefficients presented 
in Table 4.1. Except for the experimental variables - all continuous variables are set at their 
means. For binary (non-experimental) variables, legislators are not leaders, from the lower 





Labor and business money has a substantively significant effect on economic roll 
call liberalism for Democratic and Republican legislators. A one standard deviation 
increase in donations from business groups decreases the roll call liberalism of legislators 
by 3 percent. Labor contributions have more of an effect on Democrats. A one standard 
deviation increase in labor contributions nets a 4 percent increase in economic roll call 
liberalism for Democrats and a 2 percent increase for Republicans. Over the entire range 
of labor contributions, from lowest to highest, the increase for democrats is nearly 30 
percent and the increase for Republicans is just over 20 percent. The labor money effect 
is likely greater on Democrats, while the business money effect is about equal between 
the parties, because business money gets more evenly distributed than labor 
contributions. Although statistically significant, the substantive difference between 
female and male legislators and party leaders versus rank-and-file members on economic 
roll call votes is quite modest.  
 Party is even more influential in the social roll call model. The change of party 
from Republican to Democrat produces almost a 67 percent increase in social roll call 
liberalism. Thus, even when controlling for the other variables, the partisan polarization 
of state legislators on social issues could not be much larger. This is perfectly reasonable 




Table 4.3:  
Predicted Probabilities for Social Roll Call Liberalism 
  Predicted Roll Call Liberalism  
 Party   
  Democratic Legislators 79.1  
  Republican Legislators 12.5  
     
  Democrats Republicans  
 District Liberalism    
  Max (D=100, R=.94) 100 30.5  
  +1 sd (D=.74, R=.67) 85.9 14.9  
  Mean (D=.59, R=.53) 77.7 7.4  
  -1 sd (D=.44, R=.39) 69.5 0  
  Min (D=.07, R=0) 47.9 0  
 
Percent of Receipts from 
Liberal Social Groups    
  Max (87.6) 100 --  
  +1 sd (6.3) 100 --  
  Mean (1.5) 82.8 --  
  -1 sd (0) 76.4 --  
  Min (0) 76.4 --  
 Party Leader    
  Leader 99.9 17.3  
  Rank and File 79.1 12.5  
 Gender    
  Female 93.4 26.8  
  Male 79.1 12.5  
    
Note: These predicted estimates are based on the Interval Regression coefficients presented 
in Table 4.1 (Column 2). Except for the experimental variables - all continuous variables 
are set at their means. For binary (non-experimental) variables, legislators are from the 
lower house, not party leaders, male, and the scoring year is 2000. No predicted estimates 
can be predicted for the effect of liberal social group money on Republican roll call 
liberalism because of the method used to estimate amounts of social group money donated 





 District ideology has impressive effects on legislator’s social roll call liberalism. 
A Democratic legislator representing a 100 percent liberal district has a social roll call 
liberalism of 100 percent, whereas a Democratic legislator from the most conservative 
democratic district yields a social roll call liberalism of only 48 percent. A Democratic 
legislator moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the 
mean yields a 16 percent increase in social roll call liberalism. For Republicans, district 
ideology has a slightly different effect. Republican legislators from the most liberal 
republican district (95 percent liberal) has a predicted social roll call liberalism of 31 
percent while those with districts one standard deviation or less below the mean have a 
predicted social roll call liberalism of 0 percent.  
 The effect of liberal social group money is felt at the margins. A Democratic 
legislator at the mean level of receipts from liberal social groups has a predicted roll call 
liberalism of 83 percent. A one standard deviation increase above the mean results in a 
perfectly liberal at 100 percent; one standard deviation below the mean decreases a 
legislative liberalism to 76 percent. 
 Democratic men are nearly 79 percent liberal in their social roll call voting, while 
Democratic women are nearly 93 percent liberal. Likewise, Republican men are nearly 12 
percent more conservative than Republican women (13 percent to 27 percent liberal 
respectively). As opposed to the modest effect that gender has on economic roll calls, it is 
both statistical and substantively meaningful on social roll calls. This finding has 
important implications for research on the gender gap. At the start of the 21st century few 
legislative differences exist between female and male legislators on economic issues. On 
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social issues, however, the gender gap is still a relevant concept in state legislative 
studies. Finally, Democratic Party leaders are 14 percent more liberal than other 
Democrats, holding all else constant, the effect of party leaders for Republicans is not 
significant.  
These models do a good job of predicting the roll call liberalism for my various 
case studies. Currie’s (D-IL) actual economic roll call liberalism was 81 percent and the 
economic roll call liberalism model predicted her to be a 75 percent liberal legislator. Her 
actual social roll call liberalism was a perfect 100 percent and she was actually predcted 
to 110 percent liberal. Being a Democrat took Currie onto the expected side of the 
distribution, and the her mix of business and labor contributions landed her slightly below 
her actual economic liberalism level. She received more business support (probably 
because she was a party leader) than the model would have predicted. The other case 
studies also predicted to within 15 points the actual social and economic roll call 
liberalism of the other three members. A close look shows that party and district 
liberalism land a legislator on the right side of the continuum and donations, electoral 
margin and gender account for the incremental adjustments.  
Conditional Responsiveness 
 Under what conditions are legislators most likely to represent their district 
constituents, their parties, and/or their campaign supporters? As discussed in Chapter 2, 
certain environmental factors are likely to affect the relationship between legislators and 
their various constituencies. The environmental factors analyzed here are electoral 
competitiveness and legislative professionalism. As discussed, the relationship between 
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these contextual variables and legislators’ parties, districts and campaign supporters is 
often times not clear.  
As discussed at length in Chapter 2, electoral competitiveness likely conditions 
the relationship between all the actors and roll call responsiveness. The literature is 
inconclusive regarding the relationship between district ideology and legislative roll call 
ideology in competitive versus uncompetitive elections. It could be that legislators in 
competitive districts go out of their way to appease their constituents out of fear for their 
reelection – the “marginality thesis” (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995). Conversely, 
it could be that legislators in safe, likely homogeneous, districts have an easier time being 
“of their districts” and unconsciously being very responsive – the “homogeneity thesis” 
(Miller 1964; Jones 1973). Whichever side of this argument proves correct has important 
implications for reformers who wish to adjust redistricting plans to facilitate greater 
competition.  
Party influence may change based on the level of electoral uncertainty facing a 
member. Parties are ideologically charged units led by policy-motivated activists who 
seek to push a partisan agenda in Congress and state legislatures. As such, legislator 
deference to the party position is likely less common when they have to worry about their 
chances for reelection. On the other hand, legislators running in competitive elections do 
need the financial support of parties. It is possible that legislators must toe the party line 
in an effort to get these resources and hope that their constituency does not notice. More 
likely, however, parties likely give them leeway to pursue whatever agenda will get them 
reelected and help the party maintain it’s seat count.   
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Similarly, interest groups may be better able to influence legislators in safe seats 
when a member has nothing to fear from district opinion. As explained in Chapter 2, 
Danzau and Munger (1986) show that policy outcomes depend on comparative 
advantages to legislators of constituents and groups. The amounts of money interest 
groups are able to offer members, versus the number of votes a legislators needs to win 
reelection, are carefully maximized. Legislators are more likely to support interest groups 
when they face minimal competition for the same reasons they align with their party – if 
left unchecked they will align themselves with more ideologically extreme actors. On the 
other hand, members running in competitive races have a greater need to raise campaign 
money. So, it is possible that, in an effort to increase their war chest, in order to persuade 
voters to support them, they may need to alienate their voters and grow more 
ideologically extreme.  
Professionalism also conditions responsiveness. Legislators in professional 
legislatures may have the resources at their disposal to be particularly responsive to their 
districts, or perhaps as term limits supporters suggest, a chasm exists between 
professional careerist legislators and their constituents that does not exist between 
amateur legislators and their constituents. 
Regarding the effect of party in professional versus amateur legislatures, the 
direction of the relationship is not entirely clear. The traditional thinking holds that 
legislators in amateur legislatures do not have the individual capacity they need and turn 
to the parties for help (Hershey and Beck 2003). It is also possible, however, that because 
members of professional legislatures are more career (legislative career) focused, they 
will more readily toe the party line. Furthermore, states with professional legislatures 
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have stronger party organizations which are known to engage in more rigorous candidate 
recruitment (Hershey and Beck 2003), likely finding future legislators who are more 
attracted to the ideological battles that define professional legislatures.  
The relationship between group contributions and roll calls is also likely 
conditioned by levels of legislative professionalism. Because professional legislatures 
have more access points for interest groups to make contact with legislators and because 
legislators may be more likely to develop long-standing relationships with these groups, 
legislators in professional state legislatures may be more receptive to pressure from labor 
and business groups. On the other hand, legislators in amateur legislatures have less staff 
to help with legislating and perhaps these groups’ efforts, in concert with their campaign 
contributions, fill this expertise void and create a codependence between group and 
legislator. 33 
The Contextual Effect of Electoral Competition 
 The only primary independent variable (of party, district ideology, business 
money, labor money) that significantly influences economic roll call liberalism in 
competitive districts is party affiliation.34 All four of the primary independent variables, 
however, help explain economic roll call liberalism in uncompetitive districts. So the 
                                                 
33 Closely tied to my discussion of professionalism is the issue of term limits. I considered included 
controls in my models for states with term limits but decided against it. Since my study includes data from 
1998-2000, many states that enacted term limits had not yet implemented them; these include AZ, CO, MI, 
ID, MO, MT, OR, UT and WY. The only states to have implemented their term limits before 1998 were 
CA and ME.  
34 Competitive districts are those in which the preceding election was decided by 10 percentage points or 
less (between the first place and second place finisher).  
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question becomes, are there significant differences between the effect of these variables 
in uncompetitive versus competitive races? A close look at the party and district 
liberalism coefficients reveals that both, respectively, work in nearly the same way in 
both competitive and uncompetitive districts. Support is not found for either the 
marginality thesis nor the homogeneity thesis, as responsiveness to district constituents 
on economic issues is the safe for under both contextual settings. Receipts from business 
and receipts from labor, however, have significantly greater effects in uncompetitive as 
opposed to competitive districts. These groups give money in support of their inside 
lobbying game and it appears to pay off. I will discuss this finding more while presenting 























Table 4.4:  
The Contextual Effect of Competitiveness on Roll Call Liberalism 
  
 
β (se) P >׀z׀  
P >׀z׀          
difference 
from slope for   
uncompetitive  
Economic Roll Call Liberalism     
 Competitive District     
  Democratic State Legislator .403 (.042) .001 .308  
  District Liberalism .110 (.170) .170 .287  
  Percent of Receipts from Business  -.059 (.058) .154 .045  
  Percent of Receipts from Labor .072 (.101) .238 .001  
 Uncompetitive District     
  Democratic State Legislator .420 (.038) .001 --  
  District Liberalism  .188 (.109) .043 --  
  Percent of Receipts from Business  -.137 (.037) .001 --  
  Percent of Receipts from Labor .378 (.080) .001 --  
      
Social Roll Call Liberalism     
 Competitive District     
  Democratic State Legislator   .711 (.068) .001 .254  
  District Liberalism    .692 (.406) .044 .452  
  
Percent of Receipts from 
Conservative Social Groups -.753 (.309) .008 .020  
  
Percent of Receipts from Liberal 
Social Groups .763 (.258) .002 .025  
 Uncompetitive District     
  Democratic State Legislator   .663 (.031) .001 --  
  District Liberalism    .743 (.164) .001 --  
  
Percent of Receipts from 
Conservative Social Groups -.103 (.078) .094 --  
  
Percent of Receipts from Liberal 
Social Groups .382 (.118) .001 --  
Note: Interval Regression Coefficients with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by 
state. P-values for differences were computed based on models with interaction terms between 
the independent variables and a dummy representing the degree of electoral competitiveness The 




 All of the primary independent variables significantly relate to social liberalism, 
regardless of level of electoral competition. As was the case with the economic policy 
model, only interest group donations produced significantly different results between 
competitive and uncompetitive districts. Before discussing the interesting interest group 
findings, I will spend some time discussing why party and district influence are not 
statistically different between competitive and uncompetitive districts.  
The effect of district ideology is always stronger in uncompetitive districts, 
indicating that perhaps the homogeneity thesis is correct; however, the differences never 
reach levels of statistical significance. Thus, my results offer no strong evidence as to 
whether the marginality or homogeneity thesis is correct. When I run a version of this 
model with party and district liberalism interacted, within the interaction of 
competitiveness, the resulting party/district measure is positively, and significantly 
greater in uncompetitive districts. The model, however, is far from parsimonious and 
difficult to present. It works because district and party correlate to a greater extent in 
uncompetitive districts (competitive r=-.013, uncompetitive r=.251). Thus, district and 
party forces align in safe districts and influence legislative voting. In competitive 
districts, they do not align and produce insignificant results. This result supports the 
“homogeneity thesis” but to get the result, the effect of party and district must be 
interacted.  
 A more clearcut, and quite interesting, story concerns the contextual effect of 
competitiveness on the impact that contributions have on legislators’ roll call votes. On 
economic issues, business and labor groups give money to uncompetitive legislators, 
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pursuing an inside strategy. On social issues, ideological groups give to competitive 
candidates, likely hoping to change the makeup of the legislatures. Predicted estimates, in 
the form of line graphs, display the substantive significance of the differences of labor 
and business contributions on economic roll call liberalism based on the presence of 
electoral competitiveness (see Figure 4.3). Legislators in competitive districts are not 
influenced by business and labor money. Regardless of how much money they receive 
from labor, Democrats running in competitive races hover around 60 percent liberal, 
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Note: These predicted estimates are based on the Interval Regression coefficients presented in 
Table 4.4. Except for the experimental variables - all continuous variables are set at their means. 
For binary (non-experimental) variables, the legislator is from the lower house, not a party leader, 





When races are uncompetitive, however, the influence of labor money becomes 
much more pronounced. Democrats with 0 percent of their receipts from labor are about 
60 percent liberal, but Democrats with 100 percent of their receipts from labor are around 
95 percent liberal. Republicans experience a similar 35 percent increase. Apparently 
labor gets the biggest “bang for their buck” when their donation strategy supplements 
their inside activities. Francia et al. (2003) find that donors fall into three broad categories 
based on their reason for contributing – investors, ideologues and intimates. The findings 
suggest that labor and business interests largely follow an “investment” strategy where 
the donors care most about material incentives like whether or not the legislator is 
friendly to their interests. Thus, their donations are targeted in a way that maximizes their 
access to key members.   
 The impact of business money in competitive versus uncompetitive races, 
although statistically different, is somewhat less meaningfully in its change. For business 
groups to increase a legislator’s economic roll call liberalism by 10 percent, they must 
completely fund a candidate in uncompetitive races. This is an expensive proposition 
given the average receipts for candidates in uncompetitive races (in this sample) 
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Note: These predicted estimates are based on the Interval Regression coefficients presented in 
Table 4.4. Except for the experimental variables - all continuous variables are set at their means. 
For binary (non-experimental) variables, the legislator is from the lower house, not party leaders, 




 On social issues, groups have the opposite effect. The greater amount of money 
goes to competitive races, and the effect of money on votes appears greatest in 
competitive races. Unlike labor and business group money, however, the amount of a 
candidate’s war chest coming from social groups is much smaller. As such, the 
substantive impact of these contributions is less compelling. If a representative receives 
more than 10 percent of their total contributions from social issue groups (a feat that only 
1.7 percent of legislators achieve) they are predicted to have a 100 percent liberal or 0 
percent conservative score depending upon party.  
 These findings are extremely relevant for groups donating money to candidates. 
Economic interest groups should take some solace in the fact that their donations seem to 
be driving up support for their agenda among electorally safe legislators. Their 
“investment” strategy seems to be working. It would frustrate them to learn, however, 
that their donations to competitive members, the ones who are probably most anxious to 
receive their contributions, are not having an impact on their roll call votes.  
Just the opposite is true for the social issue groups. They can take comfort in 
knowing that where their contributions are most needed, in competitive districts, 
legislators are responding to their electoral support with more friendly roll call votes. 
However, the social groups seem quite ineffectual in increasing support among safe 
incumbents. This finding supports the congressional literature that finds social groups to 
be most influential in the electoral arena, and quite amateur in their ability to support an 
inside lobby (Bruce 1988; Hertzke 1988; Hofrenning 1995; Rozell and Wilxox 1999; 
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Note: These predicted estimates are based on the Interval Regression coefficients presented in 
Table 4.4. Except for the experimental variables - all continuous variables are set at their means. 
For binary (non-experimental) variables, the legislator is from the lower house, not party leaders, 
male, not from the South, and the scoring year is 2000.  
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The Contextual Effect of Legislative Professionalism  
 In states with professional legislatures, all four of the primary independent 
variables (district constituency, party, labor donations, business donations) significantly 
relate to economic roll call liberalism. In amateur legislatures, only party significantly 
relates to economic liberalism. Party and labor money are not significantly different 
between professional and amateur legislators on economic policy; however, the 
differences are significant for district ideology and business receipts.  
Legislators in professional legislatures are significantly more responsive to their 
district ideology than legislators in amateur legislatures. Thus, responsiveness is more a 
function of legislative capacity, not a perceived closeness that term limits supporters cite 
as a virtue of amateur legislative institutions. Likewise, legislators are more responsive to 
their business supporters in professional as opposed to amateur legislatures. The 
argument that amateur legislators might look to interests to help fill the capacity gap does 
not hold up. Instead, professional legislatures that nurture long-term relationships 
between legislators and interest group supporters and which have many access points for 























Table 4.5:  
The Contextual Effect of Professionalism on Roll Call Liberalism 
  
 
Β (se) P >׀z׀  
P >׀z׀          
difference 
from slope for   
amateur  
Economic Roll Call Liberalism     
 Professional     
  Democratic State Legislator .420 (.048) .001 .427  
  District Liberalism .364 (.181) .023 .038  
  Percent of Receipts from Business  -.185 (.047) .001 .014  
  Percent of Receipts from Labor .350 (.101) .001 .253  
 Amateur     
  Democratic State Legislator .408 (.045) .001 --  
  District Liberalism  -.080 (.188) .336 --  
  Percent of Receipts from Business  -.024 (.023) .149 --  
  Percent of Receipts from Labor .227 (.155) .072 --  
      
Social Roll Call Liberalism     
 Professional     
  Democratic State Legislator .737 (.031) .001 .001  
  District Liberalism  .759 (.174) .001 .133  
  
Percent of Receipts from 
Conservative Social Groups -.338 (.492) .246 .001  
  
Percent of Receipts from Liberal 
Social Groups .398 (.156) .006 .404  
 Amateur     
  Democratic State Legislator .405 (.052) .001 --  
  District Liberalism  .367 (.321) .133 --  
  
Percent of Receipts from 
Conservative Social Groups -.125 (.031) .001 --  
  
Percent of Receipts from Liberal 
Social Groups .443 (.116) .001 --  
Note: Interval Regression Coefficients with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by 
state. P-values for differences were computed based on models with interaction terms between 
the independent variables and a dummy representing professional/amateur The full model is 




 In both professional and amateur legislatures, Democratic lawmakers are 
significantly more liberal than their Republican colleagues. However, the influence of 
party is significantly greater in professional legislatures. This relates back to the greater 
partisan polarization on social issues as opposed to economic issues. Increasing district 
liberalism results in significantly greater social roll call liberalism for professional 
legislators, but not for amateur legislators. The difference between levels of 
professionalism, however, is not significant.  
 To elucidate the impact of these various groups on economic and social policy 
roll call liberalism, I again calculate predicted estimates for those variables that turned 
out to be significantly different legislators in professional and amateur legislatures. The 
impact of district ideology on economic roll call votes in professional legislatures is 
significantly different from its impact in amateur districts. A Democrat representing a 
perfectly conservative district has a 55 percent liberal score on their economic roll call 
vote regardless of the level of professionalism in their chamber. If the legislator 
represents a fully liberal district, however, a Democratic from a professional chamber is 
likely to be over 90 percent liberal whereas the same Democratic legislator in an 
unprofessional district is still only about 50 percent liberal. This 30 percent increase in 
economic roll call liberalism, based on change in party, is also evident amongst 
Republicans in professional legislatures.  
 This finding is interesting, given the fact that overall, district opinion matters so 
much more on social as opposed to economic issues. The lack of constituency 
responsiveness on economic issues, however, appears in part to be a function of a lack of 
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legislative professionalism. Within professional states, legislators are able to gain a grasp 
of their districts’ wants/needs, even on economic issues, and deliver. This should not take 
away, however, from the larger point that constituency responsiveness is greater on social 
issues. Going back to Table 4.5, the coefficient for district liberalism on social roll call 
liberalism is greater for legislators in both professional and amateur districts, than it is in 
either of the economic roll call models. The difference between the effect of district 
opinion on legislators in professional and amateur states, however, is only significantly 
different in the economic roll call models. Essentially, legislators in professional states 
are about as responsive to their districts on economic roll calls as are legislators to their 











































































Note: These predicted estimates are based on the Interval Regression coefficients presented in 
Table 4.5. Except for the experimental variables - all continuous variables are set at their means. 
For binary (non-experimental) variables, the legislator is from the lower house, not party leaders, 




 The impact of business money on economic roll call liberalism is significantly 
different between professional and amateur legislatures but the substantive differences 
are small. When a legislator receives all of their money from business, they grow about 
10 percent more conservative in professional legislatures. In amateur legislatures, they 
become about 2 percent more conservative. For practical purposes, this 10 percent figure 
is inflated because only 2 legislators in the study were actually completely funded by 
business. A more realistic range is to look between 25 percent and 75 percent business 
funding. The decrease in economic roll call liberalism between these two points is about 
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Note: These predicted estimates are based on the Interval Regression coefficients presented in 
Table 4.5. Except for the experimental variables - all continuous variables are set at their means. 
For binary (non-experimental) variables, the legislator is from the lower house, not party leaders, 




 Legislative professionalism conditions the relationship between party and social 
roll call liberalism. The main differences exist for Democrats. Holding all other variables 
constant, Democratic legislators who work in professional legislatures are almost 
uniformly rated 100 percent liberal. Democratic lawmakers from amateur legislatures, 
however, are only rated about 65 percent liberal. This difference of 35 percent does not 
exist for Republicans who hover around 20 percent liberal regardless of the level of 
legislative professionalism in the chambers in which they serve. Professionalism, thus, 
drives Democratic, but not Republican, lawmakers to ideological extremes. This likely 
relates to the motivation of members to serve in states with professional legislatures. In 
amateur legislatures, with their short, perhaps biennial sessions, are more attractive to 
those who can combine part-time legislative service with another primary occupation. 
These tend to be professionals, who are more likely to be Republicans. Professional 
legislatures may not be attractive enough for business professionals to leave their career 
for, but they are to policy motivated Democrats (Fiorina 1994). I find that these career 
oriented Democrats are quite liberal vis-à-vis those serving in more amateur states.35  
                                                 
35 This finding is not a function of region. When I run the model in different regions, similar difference 











































































Note: These predicted estimates are based on the Interval Regression coefficients presented in 
Table 4.5. Except for the experimental variables - all continuous variables are set at their means. 
For binary (non-experimental) variables, the legislator is from the lower house, not party leaders, 





 Finally, the relationship between conservative ideological group money on the 
social roll call liberalism of Republicans differs based on level of legislative 
professionalism. Social group money has almost no effect on Republican legislators in 
amateur legislatures. However, it does significantly relate to Republican member 
conservatism in professional legislatures. This is likely because of the type of Republican 
legislators drawn to serve in professional legislatures. Career minded Republicans who 
give up their private sector job to serve in a professional legislature are not likely to be 
moderates. They have what scholars call progressive ambition. They want to win higher 
office and are seeking in their state legislative career to shore up those constituencies they 
feel they need in future races for higher office (Hibbing 1986; Maestas 2000). With this 
said, the reader should note that two percent of campaign funds coming from socially 
conservative groups is an abnormally high amount. Slightly less than one percent of all 
legislators in this study have two percent or more of their funds coming from these 
groups. So this result, while statistically significant, lacks a meaningful impact as long as 
conservative social groups continue to donate such small amounts of money to the vast 
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Note: These predicted estimates are based on the Interval Regression coefficients presented in 
Table 4.5. Except for the experimental variables - all continuous variables are set at their means. 
For binary (non-experimental) variables, the legislator is from the lower house, not party leaders, 






In this chapter, I examined the relationship between legislators and their various 
constituencies and confirm a great deal of what was suggested in the theory and literature 
chapters. On economic issues, there is an overall tilt of legislators in the conservative 
direction. This is consistent with scholarship that shows a shifting in economic regimes 
over the past 30 years in which the New Deal coalition, which favored state intervention 
on economic matters, was to a certain extent replaced by a more conservative, lassie 
faire, approach to economic policy. On social issues, legislators are overwhelmingly 
polarized. With a line drawn in the sand, state legislators are battling over the cultural 
issues that divide the two parties.  
Perhaps the most interesting finding in this study is that increased district 
liberalism results in increased legislator roll call liberalism on social but not economic 
issues. On social issues, legislators need to care about the opinion of their constituency 
because it is most likely that voters are paying attention to these higher salient legislative 
controversies. A Democratic legislator from a liberal leaning district may be able to vote 
against a labor bargaining rule and emerge unscathed, but they are much less likely to get 
away with a vote for a law restricting abortion.  
This dynamic has implications that go to the heart of what it means for legislators 
to represent their constituency. Social policy congruence, from the standpoint of 
responsiveness, if fine, but an inability of constituents to hold their members accountable 
on economic issues presents a discouraging problem for the worst off among us, 
especially given the fact that the Democratic state legislators (unlike Republican 
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legislators) are the ones lacking unity. The trend over the past twenty years has been for 
less government action aimed at alleviating the worst forms of economic depression 
among low-income families. If only the most active groups (usually business who do not 
want to pay taxes that social programs require or because they want to keep a perpetual 
underclass dependent on the lowest paying jobs) are having a noted influence on 
economic policy. The trade off between the organized and the unorganized 
constituencies, on economic issues is very near zero-sum. The relatively strong 
conservative gains of business take precedence over the weak influence of constituents in 
the minds of legislators. Until or unless the Democratic Party can make economic issues 
more salient (as they did in the New Deal and Great Society eras) little incentive exists 
for legislative responsiveness.  
The contextual effect of electoral competition is also important to understanding 
responsive notions of representation. Constituency opinion, when interacted with a 
legislator’s party affiliation, is more influential in uncompetitive districts. This is because 
members who win election in safe districts are so similar to their districts (because of 
district homogeneity) that responsiveness can happen almost unconsciously. The next 
chapter will elaborate on this finding. Electoral competition also influences the 
relationship between legislators and their organized constituencies. Business and labor 
donations influence legislative roll call voting on economic issues when legislators are 
from uncompetitive districts. The relationship between ideological group money and 
social issue roll call voting, however, is strongest when legislators are from competitive 
districts. Labor and business groups have the resources to target their donations using an 
investment strategy, strengthening their relationship with legislators who need not worry 
 
 147
about their reelection. More amateur ideological groups, however, target their relatively 
limited contributions with an eye toward reshuffling the membership of state legislatures. 
The influence of this money on legislators in competitive races is significant.   
The contextual effect of legislative professionalism is also important to 
understanding the roll call activity of state legislators. District ideology, although not 
usually effective in influencing economic roll call activity, does have a greater influence 
on legislators who work in professional legislatures. Capacity enables responsiveness. 
The view that legislators are more responsive when they are part-time, “ordinary,” 
legislators is simply not born out in this analysis. Since 2000, term limits have gone into 
effect on many state legislators and the amaturizing of state legislatures is in full bloom. 
This reform is especially troubling for responsiveness because in addition to low capacity 
amateur legislators problems in responding to district opinion, they are now low capacity 
and unaccountable legislators. Without even reelection to worry about, amateur 
legislators have even fewer incentives to worry about their reelection prospects.   
 
 148
Appendix to Chapter 4 
Appendix Table 4.1:  
Models of Economic Roll Call Liberalism by Competitiveness 
  β (se) β (se) β (se) β (se)  
 
District Liberalism 
X Competitive -7.736 (13.751) -- -- --  
 
Democratic X 




Competitive -- -- -30.643 (7.815) --  
 
Percent from Labor 
X Competitive -- -- -- 7.813 (4.629)  
 District Liberalism  18.775 (10.913) 17.178 (10.927) 16.053 (10.902) 16.916 (10.906)  
 Democratic 41.722 (3.573) 42.079 (3.782) 41.593 (3.506) 41.740 (3.561)  
 
Percent of Receipts 
from Business  -12.085 (3.930) -12.099 (3.937) -12.116 (3.907) -13.674 (3.706)  
 
Percent of Receipts 
from Labor  27.877 (9.715) 28.243 (9.648) 37.844 (8.021) 28.408 (9.586)  
 Competitive 3.084 (9.636) -1.203 (2.504) .221 (2.266) -5.176 (2.314)  
 Democratic Leader 6.856 (1.821) 6.808 (1.816) 6.928 (1.833) 6.735 (1.802)  
 Republican Leader -2.692 (2.290) -2.616 (2.290) -2.482 (2.293) -2.585 (2.295)  
 Lower Chamber -2.361 (1.819) -2.334 (1.827) -2.279 (1.794) -2.314 (1.821)  
 Professionalism -4.902 (9.445) -4.689 (9.421) -4.586 (9.256) -4.380 (9.390)  
 Female Legislator 2.816 (1.361) 2.845 (1.337) 2.865 (1.351) 2.806 (1.349)  
 South -4.910 (6.207) -4.870 (6.206) -4.818 (6.172) -4.954 (6.198)  
 Scoring Year 2000 9.085 (10.720) 9.071 (10.725) 9.054 (10.635) 8.989 (10.756)  
 Scoring Year 1999 -.319 (11.585) -.169 (11.523) .550 (11.574) -.240 (11.563)  
 Constant 3.389 (13.390) 4.184 (13.534) 4.446 (13.405) 5.266 (13.463)  
       
 
Wald Chi-Square 
(Significance) 335.20 (.001) 333.32 (.001) 346.58 (.001) 341.40 (.001)  
 N 4140 4140 4140 4140  






Appendix Table 4.2:  
Models of Social Roll Call Liberalism by Competitiveness 




Competitive -5.116 (42.023) -- -- --  
 
Democratic X 




Social Groups X 





Competitive -- -- -- 3.805 (3.152)  
 
District 
Liberalism  74.349 (16.436) 74.945 (15.840) 75.003 (15.754) 73.647 (15.746)  










Groups 4.250 (.940) 4.240 (.936) 4.238 (.935) 3.822 (.915)  
 Competitive -.911 (29.461) -6.722 (4.864) -2.570 (3.778) -6.390 (3.845)  
 
Democratic 
Leader 20.921 (7.353) 20.892 (7.350) 20.832 (7.336) 20.766 (7.340)  
 
Republican 
Leader 6.161 (6.551) 5.963 (6.555) 5.714 (6.552) 5.958 (6.550)  
 Lower Chamber .429 (2.863) .423 (2.861) .671 (2.857) .371 (2.857)  
 Professionalism -11.424 (7.328) -11.466 (7.330) -11.565 (7.339) -11.120 (7.313)  
 Female Legislator 13.568 (3.050) 13.533 (3.048) 13.494 (3.044) 13.407 (3.050)  
 
Scoring Year 
2000 -3.477 (3.722) -3.535 (3.713) -3.407 (3.707) -3.627 (3.709)  
 Constant 
-34.960 
(10.064) -34.933 (9.600) -35.419 (9.565) 34.057 (9.562)  
       
 
Wald Chi-Square 
(Significance) 1073.22 (.001) 1074.09 (.001) 1079.46 (.001) 1076.50 (.001)  
 N 1602 1602 1602 1602  





Appendix Table 4.3:  
Models of Economic Roll Call Liberalism by Legislative Professionalism 




Professional 44.350 (24.981) -- -- --  
 
Democratic X 








Professional -- -- -- 12.253 (18.415)  
 
District 
Liberalism  -7.965 (18.836) 18.447 (12.788) 18.763 (12.436) 17.966 (12.556)  








Labor  26.790 (9.956) 28.904 (9.775) 28.736 (9.526) 22.686 (15.487)  
 Competitive .030 (.024) .033 (.024) .033 (.024) .031 (.024)  
 
Democratic 
Leader 6.994 (2.021) 6.887 (2.007) 6.605 (1.797) 6.915 (2.046)  
 
Republican 
Leader -2.275 (2.233) -2.448 (2.300) -2.392 (2.293) -2.424 (2.258)  
 Lower Chamber -1.890 (1.662) -2.243 (11.265) -2.088 (1.636) -2.172 (1.709)  
 Professionalism -33.710 (18.060) -4.876 (5.893) 2.655 (4.896) -4.991 (4.641)  
 Female Legislator 3.032 (1.387) 2.906 (1.325) 2.859 (1.311) 2.904 (1.357)  
 South -4.848 (5.501) -5.332 (5.871) -4.981 (1.311) -5.230 (5.757)  
 
Scoring Year 
2000 8.630 (8.671) 9.233 (9.477) 9.438 (9.404) 9.086 (9.513)  
 
Scoring Year 
1999 -4.156 (10.280) -2.295 (11.265) -2.012 (1.636) -1.861 (11.512)  
 Constant 20.771 (16.315) 3.630 (12.934) -1.444 (13.075) 3.952 (12.989)  
       
 
Wald Chi-Square 
(Significance) 344.64 (.001) 399.43 (.001) 337.06 (.001) 331.10 (.001)  
 N 4140 4140 4140 4140  





Appendix Table 4.4:  
Models of Social Roll Call Liberalism by Legislative Professionalism 




Professional 29.171 (35.917) -- -- --  
 
Democratic X 




Social Groups X 





Professional -- -- -- .455 (1.872)  
 
District 
Liberalism  46.681 (32.151) 68.455 (15.562) 73.864 (15.511) 69.423 (15.562)  










Groups 4.285 (.957) 4.555 (.996) 4.130 (.946) 3.980 (1.559)  
 Competitive .144 (.035) .134  (.035) .146 (.035) .146 (.035)  
 
Democratic 
Leader 21.335 (7.218) 20.899 (6.976) 21.319 (7.245) 21.331 (7.234)  
 
Republican 
Leader 5.284 (6.517) 6.687 (6.306) 3.504 (6.428) 5.085 (6.468)  
 Lower Chamber .331 (2.853) .645 (2.799) .538 (2.833) .145 (.035)  
 Professionalism -21.722 (25.974) -16.238 (5.064) -7.928 (4.920) -1.384 (4.851)  
 Female Legislator 14.876 (3.054) 15.470 (3.022) 14.612 (3.038) 14.773 (3.056)  
 
Scoring Year 
2000 -.929 (6.444) -4.114 (4.985) 1.883 (5.659) -3.398 (5.591)  
 Constant -28.205 (19.155) -28.766 (9.769) -42.981 (9.653) -41.478 (9.735)  
       
 
Wald Chi-Square 
(Significance) 1100.06 (.001) 1141.13 (.001) 1105.51 (.001) 1096.98 (.001)  
 N 1602 1602 1602 1602  




Chapter 5: Roll Call Extremism in State Legislatures 
 
The preceding chapter investigated the dynamics that explain legislative roll call 
liberalism and conservatism. Under certain conditions; on social issues, in electorally safe 
districts, and in professional legislatures; lawmakers were found to be more responsive to 
the opinions of their district constituencies. Ideological direction however, is only the 
most obvious characteristic of roll call voting. A second dimension of roll call activity 
concerns the extremism/moderation of a member’s roll call votes.  
Each state legislative chamber has its ideological stalwarts – legislators who are 
consistently at the polar ends in their roll call ideology. These legislators, which include 
Barbara Currie (D-IL) and Lenore Barrett (R-ID), have a clearcut view of the world and 
express that ideological certainty through their legislative roll call votes. At the same 
time, each legislature has a number of more moderate members, which include Ben 
GiaQuinta (D-IN) and Donald Moffitt (R-IL). For these lawmakers, legislative battles are 
not black and white ideological struggles, but rather a venue for compromise and 
coalition building. It is not likely that legislators randomly fall into one camp or the other. 
In an era of increased partisan polarization in legislatures, this facet of roll call behavior 
becomes even more interesting because it takes ideological direction (and the built in 
partisan explanation) out of the equation. Moreover, examining roll call extremism 
allows for the investigation of an additional district characteristic, district diversity, to 
help explain what motivates legislators in their roll call decision-making.  
District diversity should relate directly to the ability of lawmakers to be 
responsive to their district constituencies. When members come from demographically 
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homogeneous districts, and especially when they descriptively represent that dominant 
characteristic, it is likely that members respond to the prevailing character of their 
district. However, when members represent a heterogeneous district, they likely have a 
difficult time growing too ideologically extreme because they need to create electoral 
coalitions that span at least a number of the demographic divides.  
In this chapter, I investigate this second characteristic of legislative roll call 
activity – legislative extremism. The primary research question is, what drives certain 
legislators to take extreme positions on economic or social issues? I control for all of the 
characteristics that were found to influence roll call liberalism in the past chapter because 
economic and social roll call extremism is in essence a reformulation of the roll call 
liberalism measures. I pay particular attention, however, to the role that economic, racial, 
and religious district diversity has on the nature of their representatives roll call votes. 
Understanding how these diversity measures drive legislators to either roll call extremes 
or roll call moderation will expand what we know about the influence of district 
constituencies on the roll call voting behavior of their state representative.  
The Structure of Legislative Extremism in State Legislatures 
The primary dependent variables in this study are economic and social roll call 
extremism – each measured on a continuous scale from 0-100. Again, these scores are 
based on the same interest group report cards reported in Table 3.1. Because these scores, 
when indexed into an average, give a legislator’s roll call liberalism, they were then 
folded in half to produce a measure of roll call extremism. For example, if a legislator 
received a score of 100 from the AFL-CIO and a 0 from the NFIB, the legislator would 
have a 100 percent liberal economic roll call ideology (NFIB is recoded into a liberal 
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direction). That legislator would also have a 100 percent extremism score. On the other 
hand, a legislator with a 50 percent economic roll call liberalism score (average of group 
scores ) would have a roll call extremism of 0. The same procedure applies to the creation 
of social roll call extremism.  
The Structure of Economic Roll Call Extremism 
 Regarding economic extremism, the distribution appears mostly normal with the 
exception of the 100 percent category, which contains a disproportionate number of cases 
(13 percent of all case). The average level of economic extremism is 55 percent. The 
distribution looks much different when examining the two parties separately. As 
expected, the Republican Party is much more uniform in its propensity towards economic 
polarization. Of all Republican state legislators, 24 percent receive perfectly extreme 
marks and the average for all Republican legislators is 67 percent extreme.  
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Figure 5.1:  




























































N = 2,188, Mean = 67.4                N = 2,090, Mean = 42.7 





The Democrats, on the other hand, are much more varied in their level of 
economic extremism. Only a small group of legislators are in the 100 percent category (4 
percent), while a more sizable number (5 percent) are actually at the moderate end of the 
scale. The Democratic Party forms a near normal distribution with a mean of 43 percent. 
As the distributions suggest, the Republicans and Democrats are significantly different 
from one another in their levels of economic extremism.  
It is clear that party will be a major explanatory force when modeling economic 
roll call liberalism. As expected, the Republicans are defenders of government 
uninvolvement on economic matters while the Democrats are much more divided on 
these issues. As previously suggested, this likely relates to the overwhelming support in 
the United States for the principles underlying the free market system. The Democratic 
Party is not anything like the socialist parties of Europe. Being “anti-business” is not a 
label that many politicians, even self-avowed liberals, desire. When policies are enacted 
that hamper the economy, officeholders are held accountable. Regardless of party, a 
quick route to electoral defeat, is when voters perceive the government as being 
responsible for a poor economy (Kinder and Kiewet 1981).  
The Structure of Social Roll Call Extremism 
 Virtually all legislators take extreme positions on social issues. On a broad 
spectrum of social issues ranging from abortion, to gay rights, to teaching about God in 
public schools, to symbolic issues like desecration of the flag, the parties are 
fundamentally polarized. These issues do not lend themselves to compromise and it is as 
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if gravity pulls legislators to extremes on social issues in a way that it does not on 
economic issues.  
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Figure 5.1:  













































 N = 850, Mean = 74.1                 N = 805, Mean = 76.3 





An impressive 43 percent of all legislators fall into the 100 percent extreme 
category while the average level of extremism is 75 percent. Thus, on social issues, state 
legislators are a full 20 percent more extreme than they are on economic issues. 
Furthermore, this dynamic crosses party lines. For both Democrats and Republicans, just 
less than half of all members fall into the 100 percent extreme category (45 and 41 
percent respectively). As a result, the two party distributions are not significantly 
different on social issues.  
The Correlates of Legislative Extremism 
District Diversity and Legislative Extremism 
Besides the likely effect of party on economic extremism, what helps explain 
these distributions? District diversity is likely to relate to the nature of their 
representative’s legislative activity. Representatives from homogeneous districts, who 
themselves likely reflect that homogeneity, likely move to ideological extremes.  
More internally homogeneous districts – be them economically, racially, or 
religiously alike – are prone to electing legislators who reflect that sameness and act with 
more legislative certainty. On the other hand, districts rich in diversity likely elect 
representatives who must walk a difficult line between the interests of their 
economically/socially diverse districts. This likely results in legislative moderation. 
Consider a district that is 95 percent black, versus a district that is equal parts White, 
Black, Latino, versus a district that is 95 percent White. In the 95 percent Black district, 
the representative will probably be an extremely liberal legislator; while in the mixed 
 
 160
district, the legislators will likely be more moderate; and in the 95 percent white district, 
the representative will likely be an extreme conservative legislator.  
What makes districts more or less diverse? Those responsible for state legislative 
redistricting plans have as their primary motive the desire to increase the number of seats 
their parties hold in the legislative chambers (Bullock 1975; Niemi and Winsky 1992; 
Ostdiek 1995). These redistricting decisions are likely to have real and observable effects 
on the nature of district diversity and thus will affect the nature of legislative voting. 
When legislative districts are “packed” – creating internally homogeneous units – 
extremism likely follows. When districts are “cracked,” moderation is the likely result. 
Researchers studying the effect of majority-minority redistricting plans have found this to 
be true. Majority-minority districts (by design racially “packed”) elect sharply liberal 
members, while the surrounding, overwhelmingly White, districts tend to elect very 
conservative members (Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran 1996; Petrocik and Desposato 
1998).36 As such, homogeneity works to the benefit of legislative extremism.  
Redistricting, as an explanation of homogeneous populations, however is 
incomplete. Not only do those responsible for redistricting often group like people 
together. Evidence exists that people emigrate in such ways as to bolster homogeneity. 
When people increase their economic standing, they tend to leave poorer neighborhoods, 
leaving the places they left less diverse and bolstering the homogeneity of their new 
location (Gimpel 1999).  
                                                 
36 It is important to note that an average majority-minority district possesses more racial diversity than non-
majority-minority districts. However, though their effect on neighboring districts, majority minority 
districts do cause increasing levels of homogeneity overall.  
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 To measure district diversity, a Sullivan Index (Sullivan 1969) of diversity is 
generated for economic, racial, and religious diversity in each district. I expect that 
economic diversity decreases economic roll call extremism and that racial and religious 
diversity decreases social roll call liberalism. For a detailed explanation of this measure, 
see Chapter 3. 
Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Legislative Extremism 
Even though partisanship is not expected to have the overwhelming effect on 
extremism that it does on legislative liberalism, lawmakers’ party affiliations still relate 
to their roll call extremism. As shown, Republican legislators are more predisposed to 
ideologically extreme position taking vis-à-vis their Democratic colleagues on economic 
issues. It is of course true that Democratic legislators are more willing to use the 
government to regulate certain business practices, but they are not, overall, seeking to 
undo the free-market system. Republicans, on the other hand, find it much easier to unite 
in a pure defense of limited government involvement on economic matters.   
This ideological moderation by Democrats on economic issues, however, is less 
evident on social issues. On social issues, which are not amiable to compromise in the 
first place, legislators of both parties are similar in their propensity towards extremism. 
For Democrats, this means a limited view of government regulation on social issues; for 
Republicans, a more hands on approach to regulation of what they view as questionable 
social behavior – be it gay marriage, the desecration of the flag, or the use of abortion, to 
name a few key issues. The effect of party has already been outlined, but it is nonetheless 
important to test its effect while controlling for the other factors which follow.  
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Interest groups exist because they are seeking to change or defend policies. They 
also tend to represent ideologically narrow groups of individuals who feel the 
government is not responding to their concerns. Interest group constituencies are highly 
partisan, have high levels of political knowledge, and are willing to participate in a 
variety of activities aimed at affecting the policy process (Verba and Nie 1972; 
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba et al. 1995). Interest groups are also careful to 
maximize the impact of the dollars they contribute. They pay more for greater legislator 
effort, and less when voters are less hostile to a given policy (Denzau and Munger 1986). 
As such, interest groups do not generally pressure legislators towards the ideological 
middle. Business and labor attempt to pull legislators to extremes on economic policy. 
Ideological groups attempt to pull legislators to extremes on social policy.  
Interest group support is measured as the percent of campaign receipts a legislator 
receives from interest groups. The Institute for Money in State Politics provided this data 
on legislative campaign finance and a complete discussion of the measure can be found in 
Chapter 3.  
Controlling for Chamber Characteristics 
 Party competition in the chambers may also relate to differing levels of legislative 
extremism. Legislating in a closely divided chamber can result in either greater levels of 
stalemate or greater levels of cross-aisle cooperation. If legislators opt for stalemate, 
legislative extremism likely follows, if they decide to be bipartisan for the sake of getting 
something done, moderation should result. The same exact logic applies to legislating in 
divided versus unified party government. Members serving under divided government 
may choose to moderate their views and work together, or they may decide to engage 
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each other in an ideological battle and wait until the next election in hopes of unified 
party government (Jones 2001). Chamber competition and the presence of divided 
government is included in the models to test these possibilities.  
 Legislative professionalism may relate to roll call extremism. Perhaps legislators 
have an easier time breaking with their party when they have greater individual capacity. 
This individual capacity (more staff, full-time legislative job, longer sessions) may allow 
them to develop greater ties with their district, resulting in a greater focus toward home 
and less of a focus on partisan politics at the statehouse. On the other hand, professional 
legislators, who choose politics as their primary career, may be more likely to engage in 
struggles over issues on which they have strong opinions. Following this line of 
reasoning, legislators in amateur legislatures would be less ideologically decisive and 
more willing to moderate their views. For a discussion of the measurement of chamber 
competition, divided government, and legislative professionalism, see Chapter 3. 
Controlling for Legislator and District Characteristics 
 Certain characteristics related to each individual legislator and the districts they 
represent may relate to legislative extremism. Ideally, one would survey all legislators 
and ask a battery of questions to measure their propensity toward taking ideologically 
extreme versus ideologically moderate positions. This type of data, however, is not 
available so I instead focus on those characteristics that are directly measurable, 
including the legislator’s tenure, whether they are a party leader, the competition they 
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face in elections, and their gender. District controls not included in the diversity measures 
include percent of the district with a college degree and percent living in poverty.37  
No scholarship, that I know of, has tested the relationship between legislative 
tenure and ideological extremism. My measurement of tenure, from the Institute on 
Money in State Politics, only includes whether or not the member was serving in their 
first term in 1998. What should we expect from a new class of legislators? It could be that 
they are electorally uncertain and as such would gravitate toward moderate positions out 
of fear of the ideological unknown. It could also be, however, that they are young, 
idealistic, and have high hopes for what may be their very ideological (rather than 
pragmatic) agenda. Furthermore, at this early point in their career they may be seeking 
recognition by their parties that would follow from extreme ideological position taking.  
I expect party leaders to be more ideologically extreme than the rank-and-file 
members. Scholarship from nearly fifty years ago suggested the opposite; that leaders in 
Congress would position themselves in the ideological middle of their parties (Matthews 
1960) – as much servants of their fellow partisans as leaders. As the power of parties in 
Congress rose (at the expense of committees), the role of party leaders became less that 
of an intermediary peacemaker, and more of a ideological guiding light (Cox and 
McCubbins 1994; Sinclair 2000). Leaders increasingly use carrots (like prime committee 
assignments) to keep their fellow partisans in line. Furthermore, with more unified 
                                                 
37 Several measures including household income, public assistance, social security receipts, and others, 
were tested and eventually dropped from the analysis because of the multi-collinearity they produced with 
each other and the diversity indexes.  
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parties, members are typically amenable to following their leaders to extremes (Hershey 
and Beck 2003).  
 Regarding electoral competition, I expect that close elections lead to less 
legislative extremism. We know that districts are relatively moderate, ideologically, and 
when members face the prospect of losing their seat or are in position to win a closely 
contested election, I expect them to moderate their positions, in Downsian fashion. When 
members run in uncompetitive elections, they are free to test the waters of legislative 
extremism with a good deal of certainty that it will not come back to haunt them in future 
elections. The evidence supporting such a claim was discussed at length in Chapters 2 
and 4 and does not need reiteration, especially considering that this is a control variable 
in this chapter. Regarding the measurement of tenure, leadership, college percent, poverty 
percent, and electoral competition, see Chapter 3. 
 No scholarship exists that test the effect of state level elite and mass polarization 
on individual legislator extremism.38 The two, however, are theoretically linked and as 
such, I test their influence on state legislator extremism. Party elites, which I measure 
using a compilation of delegates to the national party conventions, are those activist 
components within each party that legislators rely on for primary support as well as for 
                                                 
38 I also attempted to include them in models in the previous chapter but the models would not support their 
inclusion. To use state level mass and elite measures to test for ideological direction requires the inclusion 
of Republican and Democratic elite measures for both the elite and mass level partisans. These four 
variables, in combination with legislator’s party created such multi-collinearity problems that often the 
party of the legislators would fall out of significance or point in the wrong direction. In this chapter, 
however, the mean difference between the parties is appropriate and with fewer measure multi-collinearity 
did not pose a problem.  
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financial backing. As such, it is possible that as the party elite diverge, legislators follow 
their activist supporters and become more extreme in their roll call behavior. The same 
reaction is possible to mass partisans in each state. As the citizens who identify with each 
party grow further apart, legislators may respond with increasing extremism. Based on a 
continuation of my theory regarding responsiveness and issue type; I expect mass 
polarization to have a greater effect on social issue extremism and elite polarization to 
have a greater effect on economic issue extremism.   
The Causes of Economic Roll Call Extremism 
 To model the effect of the various explanatory variables on economic and social 
extremism, I again use Interval Regression to deal with the fact that so many cases 
congregate at the extreme.39 In explaining the meaningful significance of statistically 
significant variables, and flush out the theoretical relevance of each, I compute predicted 
                                                 
39 To test for multi-collinearity, I conducted VIF tests on OLS versions of the models. On the economic 
extremism model, one VIF score was 4.1 but the rest were 2.1 or lower. On the social extremism model, 
none exceeded 2.4. Because the 4.1 VIF score was a bit disconcerting, I ran the model without the most 
correlated variable to make sure my findings did not change. Although the coefficients did change slightly, 
overall significance levels (and directions) of the primary independent variables did not change. Because of 
the propensity of cases to congregate at the upper extreme in both models, the Interval Regression model 
was instructed to censor the upper limits. When run without controlling for the upper limit category the 
results are nearly identical and when run in OLS the same variables appear significant (some others become 
significant in the OLS models) and none become significant simply by the use of the Interval Regression 
model. Besides the fact that Interval Regression is required based on the distribution of the dependent 
variable, this offers assurance that it is not artificially producing significant variables but is in fact biased 
toward accepting the null. Furthermore, when OLS models are run without the 100 percent categories, no 
VIF scores exceeded 2.0, further indicating no serious levels of multi-collinearity in the model.  
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estimates. Two out of the three primary hypotheses relating to economic roll call 
extremism hold. As expected economic diversity is related to a decrease in economic roll 
call extremism and Democratic legislators are less extreme on economic roll calls than 
their Republican counterparts. Interest group money from economic interests comes close 
to increasing economic roll call extremism, however it does not reach necessary levels of 




Table 5.1:  
Economic Roll Call Extremism  
  β (se) P >׀z׀   
 Economic Diversity in the District  -81.741 (30.571) .004  
 Democratic State Legislator -30.508 (4.291) ..001  
 Percent of Receipts from Economic Interest Groups  4.876 (4.659) .148  
Legislator and District Characteristics 
 First Term Legislator -.388 (2.356) .435  
 Party Leader 5.499 (2.590) .012  
 Electoral Competition -3.247 (2.814) .125  
 Percent of District with a College Education 11.671 (10.329) .129  
 Percent of District Living in Poverty -20.106 (16.714) .115  
 Female Legislator 2.031 (1.219) .048  
State Opinion Polarization 
 State Elite Polarization 12.301 (4.679) .005  
 State Mass Partisan Polarization -1.072 (5.206) .419  
Chamber Characteristics    
 Chamber Competition -18.188 (33.315) .293  
 Divided Government 3.282 (4.937) .253  
 Legislative Professionalism 9.080 (18.040) .307  
 Lower House -1.581 (3.950) .345  
Control Variables 
 Scoring Year 2000 -13.204 (7.167) .033  
 Scoring Year 1999 -22.903 (9.964) .011  
 Constant 85.134 (19.669) .001  
     
 Wald Chi-Square 117.80 Prob. > .001  
 N 4060   
Note: Interval Regression Coefficients with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by 




 Party leaders are found to be significantly more extreme than the party 
rank-and-file. Female legislators are also significantly more extreme on economic matters 
than their male colleagues. Electoral competition appears to diminish economic 
extremism, but just misses the .05 level of statistical significance. No chamber 
characteristics appear to significantly influence the level of legislator’s economic 
extremism.  
As I expected, from my theory that mass attitudes matter more on economic 
issues; elite polarization significantly increases legislator roll call extremism on economic 
issues. Mass polarization, however, has no significant effect. I will talk more about this 
and the other significant variables as I describe their predictive values.  
What is the substantive significance of these findings? Holding all other variables 
constant Democratic legislators have a roll call extremism of 38.4 percent while their 
Republican colleagues have a roll call extremism of 69.1 percent. Thus, the partisan 
divide (31 percent gap) is robust even when controlling for the other variables. 
Republicans, as explained in the previous chapter, are ideologically united in a 
conservative direction while Democrats, although more liberal overall are much more 
moderate. Southern representatives, especially, contribute to economic moderation on 




Table 5.2:  
Predicted Economic Roll Call Extremism 
  Predicted Roll Call Extremism  
 Party   
  Democratic Legislators 38.4  
  Republican Legislators 69.1  
     
  Democrats Republicans  
 Economic Diversity in District    
  .198 (min) 54.0 84.5  
  .348 (-1 sd) 41.8 72.3  
  .388 (mean) 38.4 69.0  
  .428 (+1 sd) 35.2 65.7  
  .543 (max) 25.8 56.3  
     
 Party Leadership    
  Party Leader 43.9 74.4  
  Rank and File 38.4 69.0  
      
 State Elite Polarization    
  1.81 (min) 24.6 55.1  
  2.47 (-1 sd) 32.7 63.2  
  2.95 (mean) 38.4 69.0  
  3.43 (+1 sd) 44.5 74.9  
  4.06 (max) 52.2 82.7  
      
 Gender    
  Female 40.5 71.0  
  Male 38.4 69.0  
    
Note: These predicted estimates are based on the Interval Regression coefficients presented 
in Table 5.1. Except for the experimental variables - all continuous variables are set at their 
means. For binary (non-experimental) variables, government is not divided and the 
legislator is from the lower house, not a party leader, not a first term member, male, and the 




 Economic diversity has a substantive effect on economic roll call extremism. 
While holding the other variables constant Democratic and Republican legislators 
experience a 6 percent increase in economic extremism moving from an economic 
diversity of -1 standard deviation to +1 standard deviation. The full range of economic 
diversity, from the lowest to the highest point, represents an increase of 26 percent. Thus, 
when legislators represent a district with greater levels of economic diversity they are 
clearly less likely to be economically extreme in their roll call voting. The entire scale is 
shifted toward the extreme end with Republican lawmakers, but the effect is the same. I 
do not directly investigate the causes of economic diversity, but either through 
redistricting efforts that geographically tie together similar economic units or through 
residential self-selection, economically similar geographic units elect legislators that are 
more economically extreme.  
 This is a theoretically important link between district constituents and legislative 
roll call behavior. Responsiveness is not just delegate style responsiveness based on 
expressed constituent desires, it is also a response to unexpressed constituent needs 
(Jewell 1983). This finding confirms that representatives know the economic 
demographics existing in their districts and respond to those needs. When districts are 
economically diverse, representatives do not respond with economically extreme roll call 
votes but instead take on each issue on a case-by-case basis. When districts are 
economically homogeneous, representatives tend to vote in a much more extreme 
fashion.  
This was the case with my four case studies. My two extremist legislators Currie 
(D) and Barrett (R) both had districts dominated by service workers (83 and 55 percent 
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respectively). My two moderate cases GiaQuinta (D) and Moffitt (R), while having a 
majority (50 percent each) of service workers had twice the manufacturing sector workers 
in their districts, compared with the other two extremists (at 40 and 42 percent 
respectively). Both government and farm sector jobs did not make up a significant 
portion of any of the case study legislator’s districts (all less than 7 percent). The 
economic diversity of their districts helped define the legislative moderation of my less 
extreme case studies. The economic homogeneity of the Currie and Barrett districts 
helped lead these legislators to ideological extremes.  
 As I expected, party leaders are more likely to be extreme in their roll call activity 
vis-à-vis the rank-and-file members. Party leaders are on average 6.4 percent more liberal 
when controlling for the other variables in the model. This indicates that on economic 
issues the party leaders, as expected, are leading the ideological charge of their respective 
parties. Like scholarship that shows congressional leaders to be out in front of their 
fellow partisan lawmakers (Cox and McCubbins 1994; Sinclair 2000) as opposed to 
being a median representation of their caucus (Matthews 1960), party leaders in state 
legislatures are also ideologically more extreme.  
 The impact of party elite polarization is quite striking. An increase from -1 
standard deviation to +1 standard deviation in elite party polarization increases economic 
roll call extremism by 12 percent. Over the entire range of the elite polarization the 
increase is 38 percent more extreme. This lends even more evidence to my theory that on 
economic issue it is the elite level actors that have the greatest impact on legislative 
voting. The public is not as interested, overall, in the complex dynamics of economic 
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issues, however the activists do have positions and are effective in getting legislators to 
respond to their position.  
The gender of legislators was also found to correspond with increased levels of 
economic extremism. The substantive effect, however, is not too great. Female legislators 
are only 2.4 percent more extreme on their economic roll call votes than their male 
colleagues.  
 In sum, the most interesting findings here relate to the relationship between party 
and economic roll call extremism; economic diversity in the district and economic roll 
call extremism; and elite party polarization and roll call extremism. As expected, 
Democrats are not overtly anti-business in the way Republicans are overtly pro-business. 
Legislators who represent economically diverse districts are less likely to be extreme in 
their economic roll call votes. In short, they do not have the luxury of ideological 
certainty on economic issues that comes with representing economically homogeneous 
districts. This is especially important because it represents one of the few instances in this 
study where mass characteristics influence economic roll calls. Diversity, however, is 
most likely to manifest itself as an unarticulated demand of the constituency. Finally, 
elite party polarization, represents the latest in a long line of elite characteristics that is 
found to influence legislative roll call voting on economic, less salient, roll call votes.  
The Causes of Social Roll Call Extremism 
 Like economic extremism, the diversity of the district is also related to social roll 
call liberalism. As racial diversity increases, social extremism decreases. As expected, 
both parties are relatively equal in their social roll call extremism. In addition, 
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contributions from ideological interest groups do not affect legislative extremism on 




Table 5.3:  
Social Roll Call Extremism  
  β (se) P >׀z׀   
 Racial Diversity in the District  -40.427 (20.563) .025  
 Religious Diversity in the District 5.115 (26.251) .420  
 Democratic State Legislator .852 (6.996) .452  
 Percent of Receipts from Ideological Groups  -11.603 (40.755) .388  
Legislator and District Characteristics 
 First Term Legislator 9.626 (3.871) .007  
 Party Leader 2.448 (5.733) .335  
 Electoral Competition .846 (4.837) .431  
 Percent of District with a College Education 39.261 (11.199) .001  
 Percent of District Living in Poverty 124.274 (31.336) .001  
 Female Legislator 3.999 (3.791) .146  
State Opinion Polarization 
 State Party Elite Polarization -4.395 (6.084) .235  
 State Mass Partisan Polarization 14.973 (7.246) .019  
Chamber Characteristics    
 Chamber Competition -93.310 (48.086) .026  
 Divided Government 13.327 (13.597) .199  
 Legislative Professionalism 73.107 (18.864) .001  
 Lower House -.144 (5.584) .490  
Control Variables 
 Scoring Year 2000 26.444 (6.242) .001  
 Constant 30.121 (24.020) .105  
     
 Wald Chi-Square 267.42 Prob.<.001  
 N 1587   
Note: Interval Regression Coefficients with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by 





Regarding the control variables, first term legislators are more extreme than more 
experienced legislators and other district controls including percent with a college degree 
and percent living in poverty are positively related to legislative extremism. Chamber 
competition appears to diminish legislative extremism, but falls just short of statistical 
significance. Increased legislative professionalism, however, significantly increases in 
legislative extremism. As I expected, on social issues it is mass party polarization, and 
not elite party polarization, that influences roll call behavior. 
 These significant variables have a meaningful impact on social roll call 
extremism. Holding all variables constant, a district that falls one standard deviation 
above the mean for racial diversity is 77.7 percent extreme while a district one standard 
deviation below the mean is 90.2 percent extreme. For districts with a minimum amount 
of racial diversity, social extremism is 90.4 percent while social extremism at the 
maximum level of racial diversity in the sample is 64.2 percent extreme; this represents a 
greater than 26 percent increase in social extremism. Thus, racially homogeneous 
districts are more likely to produce legislative extremism on social issues, while racially 
heterogeneous districts are more likely to produce legislative moderation. Just as 
economic diversity moderates legislator’s economic roll call votes; racial diversity 
moderates legislator’s social roll call votes. In fact, the effect is even greater for racial 
diversity than it is for economic diversity. Again, legislator responsiveness is found to be 
a function of district characteristics. 
Take, for instance, the racial and economic diversity of my four case studies. 
Currie (D) and Barrett (R), my two extremist examples come from racially homogeneous 
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districts. Currie’s is 85 percent Black and Barrett’s is 95 percent White. My two 
examples of moderates have slightly more racially diverse districts. GiaQuinta’s (D) is 68 
percent White and Moffitt’s (R) is 90 percent white. While the difference for the two 
Republicans are not dramatic, the difference is telling between the two Democrats. Being 
from a more racially diverse district seems to moderate GiaQuinta’s social issue 
positions. His electoral coalition likely spans different racial groups and he must remain 





Table 5.4:  
Predicted Social Roll Call Extremism 
  Predicted Roll Call Extremism  
 Racial Diversity in District   
  0 (min) 85.9  
  .007 (-1 sd) 85.6  
  .181 (mean) 78.6  
  .355 (+1 sd) 71.6  
  .730 (max) 56.4  
     
 First Term Legislator   
  First Term 88.4  
  Not First term 78.7  
     
 State Mass Partisan Polarization   
  .840 (min) 62.1  
  1.496 (-1 sd) 71.9  
  1.970 (mean) 78.6  
  2.441 (+1 sd) 86.0  
  3.000 (max) 94.4  
     
 Legislative Professionalism   
  .056 (min) 62.9  
  .081 (-1 sd) 63.9  
  .241 (mean) 78.6  
  .401 (+1 sd) 93.5  
  .659 (max) 100  
     
 Percent of District with a College Degree   
  (min) 70.9  
  (-1 sd) 74.4  
  (mean) 78.6  
  (+1 sd) 83.2  
  (max) 96.0  
     
 Percent of District Living in Poverty   
  (min) 67.2  
  (-1 sd) 70.2  
  (mean) 78.7  
  (+1 sd) 87.3  
  (max) 100  
    
Note: These predicted estimates are based on the Interval Regression coefficients 
presented in Table 5.3. Except for the experimental variables - all continuous variables 
are set at their means. For binary (non-experimental) variables, government is not 
divided and the legislator is from the lower house, not a party leader, not a first term 




 First term legislators are 9.4 percent more extreme than members who have been 
in the legislature for more than one term. It does not appear that rookie legislators 
moderate their roll call votes because of electoral uncertainty, but instead they bring with 
them a sort of idealism or clear idea of how they want to act on social issues. This could 
represent a sort of generational replacement where new socially extremist legislators are 
replacing a more moderate cohort that existed previously. Without data that extends over 
time, this can only be speculation.  
 As the legislative professionalism of a chamber increases, so does legislative 
extremism. A 22.3 percent increase occurs between a legislator one standard deviation 
below the mean and a legislator one standard deviation above the mean.  Moving from 
the lowest levels of legislative professionalism to the highest levels of legislative 
professionalism a 27.9 percent increase occurs. Clearly, when legislatures meet full-time, 
pay generous salaries, and have greater numbers of staff, legislators are more oriented 
more toward the ideological extremes; while amateurs seem much more interested in 
legislative moderation.  
 As mass party polarization in a state increases, legislators become much more 
extreme in their voting behavior on social roll call votes. An increase from -1 standard 
deviation to +1 standard deviation in mass partisan polarization, nets 15 percent more 
social issue extremism among legislators. Across the entire distribution, the increase in 
extremism is 32 percent. The evidence, as it adds up, is growing overwhelming. 
Legislators are responsive to the masses, but not their elite level supporters, on social 
issues. Just the opposite is true on economic issues. On contentious, salient, and perhaps 
more visceral issues, legislators pay close attention to the opinions of average citizens. 
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 The district controls for both percent with a college degree and percent living in 
poverty have substantive effects on social policy extremism. A one standard deviation 
increase in percent with a college degree accompanies a 4.6 percent extremism increase. 
A one standard deviation increase in percent living below the poverty line accompanies a 
7.3 percent extremism increase. These are essentially pseudo measures of diversity not 
captured in the racial and religious indices. These results reinforce the finding that district 
homogony leads to legislative extremism.   
Summary 
Most treatments of the relationship between populations and government activity 
analyze the direction of ideology (district liberalism leading to legislative liberalism or 
state opinion liberalism leading to policy liberalism). This analysis focused on explaining 
the strength of ideology, allowing me to study the effect of district diversity measures on 
legislative roll call activity. As expected, district diversity relates directly to both 
economic and social roll call output. The more homogeneous the district, the more 
extreme the legislator’s roll call votes. Studying the direction of ideology alone could not 
capture this dynamic. 
What does it mean for representation that district diversity contributes to the 
character of legislative roll call behavior? Responsiveness is easier for lawmakers that 
come from homogeneous districts, as the unarticulated demands of their district 
constituencies are easier to understand. For lawmakers from diverse districts, the job of 
representing is much more difficult. Their districts are dynamic political units that require 
a more nuanced representational approach. These legislators must put together an 
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coalition within their community that will secure them reelection. This results in less 
extreme roll call voting.  
This finding has practical political implications for those in charge of generating 
redistricting plans. If plans are chosen that enhance the levels of homogeneity, greater 
levels of legislative extremism follow. Many would view this as an unwelcome 
occurrence. However, this does not mean that representation would suffer. In fact, a 
demographically unified district is likely to elect a representative that has an extremely 
easy time reflecting the district in their legislative behavior. This presents an interesting 
scenario where the way we may want to see our government (thoughtful and moderate) 
does not line up with what we want from our individual lawmaker (someone who always 
agrees with “me”). Especially on social issues where citizens likely have a strict sense of 
what they view as right and wrong, it may be difficult for them to have both a moderate 
and thoughtful legislature and a legislator who espouses their views.  
 The evidence in this chapter produced null findings concerning the expected 
relationship between interest group money and roll call extremism. Increases in money 
from economic and social issue groups did not result in increased levels of economic or 
social extremism.  
Interestingly, the culture wars appear to by fought with more tenacity in 
professional legislatures. For these lawmakers, legislating is not a part-time hobby but is 
rather their chosen vocation. People who choose politics as a career are likely to have 
strong opinions on political issues of the day and this appears to be especially true 
concerning culture war issues. The polarized parties in these chambers only serve to 
reinforce that division.  
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Finally, the dynamics behind legislative responsiveness to mass and elite partisan 
polarization lens even more support to the overarching story of this dissertation. On 
economic issues, noted for their lack of public salience, legislators respond to their elite 
level supporters. Concerning social issues, however, legislators do not respond to their 
activist supporters and instead concern themselves with the opinions of the mass public. 
Social issues elicit constituent responsiveness. Economic issues induce elite level 
responsiveness.  
In Chapter 4, I investigated the distribution of roll call ideology and sought to 
explain why some legislators were liberal while others were conservative in their roll call 
voting. Noting the large number of legislators that possessed nearly pure ideological 
dimensions in their voting, especially on social issues, in this chapter I examined the 
dynamics that lead certain legislators to taking extreme ideological positions. The next 
logical step in this analysis is to examine how this extremism effects aggregate policy 
outcomes. Through an aggregated chamber level analysis, the following chapter analyzes 
the effect of all this extremism (at the chamber level it is called polarization) on policy 
output in state legislatures. 
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Chapter 6: Polarization in State Legislatures  
 
 Throughout the study, I have argued the importance of characteristics that 
influence the roll call voting behavior of individual legislators. It is at this level, I argue, 
that responsiveness is most crucial to normative notions of representation and democracy. 
It is also important, however, to remember that legislative roll call behavior has aggregate 
level implications. As the number of extremist legislators increases, the institutions in 
which they serve necessarily become more polarized. At the federal level, the ideological 
divisiveness of elected leaders is implicated in the generally sour public attitude towards 
government (Uslaner 1993; Jamieson and Falk 2000; Hibbings and Theiss-Morse 2003) 
and also in the reduced productivity of government (Binder 1999; Jones 2001).  
This chapter investigates the causes and consequences of legislative polarization 
at the state level. Why are some chambers more prone to polarization? What are the 
consequences of polarization in state legislatures? To answer these questions, I use data 
aggregated to the chamber level from the 30 states worth of individual legislator data in 
this study.40 Regarding the causes of polarization, I expect to find many of the 
phenomena that drive individual legislative extremism also to explain aggregate level 
polarization. What is especially interesting to see is the way different variables work at 
the aggregate level as opposed to the individual level. This presents a test of the 
ecological fallacy, that they way forces operate at the aggregate level may not be the 
same as they way they operate at the district level. I pay particular attention to the role of 
                                                 
40 Because only lower chamber scorecards were available in KS, NC, SC, and WY, the resulting number of 
cases is 56 rather than 60.  
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mass and elite polarization, along with various electoral and institutional characteristics 
that likely encourage or enable legislative polarization.  
Concerning the consequences of legislative polarization, I use the ideological gap 
between the parties to help explain legislative productivity (or what is, in the negative, 
termed gridlock or stalemate) while examining and controlling for other explanations of 
legislative productivity such as the presence of divided government, interest group 
density, and legislative professionalism. I have found throughout this study that extreme 
ideolgocial roll call voting does not usually impinge on responsiveness. In fact, it helps 
representatives be responsive because their districts are easier to understand and the 
legislators they elect likely reflect their homogeneity. The aggregation of extremism to 
the chamber level, however, results in legislative polarization. Does this produce negative 
consequences? Are polarized chambers less productive?  
Some Popular Accounts of Polarization 
Noting the polarization in state legislatures, the news media around the country 
have been quick to diagnose the negative causes and effects of polarization.41 I do not 
intend to present a laundry list of all news articles dealing with the polarization 
phenomena, but a few examples will give the reader a taste for the type of reporting 
commonly found in newspapers around the country.  
                                                 
41 As a matter of fact, a search for all stories (39) containing the words “polarization”/”polarized” and 
“legislature”/”statehouse” (all 4 combinations) produced no articles that treated polarization in a positive 
light (105 negative articles).  
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Concerning the cause of polarization, two explanations stand out in these popular 
accounts of the problem: redistricting and money. Take for example the following three 
quotes concerning the California and Oregon Legislatures. 
California is about to get more polarized…Newly drawn political boundaries 
helped consolidate districts for liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans, 
leaving fewer competitive seats.42 
The political atmosphere for all this problem-solving could be particularly 
troubling. The legislature is…even more polarized. Redistricting created safe 
districts for both parties, which produced many ideologically pure candidates on 
both sides.43 
For anyone counting on a less polarized legislature to resolve Oregon’s budget 
problems next year, a look at the money fueling this years campaigns offers little 
encouragement. Most of the money going to candidates and political parties is 
coming from powerful interest groups that lean dramatically toward one party or 
the other… Republicans, who control the Legislature, dominated in nearly every 
business sector…But Democrats have narrowed the money gap by leaning on the 
one constituency that lopsidedly and reliably favors them: organized labor…This 
reliance, in turn makes legislators more hesitant to do things that they believe will 
be unpopular with their supporters.44  
                                                 
42 Salladay, Robert, San Francisco Chronicle. October 27, 2002.  
43 Smith, Dan, Sacramento Bee, November 10, 2002.  
44 Suo, Steve and Dave Hogan, The Oregonian, October 28, 2002. Internal references to Bill Lunch at the 
University of Oregon.  
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A uniquely insightful story appeared in the Omaha World Herald concerning the 
relationship between mass polarization and legislative divisiveness:  
Mirroring the attitude of the polarized public, the Nebraska Legislature on 
Wednesday rejected a ban on fetal-tissue research for the second year in a row. 
The outcome did not surprise one legislative observer, who said issues that 
sharply divide constituents have the same effect on their elected representatives.45 
The consequences of polarization on policy outcomes are less frequently 
mentioned in newspapers, but they do sometimes raise interesting points, like the possible 
shutdown of government in Minnesota.  
Welfare time limits, children’s health insurance and family planning programs 
are emerging as major hurdles in the Legislature’s effort to avert a partial state 
government shutdown on Sunday.46 
Republicans are back. "No more gridlock," said a jubilant state Republican Party 
Chairman Bruce Benson after the GOP regained control of the Colorado State 
Senate. No one was happier than Gov. Bill Owens who campaigned hard and 
donated money to help with several key races. "You've got to have a Senate you 
can work with," Owens said after learning of the GOP victory. "The last two 
years have been very difficult. "This will allow us to move our agenda forward. 
Republicans worked hard for this."47 
                                                 
45 Tysver, Robynn , Omaha World Herald. April 12, 2001.  
46 Staff Writers, Star Tribune. June 27, 2001.  




This state cannot abide the gridlock of another 49-49 tie in the House. Heading 
into leaner times and the same old trans-portation woes, someone has to be in 
charge and held accountable. Deadlock is a gift to incumbents in both parties. 
They shrug their shoulders, decry the stalemate and whisper sweet nothings to 
voters about what they wanted to do.48 
These stories from individuals who report on the front lines of legislative politics 
offer some insights into the causes and effects of legislative polarization: redistricting, 
campaign money, mirroring a polarized public. What follows is a discussion and 
presentation of findings regarding the possible causes of polarization. The second section 
of this chapter deals with the consequences of polarization. 
Why Can’t We All Just Get Along? 
 I measure chamber polarization as the mean ideological difference between the 
parties in each legislative chamber. The ideology of each party, within each chamber, is 
the aggregate (mean) roll call liberalism obtained from the interest group scorecards 
previously discussed. In the primary statistical analyses (those presented in tables 
throughout this chapter), only economic roll call polarization is included. This is because 
the aggregate social roll call polarization leaves too few cases (23 chambers) for the 
statistical models to produce reliable estimates. To assess the effects of social roll call 
polarization, I will use simple correlations and present those findings in the text.49  
                                                 
48 Dickie, Lance. The Seattle Times. October 26, 2001 
 
49 Note that unless otherwise specified, when I discuss chamber polarization I am referring to economic 
policy polarization.  
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As presented in Chapter 3, some states, like California and Michigan, are wildly 
polarized; while others, like Kansas, Kentucky and Wyoming, exhibit no significant 
ideological differences between the parties. Economic polarization in the 55 chambers 
under analysis is distributed normally with an average ideological chasm of a robust 45.8 
percentage points. Thus, parties in state legislatures, like the contemporary Congress 
(Aldrich 1995; Coleman 1997; Rohde 1991; Sinclair 2000, and Stonecash et al. 2003) are 
engaged in a good deal of partisan struggle.  
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Figure 6.1:  
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What explains the gulf, or in some cases the hairline fracture, that separates the 
parties in state legislatures? I expect that a combination of opinion forces, electoral 
characteristics, and institutional variation will help explain the varying levels of observed 
polarization.  
Opinion Forces and Legislative Polarization 
Legislative polarization may simply be a reflection of mass opinion polarization. 
States with a polarized populace, where Democrats are very liberal and Republicans very 
conservative, may produce legislatures that reflect those divisions. When mass 
ideological differences between state partisans are relatively small, legislative parties will 
likely be programmatic and contest the middle ground; however, states with substantial 
mass ideological differences are more likely to have issue-oriented, polarized, parties 
(Paddock 1998, 774). The most straightforward conceptualization of mass polarization is 
simply the degree to which Democratic and Republican identifiers are ideologically 
distinct. I measure this using an updated formulation of the mass polarization index 
devised by Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) described in detail in Chapter 3.  
Elite opinion polarization may also help predict legislative divisiveness. One of 
the most consistent findings in the political party literature over the past 30 years is the 
sustained ideological polarization between national Democratic and Republican party 
activists (for example see Kirkpatrick 1976; Poole and Rosenthal 1984; Stone, Rapoport, 
and Abromowitz 1994; Jackson, Bigelow, and Green 2004). Although the national parties 
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have polarized, at the state level, a good deal of variation still exists (see Chapter 3).50 As 
such, the states are a useful venue for testing the degree to which elite level polarization 
spills over into legislative divisiveness.  
Electoral Characteristics and Legislative Polarization 
 Another elite level measure related to polarization is the amount of campaign 
money from interest groups circulating around the statehouse. In Chapter 4, I 
hypothesized that money from liberal groups would lead to more liberal roll call votes 
and conservative group money would lead to more conservative legislative voting 
behavior; and in Chapter 5, I hypothesized that campaign money would lead to greater 
levels of roll call extremism. As such, my expectation is that when interest group money 
increases so does legislative polarization. As discussed previously, interest groups do not 
typically represent the ideological middle (Danzau and Munger 1986) and in states where 
groups give significant amounts of money, the result may be increased levels of 
polarization. However, the relatively modest effects of interest group money in the 
previous two chapters raises some concerns about this expectation. Perhaps groups do not 
give because they want to increase the ideological nature of roll call votes, but rather they 
are seeking access to important members regardless of their past support or prospects for 
future support. Especially among business and labor groups this appears to be the case. 
                                                 
50 Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) also find the elite fundamentally divided (as measured by the 
opinions of legislators, party activists, and party identifiers), however they choose not to test the effects of 
elite opinion along side mass opinion. Instead, they argue that elite opinion is a reflection of mass opinion, 
which is itself a reflection of underlying state political culture.  
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Campaign receipts, in this chapter, are measured in dollar amounts per state resident (see 
Chapter 3 for more information on the source of this data).  
Party competition in legislative elections, or average electoral margin of victory, 
is likely related to chamber polarization. Since the 1940’s, scholars have suggested a link 
between party competition and state policy and organizational differences (Key 1949; 
Fenton 1966; Sharkansky and Hofferbert 1969; Dye 1984; Barrilleaux 1986). The 
direction of the link between electoral competitiveness and chamber polarization, 
however, is not entirely clear. As mentioned, popular accounts of legislative unrest are 
often traced back to redistricting plans that emphasize electoral safety over two-party 
competition. The argument goes that redistricting plans eliminate competitive seats and 
thus remove the most centrist members of both parties. Evidence to support this 
argument, however, has been hard to find at the Congressional level (but see Carson, 
Carson, Crespin, Finocchiaro, and Rohde 2003).51 An obvious problem with the 
redistricting explanation is that it cannot explain increases of polarization in the Senate 
and in House districts that do not significantly change their borders (Theriault 2005).  
Furthermore, it may be naive to reason that more divisive elections will lead to 
less partisan rancor in the chambers. Candidates running in close elections raise and 
spend more money (Herrnson 2004) and are more likely to engage in negative 
campaigning (Kahn and Kenney 2004; Damore 2002). These are not the ingredients of 
future conciliation and moderation. In other words, it seems perfectly plausible that 
electoral ugliness will spill over into governing divisiveness in the form of partisan 
polarization. Because the direction of the relationship is unclear, I test the hypotheses that 
                                                 
51 These authors find that more ideological members in Congress often follow redistricting.  
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average margin of victory relates to chamber polarization. Like Holbrook and VanDunk 
(1993), I measure electoral margin using the average percent of victory for all races in a 
given chamber (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation).52 
Institutional Characteristics and Legislative Polarization 
 The vast majority of scholarship analyzing the effects of institutional 
characteristics deals with their effects on legislative output. I will discuss this work in the 
second part of this chapter while analyzing the effects of chamber polarization on 
legislative productivity. In addition to legislative output, however, institutional 
characteristics may also help explain levels of chamber polarization. 
 Interest group density in the states may result in greater levels of polarization 
between the parties. Parties tend to form around broad views of public policy, which 
encapsulate or provide an umbrella for a variety of interest group organizations. Strong 
parties, like those in at the national level, have some control over which groups join their 
coalition. At the state level, however, weaker parties are often captured by their interest 
group elements, which then come to define the party (Thomas and Hrebenar 1990). 
Given the ability to define partisanship, it is likely that these groups will do so in a 
polarizing way as their policy goals are usually ideologically extreme. Given the ability 
of groups to influence the policy agenda, and with legislators as their agents, I expect that 
increasing interest group density will lead to more polarized legislatures.  
                                                 
52 Some measures of party competition (Ranney 1976; Bibby and Holbrook 1996) take into account the 
proportion and duration of party success in gubernatorial and state legislative elections. These measures are 
appropriate when studying policy output, but because chamber polarization is only a legislative 
characteristic, I chose to use a competitiveness measure that doesn’t extend beyond legislative elections.  
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 Another institutional characteristic thought to relate to the level of party 
polarization is legislative professionalism. Party leadership is stronger in professional, as 
opposed to amateur, legislatures (Patterson 1997). Leaders in professional chambers have 
the power to distribute campaign funds and provide members with desirable committee 
positions. Additionally, the party leadership in professional legislatures can control the 
legislative agenda – making it difficult for individual members to shirk their issue 
priorities. As such, professional legislatures tend to grow polarized. Some have referred 
to this phenomenon as “the sick legislature syndrome” (Mahtesian 1997) where the 
professionalization of legislatures, which was expected to usher in positive changes to the 
chambers, actually had unintended consequences including general bad behavior on the 
part of legislators and a significant level of polarization. Based on this, I expect to find 
professional chambers more polarized vis-à-vis more amateur legislative institutions.   
 The presence of divided government likely affects the level of polarization in 
legislative chambers, but the direction of this relationship is not always clear. When 
different parties control one of the chambers or the governorship, the degree of 
divisiveness between the parties may decrease as legislators attempt to work together to 
gain legislative accomplishments. This is simply because in order to get anything done 
legislators and the executive must be willing to deviate from their ideological polls and 
find common ground with the other party; however, the parties may decide to remain 
ideological, perhaps blocking out the governor of a different party, thereby setting up a 
future electoral battle. This seems to be true in Maryland where a Democratic dominated 
state legislature is intent on stalling or squashing most attempts by the Republican 
Governor to gain passage of his agenda. As such, the divided government hypothesis is 
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tested with the expectation that it affects levels of polarization, but without a clear 
direction specified.  
Similarly mixed logic applies to the relationship between chamber competition 
and legislative divisiveness. When one party dominates a chamber, it could be the 
minority party seeks to distinguish itself and act as a “responsible” minority party 
constantly biting at the heels of the majority. On the other hand, in an effort to achieve 
some policy goals met, the minority party may decide to moderate. More likely, close 
partisan division likely leads to greater levels of polarization. Charles Mahtesian (1997) 
describes this logic in a case study of the Minnesota House. “With party control up for 
grabs, [partisanship] hardened into a conviction on both sides that they were entitled to 
pursue their goals by any means necessary.” Both possibilities are tested here. Chamber 
competition is measured as the absolute value of the difference between percent of seats 
held by each party (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed presentation of chamber 
competition).  
 A number of control variables are included that also represent institutional 
characteristics. Although I pay less attention to the effect of these variables, I can posit 
some brief expectations. I expect polarization is greater in the lower chambers of state 
government, since, like the U.S. Senate, the upper houses of state government are 
typically smaller in number and more informal in their operation. In addition, they often 
elect members every four or six years, perhaps leading to less polarization. Percent of the 
legislature made up of minorities, which are overwhelmingly liberal and Democratic 
(Nelson 1991; Conyers and Wallace 1976), may result in more polarized legislatures. 
Like minority legislators, female members tend to be more Democratic and liberal than 
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their male colleagues (Leader 1977), but they also may bring a more civilized approach 
to legislating – perhaps making chambers less polarized.  
The Causes of Polarization 
Increased elite polarization in states causes a significant increase in legislative 
divisiveness. As expected, legislators exhibit similar tendencies to the elite level 
communities from which they are drawn. Legislators are not average citizens. Republican 
legislators tend to be male, White, and drawn from the business community; while 
Democratic legislators are typically more diverse both in terms of race and gender and 
often come from backgrounds in law. All legislators are relatively wealthy and well 
educated (Patterson 1997). An analysis of the demographics of party elites reveals an 
almost identical snapshot (Jackson, Green and Bigelow 2004). Party elites are similar to 
their parties’ legislators both demographically and ideologically and as such, this finding 
should be no surprise.  
This elite polarization finding is both statistically and substantively significant. A 
chamber with elite polarization one standard deviation below the mean has a predicted 
legislative polarization of 35.5 percent, whereas a chamber with elite polarization one 
standard deviation above the mean has a predicted legislative polarization of 49.1, for a 
difference of nearly 15 percent. Over the entire range of elite polarization, the difference 
in expected legislative polarization is 40 percent. These are large increases in chamber 

















Table 6.1:  
The Causes of Legislative Polarization 
  β (se) P >׀t ׀   
Opinion Forces    
 Elite Polarization 13.891 (4.718) .003  
 Mass Polarization -7.839 (6.583) .122  
Electoral Characteristics    
 
Average Percent of Contributions 
from Economic. Group 2.832 (7.725) .359  
 Average Margin of Victory -.314 (.127) .010  
Chamber/State Characteristics    
 Interest Group Density .013 (.008) .063  
 Legislative Professionalism 22.294 (19.696) .134  
 Divided Government 10.423 (4.915) .021  
 Chamber Competition -.017 (.212) .468  
Controls    
 Lower House -1..366 (3.550) .352  
 Percent Minority  .654 (.473) .089  
 Percent Female -.101 (.515) .423  
 South -22.604 (8.819) .008  
 Northeast -.609 (6.556) .464  
 West 2.540 (8.555) .385  
 Constant 17.402 (15.970) 142.5  
     
 Adjusted R Squared .632   
 N 56   
Note: OLS Regression Coefficients with robust standard errors adjusted for 




Table 6.2:  
Predicted Legislative Polarization 
    
 Elite Polarization in the State   
  1.18 (min) 17.5  
  2.47 (-1 sd) 35.5  
  2.96 (mean) 42.3  
  3.45 (+1 sd) 49.1  
  4.06 (max) 57.5  
     
 Interest Group Density   
  221 (min) 37.0  
  304 (-1 sd) 38.1  
  616 (mean) 42.3  
  928 (+1 sd) 46.4  
  1348 (max) 51.9  
     
 Average Winning Margin in the Legislature   
  9.8 (min) 53.7  
  31.6 (-1 sd) 46.9  
  46.4 (mean) 42.3  
  61.2 (+1 sd) 37.6  
  78.4 (max) 32.2  
     
 Status of Government   
  Unitary 42.3  
  Divided 52.7  
    
Note: These predicted estimates are based on the OLS Regression coefficients 
presented in Table 6.1. Except for the experimental variables - all continuous variables 
are set at their means. For binary (non-experimental) variables, government is not 




Interestingly, states with more polarized mass partisans have less overall 
legislative divisiveness. This finding falls just short of the p<.1 level of significance, but 
its direction and closeness to statistical significance is at odds with expectations.53 As 
discussed previously, the measure of legislative polarization used in this study captures 
economic issues polarization. In Chapter 4, I found overwhelming evidence that 
legislators respond to their constituents on social issues, but only weak statistical 
indications they are responsive on economic issues. While this does not explain the 
negative relationship found here, it does offer a clue. Running a simple correlation 
between mass opinion polarization and both social and economic legislative polarization 
reveals this to be true. The correlation of mass opinion polarization with social legislative 
divisiveness is a strong .404, while the correlation with economic polarization is -.100. 
Complimenting the evidence in Chapter 4, this result suggests that not only legislators, 
but actually legislatures are more responsive to mass opinion on social, as opposed to 
economic, issues.    
 Theoretically, the direction of two-party competition to legislative polarization 
was unclear. The results suggest that instead of decreasing legislative divisiveness, 
electoral competition actually increases polarization. As the margin of victory increases, 
legislative polarization decreases. This suggests that divisive campaigns may spill over 
into divisive legislating. When the average winning margin in a chamber is one standard 
deviation above the mean (less competitive), the predicted level of polarization in the 
                                                 
53 This finding is not necessarily a function of multi-colliniarity between elite and mass opinion (the 
correlation between the two is .300) 
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chamber is 37.6; however, one standard deviation below the mean (more competitive) 
results in a predicted polarization of 46.9.  
 As expected, interest group density in state capitols leads to greater levels of 
legislative polarization. This is the second elite level measure to reach statistical 
significance. Moving from a state one standard deviation below the mean to a state one 
standard deviation above the mean (in interest group density), results in a legislative 
polarization increase of 8 percent. Over the entire range, interest group density adds 15 
percent more polarization to a legislative chamber.  
Finally, divided government produces more polarization than unitary state 
government. Theoretically, it was unclear whether legislators would come together under 
divided government in the hopes of accomplishing legislative goals – what we might call 
the Clinton model – or instead act as opposition parties. The evidence supports the latter. 
I find divided government significantly more polarized than unitary government, 
regardless of other controls being included in or excluded from the model. A unitary state 
government has a predicted legislative polarization of 42 percent, whereas a divided state 
government has a predicted legislative polarization of 53 percent.  
“It’s not that we can’t do things…”54 
 Polarization has potential consequences for the operation of government and 
legislative outcomes. Polarized chambers produce unruly behavior such as name-calling 
and ad homonym attacks on the part of legislators (Jamieson and Falk 2000; Uslaner 
                                                 
54 “It’s not that we can’t do things…it’s that there are pressures stopping us.” Senator John Marty, the 1994 
Democratic gubernatorial nominee in Minnesota speaking about an unproductive legislative session – 
(quoted in Mahtesian 1997). 
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1993) and fuels the negative attitudes citizens have toward government (King 1997; 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2003). But what about the effect polarization has on 
legislative productivity? 
 To measure legislative productivity, I use two related measures. The average 
number of bills introduced (per member) in each state and the ratio of bills introduced to 
those enacted (minus 100 – to give a measure of stalemate as opposed to productivity). 
These are essentially the same measures used by Gray and Lowery (2000) in their study 
of interest group density on legislative productivity and come from The Book of the States 
2001, which provides an account of all bills and resolutions passed each session. I do not 
include resolutions in this measure, as they are often honorific as opposed to substantive. 
Nor do I consider bills passed during special sessions, and for states with biannual 
legislatures not meeting in 2000, I use figures from 1999. This measure is much cruder 
than those commonly used at the congressional level, which analyze “significant,” 
“landmark,” or “salient” legislation (Mayhew 1991; Cameron, Howell, Adler, and 
Riemann 1997; Binder 1999), but they represent the best measure readily available at the 
state legislative level.  
Congressional scholarship shows that polarization produces greater levels of 
gridlock (Binder 1999; Jones 2001). The drawback of congressional studies is that to 
observe changes in polarization one must look back over several decades and control for 
a host of temporal circumstances in order to observe changes in polarization. Studies at 
the state level can compare differing levels of polarization in a cross-sectional analysis; 
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yet, no state level study (that I can find) has included legislative polarization in an 
empirical analysis of legislative gridlock.55 
 For the same reasons as in Congress, I tie state legislative polarization, 
theoretically, to gridlock. I hypothesize that when parties polarize, the likelihood of 
passing their legislation likely decreases. Through the separation of powers and 
bicameralism, extraordinary levels of consensus are needed to pass legislation (Krehbiel 
1998). Most states do not have a filibuster provision in either legislative chamber. 
Nonetheless, veto threats from governors (which in most states require super-majority 
overrides) and relatively weak party control (which instills a degree of roll call 
uncertainty) makes polarization a detriment to the passage of legislation. Furthermore, 
greater polarization increases the incentive for legislators to engage in strategic 
disagreement (or the “blame game”), which leads to bargaining failure and gridlock 
(Gilmour 1995, Groseclose and McCarty 2000).56  
No other cause of legislative gridlock in Congress has received more attention 
than divided government (Sundquist 1988; Cutler 1988; Mayhew 1991; Fiorina 1996; 
Kelly 1993; Cameron, Howell, Adler, and Riemann 1997; Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 
1997; Binder 1999). The divided government hypothesis typically holds that legislation is 
less likely to pass when the President’s (or in my case Governor’s) party does not control 
both houses of the legislature. The logic simple: the separation of powers requires a great 
deal of agreement between the executive, and both chambers of the legislature. Unified 
                                                 
55 An exception to this is Uslaner (2006), but he is looking at polarization effects on quality of government 
not legislative productivity.  
56 Unfortunately, this can only be inferred as going hand and hand with polarization as no direct measures 
of such activity exist at the state legislative level.  
 
 203
party control is thought to provide the necessary condition for significant policy 
accomplishments, and its absence to preclude any chance of productivity. 
While intuitively pleasing, empirical support for the divided government 
hypothesis is mixed. Mayhew’s (1991) analysis of “significant laws” found no evidence 
that divided government hindered their enactment. Cameron, Howell, Adler, and 
Riemann (1997) found that divided government hinders enactment of “landmark 
legislation” and increases enactment of less significant policy. Binder (1999) finds that 
divided government decreases the amount of “salient legislation” passed into law, even 
though the effect is not dramatic.  
A problem with the standard operationalization of divided government is the 
concept is usually treated dichotomously (divided, or not divided) (but see Binder 1999). 
This assumes that unified Democratic and unified Republican government operates the 
same way. Republicans, however, may not be as opposed to stalemate as Democrats since 
it prevents government action – a conservative ideal. As such, I treat divided government 
as a three part dummy variable with unified Democratic and unified Republican 
government in the models and divided government left out as the base. I expect that 
divided government will produce more productivity, but leave open the possibility that 
unified Republican government may be purposefully less productive.    
 I expect chamber competition to drive up the likelihood of stalemate. When 
parties are closely divided (numerically, not necessarily ideologically), the number of 




 In a similar analysis to this one, Gray and Lowery (2000) find that number of 
interest groups registered in a state increases the occurrence of stalemate. Their finding 
supports the view that groups block-up the system (sometimes called hyperpluralism), 
producing an inability on the part of government to act. This finding is supportive of the 
neopluralist school of thought (Walker 1983; Heclo 1978), which emphasizes the 
extensive conflict that exists among interest organizations. Conflict raises the costs 
associated with logrolling and coalition building (Heinz et al. 1993) leading eventually to 
legislative gridlock. In short, increases in interest group activity “cancel out” groups 
influence (Truman 1951) and causes gridlock.     
 Legislative professionalism should increase legislative productivity. Professional 
legislatures meet all year round, offer incentives encouraging legislating is the primary 
vocation of the members, and provide for professional staff assistants, all designed to 
make government work. In addition to being a theoretically relevant concept, 
professionalism is an important control variable; it captures the length of session, which 
is a logical control in any model that deals with the number of bills introduced and 
passed.57 
 Controls are included for the chamber of the legislature, the power of the 
governor, the solvency of the state budget, and region. Since governors are players in the 
policy-process (in some state more than others), it is expected that increased 
gubernatorial powers will decrease the likelihood of stalemate (controlling for divided 
government). States with budgetary problems may make it impossible for members to 
                                                 
57 I included a measure for the length of session, but it was so correlated with professionalism (actually a 
sample of it) that I removed it from the final analysis.  
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introduce and/or pass legislation. These variables fall outside of the main focus of this 
project and are included as control variables but not discussed at length.  
The Consequences of Polarization 
 Legislative polarization increases the level of stalemate in state legislatures (see 
Table 6.3). Controlling for everything else in the model, a one-unit increase in legislative 
polarization nets a .144 percentage increase in the proportion of bills not enacted. A 
chamber with one standard deviation less polarization (than the mean) produces a 79 
percent bill failure rate (holding everything else constant – see footnote in the table); 
whereas a legislature with one standard deviation more polarization has an 85 percent 
failure rate (see Table 6.3). Across the entire range of chamber polarization, the increase 
is 12 percent. This increase, while modest, represents the most substantively significant 
increase of any of the main explanatory variables (see Table 6.5). Legislative 
polarization, however, does not significantly decrease the number of bills introduced per 






Table 6.3:  
Legislative Productivity and the Consequences of Legislative Polarization 




  β (se) P >׀t ׀  β (se) P >׀t ׀   
 Legislative Polarization -.220 (294) .227 .144 (.098) .069  
 Republican Unified Government -28.529 (9.137) .001 6.359 (3.031) .018  
 Democratic Unified Government -17.758 (14.607) .112 -1.001 (4.845) .418  
 Chamber Competition -.961 (.476) .022 .065 (.158) .341  
 Interest Group Density .028 (.020) .088 .003 (.007) .320  
 Legislative Professionalism 82.906 (37.455) .014 -15.095 (12.424) .112  
Controls      
 Lower House -29.833 (6.560) .001 -.166 (2.176) .470  
 Governor Power Index 14.950 (10.652) .080 6.305 (3.533) .037  
 Budgetary Solvency -.001 (.002) .475 -.001 (.001) .173  
 South 19.650 (16.653) .119 16.703 (5.524) .001  
 Northeast 38.259 (10.074) .001 5.198 (3.341) .060  
 West 19.559 (9.009) .015 12.812 (2.988) .001  
 Constant 5.046 (49.063) .459 52.214 (16.274) .001  
       
 R Squared .617  .392   
 N 55  55   




















Table 6.4:  
Predicted Bill Introduction 
    
 Status of Government   
  Republican Unitary 1.5  
  Democratic Unitary 12.2  
  Divided 30.0  
     
 Chamber Competition   
  8.6 (min) 47.3  
  30.7 (-1 sd) 26.1  
  39.8 (mean) 16.8  
  48.9 (+1 sd) 8.6  
  50 (max) 7.5  
     
 Interest Group Density   
  221 (min) 5.9  
  304 (-1 sd) 8.3  
  616 (mean) 16.9  
  928 (+1 sd) 25.6  
  1348 (max) 37.3  
    
 Legislative Professionalism   
  .056 (min) 1.7  
  .076 (-1 sd) 3.4  
  .238 (mean) 16.9  
  .400 (+1 sd) 30.2  
  .659 (max) 51.7  
    
Note: These predicted estimates are based on the OLS Regression coefficients 
presented in Table 6.3. Except for the experimental variables - all continuous variables 
are set at their means. For binary (non-experimental) variables, government is divided, 





Table 6.5:  
Predicted Stalemate 
    
 Legislative Polarization   
  1.0 (min) 75.3  
  28.2 (-1 sd) 79.2  
  46.8 (mean) 81.9  
  65.4 (+1 sd) 84.6  
  81.9 (max) 87.0  
    
 Status of Government   
  Republican Unitary 88.2  
  Democratic Unitary 80.1  
  Divided 81.9  
     
 Legislative Professionalism   
  .056 (min) 84.7  
  .076 (-1 sd) 84.4  
  .238 (mean) 81.9  
  .400 (+1 sd) 79.5  
  .659 (max) 75.6  
    
Note: These predicted estimates are based on the OLS Regression coefficients 
presented in Table 6.3. Except for the experimental variables - all continuous variables 
are set at their means. For binary (non-experimental) variables, government is divided, 




What about the effect of social policy polarization? While economic polarization 
correlates with stalemate at .25, social policy polarization only correlates at a .03 level. 
Again, this test does not control for any of the other variables but it is highly unlikely that 
a correlation of .03, when specified correctly, would suddenly jump to levels even 
approaching statistical significance. 
The status of government (divided, Democratic unified, Republican unified) 
relates to both the number of introductions and the legislative success rate. Unified 
governments introduce a uniformly smaller proportion of legislation. Especially under 
Republican government, less legislation is considered, which is expected due to the 
conservative tendency of Republicans. Democratic government, however, is also less 
likely than divided government to see a great number of bills introduced.  
Holding everything else constant, the predicted number of bills introduced under 
Republican unified government is 28 percent less than under divided government; it is 18 
percent less for unified Democratic government (see Table 6.2). A degree of certainty 
exists when one party controls the levers of power in state government as the fate of 
legislation is predetermined based on party politics. Divided government raises the level 
of uncertainty, thus increasing bill introductions. Furthermore, under divided government 
the parties have more of an incentive to distinguish themselves from one another. One 
way they distinguish themselves, in the hopes of garnering electoral support, is to 
introduce legislation that is either popular or will distinguish them among some subset of 
the population.  
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 The status of governments’ relation to stalemate is even more interesting. 
Stalemate is most common under unified Republican government, significantly less 
common under divided government, and least common under unified Democratic 
government. This effect reveals the importance of not thinking about divided government 
as a dichotomous variable, but rather a three part dummy variable. Republicans do not 
want government to do much, as revealed in the substantial level of stalemate that exists 
under unified Republican government. Divided government is the next most 
unproductive form of government, likely for all the reasons stated in the classic 
hypothesis regarding its effect on gridlock. Finally, some evidence exists that unified 
Democratic government prevents stalemate, although this particular component is not 
significant.58  
 States with denser interest group communities introduce a greater number of bills. 
These results are extremely significant (see Table 6.4). Moving from least dense to 
densest state, there is a corresponding increase of 32 bills introduced per member. Unlike 
Gray and Lowery (2000), I find no evidence of interest groups decreasing the proportion 
of bills passed.59  
 Finally, legislative professionalism is found to both increase the number of bills 
introduced in a chamber and increase the likelihood of passage. The increase in the 
number of bills introduced per member is quite dramatic (see Table 6.4), but it is 
important to remember that professionalism is controlling for the length of the session, so 
                                                 
58 When specified differently (without chamber competition) the model also produces significant findings 
for unified Democratic government.  
59 Their finding does hold up when I exclude the South from my analysis.  
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an increase is expected. However, the fact that professionalism decreases the level of 
stalemate is a substantively interesting finding. As professionalism increases, the level of 
stalemate drops (by more than 10 percent over the entire range, and 5 percent between 
standard deviations). Thus professionalism, while implicated in increasing polarization 
(the results just missed significance) also acts to combat the negative effect of 
polarization on legislative productivity.  
Summary 
As citizens love their representatives but hate Congress (Parker and Davidson 
1979), citizens seem to love their extremist legislator but not polarized politics in their 
state capitol. In sum, the indicators found to exacerbate legislative polarization are elite 
opinion polarization, electoral competition, interest group density and divided 
government. Two of these indicators (elite polarization and interest group density) are 
elite level phenomenon; chamber marginality is an electoral characteristic, and divided 
government is an organizational characteristic of state government related to electoral 
divisions within the state.  
Regarding economic polarization, elite (and not mass) polarization drives 
legislative divisiveness. Although social policy polarization could not be tested in as 
rigorous a fashion, the correlation between it and mass opinion divisiveness was much 
stronger than for economic polarization. This result complements the findings in Chapters 
4 and 5, which show economic policy a consistent function of elite level factors, and 
social policy related closely to mass opinion.   
Regarding the effect of electoral competition on the level of polarization – 
reformers beware. I find that redistricting plans that heighten competition will have the 
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unintended consequence of increasing partisan polarization. The idea that chambers with 
members worried about their reelection will produce an ideological coming together of 
the parties is simply not born out in this analysis. Competition does not necessarily 
produce moderation.  
Polarization in legislative chambers increases the likelihood of stalemate. This 
finding lends real world importance to this project. Understanding what leads legislators 
to extremes is not only interesting, but has implications for the policy process. The result 
is not just legislative ugliness or a dissatisfied public; it actually hinders the productivity 
of government. In addition, this finding represents an important contribution to the 
literature for which the divided government hypothesis has received the lion’s share of 
attention.  
 Regarding divided government, it proved useful to conceive of the status of 
government not in a bivariate way, but instead as a three part construct. Republicans and 
Democratic controlled governments do not view policy productivity the same way. I find 
that Republican government produces the most stalemate, divided government comes in 
second, and Democratic government produces the lowest level of stalemate. Democrats 
want to use government of accomplish things, Republicans largely do not, and when 
government is divided the two sides struggle over the ability of government to produce.   
 Finally, legislative professionalism, shown in previous chapters to both facilitate 
district congruence and produce greater levels of extremism, is likewise found to increase 
polarization, but decrease levels of stalemate. This finding offers encouragement to those 
on both sides of the professionalism movement. Professional legislatures are contentious, 
nasty (Mahtesian 1997) and polarized, but they are also more productive.  
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Chapter 7: The Prospects for State Legislative Responsiveness 
at the Dawn of a New Century  
 
“Unless mass views have some place in the shaping of policy, all this talk about 
democracy is nonsense” (Key 1961). 
 
 From town councils to the U.S. Senate, and since colonial times, what we now 
call the United States has always included a compilation of representative democracies. 
Through free and fair elections, citizens choose their leaders whom they entrust with the 
formal task of deciding public policy. This design frees citizens from participation in the 
day-to-day activities of government by providing representatives to act in their stead. Our 
representative system is democracy on a manageable scale. The question we should never 
stop asking, however, is: How well are our representatives responding to the needs and 
desires of those they represent? If the lawmakers we send to town and city councils, the 
various state capitals, and Washington D.C., fail to act on our behalf the moment the 
chamber door closes, all this talk about democracy, as Key suggests, is nonsense.  
The purpose of this dissertation was to assess the degrees to which state 
legislators are responsive to their various constituencies. The guiding research questions 
are: 1) Under what circumstances are state legislators most responsive to their districts, 
parties, and interest group supporters? 2) What drives certain legislators to take extreme 
issue positions? and 3) What explains and what are the consequences of state legislative 
polarization? The results of my analysis show that responsiveness often occurs, but is 




Responsiveness requires legislators who are motivated to reflect constituency 
preferences. Three conditions that tap into legislative motivations are issue type, electoral 
competition, and institutional capacity or professionalism. I find each of these conditions 
influence legislative responsiveness.  
Issue Type and Representation 
Perhaps my most interesting finding is that legislators are responsive to their 
constituents on social but not economic issues. Districts elect legislators who cast roll call 
votes on social issues that reflect their constituencies’ ideological orientations. Under 
typical circumstances, the ideological orientation of the district does not matter nearly as 
much on economic issues.  
 More than at any point in recent times, social or cultural issues define our political 
consciousness. People have opinions on culture war issues like abortion and gay 
marriage, and these salient issues receive the lion’s share of media attention, tend to 
cluster together in ideologically coherent ways, and elicit strong emotional responses. 
Having coherent opinions across these issues provides constituents’ political strength. 
State legislators, either through a shared personal belief or in fear of electoral retribution, 
give the people what they want on social issues. Either way, legislators are responsive.  
Disturbing, however, is the lack of responsiveness to districts on economic issues. 
As districts become more liberal, the economic roll call votes of legislators do not. When 
districts are diverse economically (significant portions of a district working in various 
economic sectors), legislators do moderate their economic roll call votes to a certain 
extent. However, these issues, which float under the radar screen of public attention, are 
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not dealt with in nearly as responsive a fashion as social issues. Therefore, our 
government is not fully living up to its representational ideals – as understood through 
policy responsiveness.  
 I find representative democracy to be at its best when people have opinions on 
issues. Representatives tend to respond, legislatively, to expressed issue positions; 
however, an equally important part of responsiveness is the capacity among legislators to 
represent the unarticulated needs of their constituencies (Jewell 1983). If citizens are not 
particularly cognizant of a certain issue, group of issues, or in the case of economic issues 
an entire type of legislation, it is still the responsibility of their elected officials to 
respond to their needs. This task appears to be the point where state legislative 
responsiveness is failing and that breakdown carries with it important consequences. 
Economic issues include such things as the right to sue a Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs), utility deregulation, education tax credits, health coverage, and 
public retirement programs. These issues directly relate to the lives of almost every 
citizen. Gay marriage, abortion, and flag burning are of direct importance to much 
smaller subset of the population.   
 Who then are legislators responding to on economic issues? This research 
indicates that organized interests, especially business interests, who donate more money 
to incumbent legislators than other groups and have the largest lobbying presence in the 
states, are much more powerful at influencing economic roll call votes as opposed to 
district constituents. These groups often represent a narrow cross-section of America, and 
my findings show that the trade off between organized and unorganized constituencies, 
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on economic issues, is very near zero-sum. The gains of the organized are the losses of 
the unorganized.  
 In March of 2006, I witnessed this dynamic play out in the Maryland State Senate. 
The senators were debating final passage of a bill to impose strict regulations on coal-
fired power plants that do not decrease emissions. Before the final vote, several 
lawmakers rose to oppose its passage. One-by-one they defended the economic interests 
of the power companies and it became evident that lobbyists were calling in directly to 
the desks of senators while they sat in session. On multiple occasions, the President of the 
Senate stopped the proceedings because the phone calls were clear violations of Senate 
rules. In the end, the proposal stalled and final passage is still pending.  
Electoral Competitiveness and Representation 
 Constituency opinion, when interacted with a legislator’s party affiliation, is more 
influential on legislative voting behavior when members come from uncompetitive 
districts. This is because members who win election to safe seats, which usually have a 
one party orientation, are so ideologically similar to their districts (due to district 
homogeneity) that responsiveness can happen almost unconsciously. This stands in stark 
contrast to the prevailing wisdom that representatives respond to their constituents when 
fearing for their reelection. I find just the opposite: when legislators have a diverse, 
incoherent, constituency they will tend to continue being ideological, hoping their 
behavior will appeal to at least a majority of their district, but knowing they are not being 
responsive to the other half even though they may still fear for their reelection.  
Electoral competition also influences the relationship between legislators and 
their organized constituencies. Business and labor donations influence legislative roll call 
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voting on economic issues when legislators are from uncompetitive districts. This is 
because labor and business groups pursue an access-oriented strategy. They have the 
resources to target their donations using an investment strategy, strengthening their 
relationship with legislators who need not worry about their reelection. The relationship 
between ideological group money and social issue roll call voting, however, is just the 
opposite. The influence is strongest when legislators are from competitive districts.  
Social issue groups target their relatively limited contributions with an eye toward 
reshuffling the membership of state legislatures. They are not seeking access to the 
entrenched legislative membership; they want to change the makeup of the chambers to 
suit their issue priorities. The goals of groups drive their donation strategies, which are 
intimately related to the electoral competition member’s face, which in turn drives group 
influence. 
Professionalism and Representation 
The contextual effect of legislative professionalism is important to understanding 
responsiveness. I find legislative professionalism to enhance representation. District 
ideology, although not effective by itself in influencing economic roll call activity, does 
have a greater influence on legislators who work in professional legislatures. Capacity 
enables responsiveness, even on these low salience economic issues. This finding 
supports the view of many scholars who viewed the professionalization of state 
legislatures in the latter half of the 20th century as a healthy development for 
representative democracy. As such, this result challenges the critics of legislative 
professionalism who argue professionalism serves to insulate representative s from their 
constituents, leaving legislators less responsive to district interests. This is simply not 
 
 218
born out in my analysis. If legislative institutions are the engines of democracy, I find 
professional capacity to be the fuel. 
Responsiveness to interest groups, however, is also found to be greater in 
professional legislatures. In this instance, the relationship between district constituents 
and interest group supporters is not zero-sum in nature. It is important to note, however, 
that the increased responsiveness of legislators to interest group supporters in 
professional states, although statistically significant, is quite modest.  
Reformers and Responsiveness 
 Reforming political processes and institutions often results in the creation of 
unintended consequences. Sometimes these effects are relatively minor, but in other 
instances, the cure turns out to be worse than the disease. Several reforms directed at state 
legislatures (including redistricting proposals, campaign finance reforms, and term limits) 
have the potential to interfere with responsiveness. As such, my findings offer some clues 
to the potential effects that these reform proposals may have on state legislative 
responsiveness. Since policy responsiveness is central to representation, and 
representation is central to democratic design, the unintended consequences of these 
reforms could potentially strike a blow to democracy in the American states. 
 Foundational work in political science warned of the dangers associated with a 
lack of political competition (see Key 1949, 1956). The focus of much of this work 
related to the negative effects of one-party hegemony throughout most of the history of 
the American South. The concern is that democracy is not functioning properly when 
reelection rates are as low in the U.S. as they are in Cuba, China, and the old Soviet 
Union. Furthermore, persistently uncompetitive elections drive down participation rates 
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in politics because citizens do not view their vote as important. In the states, various laws 
and regulations govern the drawing of district lines – both for the state legislatures and 
the U.S. House. In most states, partisans in either the legislative or the executive branches 
of government make redistricting decisions. Some states are experimenting with non-
partisan or bi-partisan redistricting commissions that have a primary motive to increase 
political competition.60 My findings, however, suggest they should carefully consider the 
effects that their designs will have on legislative responsiveness.  
When districts are more heterogeneous, political competition likely increases, but 
responsiveness to constituents can suffer. I do not find district opinion to significantly 
influence legislative roll call voting in competitive districts the way it does in 
uncompetitive districts. A demographically unified district is likely to elect a 
representative that has an extremely easy time reflecting the vast majority of their district 
in a way that does not happen in diverse districts. Perhaps the inherent benefits of 
competition, especially increased political participation, are worth the cost of less 
responsiveness, but it is important that reformers are aware of this unintended 
consequence. Reformers who want to see more electoral competition are, without a 
doubt, attempting to improve democracy by giving voters meaningful choices; but they 
should note that increasing participation through redistricting may harm democracy by 
creating less responsive legislators.  
                                                 
60 These states include, AK, AZ, CO, HI, ID, IA, MO, MT, NJ, PA, and WA. For a detailed examination of 




Several states have experimented with clean money initiatives intended to purge 
the influence (or perceived influence) of money from legislatures, and increase 
competition among candidates.61 While most states are still not willing to publicly 
subsidize campaigns, all states place restrictions of some sort on campaign contributions 
from interest groups. How would removing money from politics effect responsiveness? 
My evidence suggests the greatest effect would be on economic issues, where interest 
groups currently have the most influence over legislative voting decisions.  Perhaps 
legislators would then turn to their constituents in determining their decisions on these 
issues, but, alas, we cannot be sure. Unless citizens develop firm opinions on economic 
issues, legislators may just turn to other elite actors (such as their parties) for cues on how 
to vote on these issues.  
The campaign finance reform literature shows, as does my research, the vast 
majority of interest group money is given to safe incumbents, committee chairs, and party 
leaders (Jewell and Cassie 1998). Significant donations at the state legislative level are 
used to augment groups’ inside lobbying game, not to influence elections. As such, strict 
campaign finance laws hold the potential to decrease the power of state lobbies. It is just 
hard to predict who would benefit most if groups were to lose their power.  
 My findings relate directly to efforts aimed at amateurizing state legislatures. The 
years analyzed in this study make direct tests of term limits impossible, but it is accepted 
as fact that term limits are intended to amateurize state legislatures. The hope of these 
reformers is that legislative turnover will give voters fresh choices and enable the 
legislature to look and act more like the citizenry. The implication is that an “average 
                                                 
61 In 2000, these states included HI, ME, MA, MN, and WI 
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citizen” would be particularly capable of representing the wishes of citizens, as opposed 
to insulated professionals; I find exactly the opposite. The more professional the 
legislature, the more responsive legislators are to constituency opinion. Representation is 
an involved process requiring great legislative capacity including skilled lawmakers who 
work full time and assisted by a capable staff with many office resources.  
 More than any other reform, term limits seem completely misdirected. 
Concerning redistricting, there would likely be tradeoffs; one problem solved but another 
created. With regard to term limits, my data indicates that their enactment will actually 
produce the opposite of their intended consequence. District responsiveness will suffer; 
the unintended consequence may be that it will suffer even more than I expect. If the 
institutional memories of legislatures are turned over to interest groups, the power of the 
organized, or perhaps the executive, may overwhelm the chambers. Greater 
professionalism, however, does have one significant drawback. Professional legislatures 
are more polarized, which leads to a more contentious and nasty brand of politics 
(Mahtesian 1997).  
Living and Legislating in an Age of Polarization 
 On the most important issues of the day, state politics circa 2000 are quite 
polarized. On social issues particularly, but also on economic issues, legislators tend to be 
ideologically extreme. When legislators assemble with their party caucuses and take to 
the floor of their chambers the result is a significant amount of cross-aisle partisan 
polarization in many statehouse chambers. At the individual district level, legislators are 
often congruent to their district opinion, which citizens no doubt appreciate, however 
polarization produces its own set of unpopular affects. I show that polarization results in 
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increased levels of stalemate and also suspect that polarization leads to lower levels of 
goodwill or comity in state legislatures. We may love our extremist legislators, but not 
the effects of polarized state politics – the natural aggregation of extremism.  
 Looking beyond the nastiness of polarization, however, the picture is not too 
grim. State legislatures are, at least conditionally, responsive. Given that the vast majority 
of citizens could not pick their state representative out of a police lineup, it is in a sense 
reassuring to know that on issues that people care about representatives do respond. To 
improve responsiveness the candle should be burned at both ends. State lawmaking 
institutions need to give lawmakers a capacity to represent their districts. On the other 
end, citizens need to develop more coherent opinions on issues. Despite the several 
pitfalls discussed, state legislatures can and are responsive political institutions. The 
impacts of their policy decisions affect our most basic needs. As I mentioned at the 
outset, these are the laws that we are born, live and die under. It is vitally important that 
we not consider democracy achieved upon leaving the voting booth. We must be vigilant 
in assuring that our government, at all levels, is responding to our expressed wishes and 
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